Props, Pistons, Old Jets And the Good Ole Days of Flying

THE AMAZING DITCHING OF PAN AM FLIGHT 6..BOEING 377 STRATOCRUISER N90943 1956

2011-08-29T17:12:00.000-07:00

PAN AM B-377

On January 15, 2009 U.S.Air Flight 1549 a regulary scheduled flight from Laguardia Airport in New York to to Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina. was successfully ditched in the Hudson River adjacent to midtown Manhattan six minutes after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport after being disabled by striking a flock of Canada Geese during its initial climb out. The incident became known as the "Miracle on the Hudson.

I totally agree that Flight 1547 and Captain Sullenberger's successful ditching was indeed one of the most interesting and successful ditching of an airliner. But for me, the most amazing and intricate ditching occurred 55 years ago on October 16, 1956. With the ditching in the Pacific Ocean of Pan Am Clipper Flight 6, a Boeing 377 Stratocruiser owned and operated by Pan American World Airways and piloted by one of my aviation heroes Captain Richard N. Ogg. Described by Life Magazine writer Herbert Brean as A tall, reticent thoughtful man.

Concerning Captain Ogg, this article was written by Scott Herhold of the Mercury News
The miracle on the Hudson had a local precedent

Richard N. Ogg, a Pan-Am pilot who lived in Saratoga, brought a... (Mercury News archives)
The pilot remembered a "very heavy" impact when the plane hit the water after losing two engines. He praised the passengers for staying calm as they filed out into the three life rafts. When he was acclaimed for rescuing everyone aboard, he was fixedly modest: "To me, it was just a matter of doing my job,'' he said

Chesley B. "Sully'' Sullenberger, the man who landed US Airways Flight 1549 on the Hudson River? No: The hero 52 years ago was Richard N. Ogg, a veteran pilot from Saratoga who landed a Pan American Stratocruiser on the Pacific Ocean, saving all 31 aboard. The miracle on the Hudson had a precedent.
Forever after, his superb ditching defined Ogg's career: He regularly spoke before aviation groups about safety procedures. Once, when he had a faraway look on his face, his wife, Margaret, asked him what he was thinking. Ogg answered that he was pondering the fate of a group of canaries that drowned in the hold when the plane went down.

Peril over the Pacific Ogg, then 42, had been a pilot for two decades when he took off from Honolulu at 9:30 p.m. on Sunday, Oct. 14, 1956, bound for San Francisco with 24 passengers and six other crew members. The name of his craft was "Sovereign of the Skies," but that night, it had to depend on others to survive.

The pilot later told San Jose Kiwanis Club members that he had completed the first leg of his trip when his number one engine, on the far left-hand side, failed. Ogg tried to feather the propeller, or alter the pitch of the blades, but it continued to "windmill," putting a tremendous drag on the plane. With the number four engine also malfunctioning and his air speed reduced to 140 knots, Ogg knew he would probably have to ditch.

Luck was with him: Ten minutes before, he had passed a Coast Guard cutter, the Pontchartrain. Ogg turned the heavy Stratocruiser around and began five hours of circling the Pontchartrain, waiting for daylight and for his tanks to empty of fuel. He practiced ditching at least three times.

At 8:16 a.m. Pacific Standard Time —7:16 a.m. by the Pontchartrain's clock — Ogg brought the Stratocruiser down in 5-foot swells and an 8-knot wind. He knew the tail would probably crack up, and it did. "We hit with a good bump but we knew we would be all right," said the 6-foot-4 captain.

Miraculously, everyone on board was rescued within five minutes, although a few passengers fell into the water as they departed the plane. Only five people reported minor injuries.
A hero's welcome
When he came back to San Francisco and to his home on Winter Lane in Saratoga, Ogg was given a hero's welcome, just as Sullenberger was in Danville last weekend. There was one obvious difference: With fewer lawyers to bring lawsuits, Ogg spoke freely of the ditching. Sullenberger has avoided releasing details in public.

A loyal Pan-Am pilot, Ogg stayed with the faltering airline until he retired in 1971, not long before it went bankrupt. He continued to fly privately for almost two decades afterward, frequently taking his single-wing Mooney aircraft to his home state of Montana.
Before Ogg died of colon cancer in 1991, Margaret once asked him whether he had ever been afraid. "When I went in for open-heart surgery," Ogg responded. What about the ditching? she asked. "Oh, I was just so busy trying to remember everything I learned that I didn't have time," he said.

Below is my story of Clipper Flight 6 amd the amazing ditching.

Editors Note: All flight data and information was taken from the official CAB Accident Investigation Report Released on July 11, 1957.
Times are all Hawaii Standard Time. Actuall times may differ by 2 or 3 minutes.
I also took the personal info from a story written by Herbert Brean Froim Vol. 41 No. 18 October 29, 1956 issue.

In memory of Captain Richard N. Ogg and the flight crew of Clipper flight 6.

The ditching of Pan American Boeing 377, N90943 October 16, 1956.

Pan Am flight 6 was a regularly scheduled around-the-world flight eastbound from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. to San Francisco, California. with en route stops in Europe, Asia. and various Pacific Islands. All prior segments had been routine and the flight departed Honolulu on the last leg of the -trip on October 15.
The last leg of this around the world flight was from Honolulu to San Francisco was being flown by a veteran Pan Am crew led by:

Captain Richard N. Ogg, age 43, was employed by Pan American World Airways on February 20, 194L. He held a valid airman certificate with airline transport rating and rating for the subject aircraft. Captain Ogg had a total of 13,089:41 flying hours., of which 738:27 were in Boeing 377s. He had passed a CAA medical examination m September 21, 1956. He had completed an emergency equipment training course dry ditching - on June 4., 1956.

First Officer George L. Haaker, age 40, was employed by PAWA on March 1, 1946. He held a valid airman certificate with airline transport rating and rating for the subject aircraft. Mr. Haaker had a total of 7,576.00 flying hours, of which 3.674:06 were in Boeing 377's. His last physical examination was passed m September 4, 1956. He completed an emergency ditching training course on August 2, 1956.

Flight Engineer Frank Garcia, Jr., age 30, was employed by PAWA on August 16, 1954. He held a valid flight engineer certificate, mechanic certificate with A&E rating, and radio operator certificate. He qualified on toeing 377s on March 28, 1956, and had accumulated 1,728 flying hours in B-377's. He received his last CAA physical examination m June 29., 1956.

Navigator Richard L. Brown, age 31, was employed by PAWA on December 9, 1955. He held a valid airman certificate with commercial rating., and a temporary CAA navigation certificate issued August 24, 1056. Mr. Brown had a total of 1,283:16 flying hours, of which 446:00 were in Boeing 377's. His last physical examination was passed on February 28, 1956. He had completed the initial emergency equipment training course - dry drill - on January 13, 1956

B-377 FLIGHT DECK

The cabin crew consisted of:

The Stewardesses Purser Pat Reynolds, Katherine Araki, Mary Ellen Daniel

Purser Patricia Reynolds, age 30, was employed by PAWA on September 23, 1946. She had completed her latest B-377 emergency equipment recheck on February 10, 1956, and had completed the USCG wet drill in San Francisco on July 12, 1956.

Stewardess Mary Ellen Daniel, age 24, was employed by PATTA on June 23, 1954. She had completed the B-377 emergency equipment recheck an March 12, 1956, the USCG wet drill on September 18, 1956.

Stewardess Katherine S. Araki, age 23, was employed by PAWA on March 26, 1955. She had completed the B-377 emergency equipment recheck on May 7, 1956.

The aircraft for this leg of the trip was a Boeing 377, registered as N 90943, S/N 15959. Pan Am owned the aircraft. The aircraft was named “The Clipper Sovereign Of The Skies”. She had accumulated 19, 820:51 flying hours. It was equipped with four Pratt and Whitney R4360-B6 engines, and four Hamilton Standard Model 24260 propellers. The aircraft and engines were in full compliance with prescriped methods and time limitations.
Complete overhaul and maintenance records of N 90943 were kept at San Francisco headquarters of the Pacific-Alaska Division. A study of these records disclosed that the aircraft had been maintained in an airworthy condition according to CAA-approved maintenance procedures. and was properly certificated and equipped. No discrepancies were noted in any of the records of N 90943.

THE FLIGHT DECK FROM TAKEOFF IN HONOLULU TO DITCHING

Arriving at Pan Am flight dispatch Captain Ogg, First Officer Haaker and Navigator Brown were briefed on the current weather conditions at Honolulu and on the filed flight path. The weather they would experience on the filed flight route was not a factor for this accident.
The crew filed an IFR flight plan for an estimated flight time of 8 hours and 54 minutes. Captain Ogg had fleet service load fuel for a flight time of 12 hours and 18 minutes. The estimated gross weight at takeoff was 138, 903 pounds. The Max T.O weight for this particular aircraft was 144,000 pounds. The CG was located within the required range.
The agreed upon flight plan reads: Clipper Flight 6 is cleared to San Francisco via Green Airway 9 then track to Position 30* N 140* W at 13,000 ft., The climb to 21,000 Ft. on course to San Francisco. All three crew members agree with the Pan Am flight dispatcher and Captain Ogg signs the release form and flight plan
Out on the ramp at the aircraft Flight Engineer Garcia was performing his walk around inspection before entering the flight deck and getting ready for the prestart checklist after which the engineer gives the Ready To Start Engines Report.
At the same time Passenger services allowed the 24 passengers three of which were infants to board the aircraft 30 minutes prior to takeoff.
Running through their pre start checklist, to include around 32 different items that need to be pre set or checked.
The engine starting procedure for these massive and powerful R4360’s requires full attention of the flight crew. After all engines are started and checked the pre taxi check list is read.
As ground control gives flight 6 permission to taxi Captain Ogg adds power, with his right hand on the four throttles he advances them to allow the aircraft to roll away slowly. Grasping the nose wheel steering wheel on his left side near his knee he steers the aircraft t to the active runway.

20:24 HST... lining up on the centerline of the runway Captain Ogg advances the four throttles to about 2700 rpm and starts his takeoff roll. Around 100 to 105 IAS the aircraft will lift off. After rotating the aircraft the big B377 departs Honolulu and climbs safely away . As the aircraft climbs and a positive rate of climb is secured Captain Ogg, calls for “Gear Up” 1st officer Haaker moves the landing gear switch and confirms that the red lights go out as the gear locks up. As the gear retracts Captain Ogg applies the brakes to allow the wheel rotation to slow down and stop. to 13,000 feet with no problems experienced.
Cruising at 13,000 feet Clipper Flight 6 heads eastbound on a heading of 062 degrees true.

01:02 HST... Clipper 6 contacts Honolulu on HF and requests a VFR climb to flight level 21.0.

01:06 HST…Honolulu ATC approves VFR climb to 21.0

01:07 HST…Clipper 6 starts its climb to Fl 21.0

Note: The mid point of the flight would be around 1140 nautical miles from Honolulu. And was calculated to be reached at 01:31 HST,

01:19 HST…Clipper 6 levels off at FL 21.0.. The cruising speed was allowed to increase to 188 Knots.

01:19 HST…Stewardess Mary Ellen Daniel the on duty stewardess opens the flight deck door and asks the crew if they wanted coffee. Two of the crew did , but Captain Ogg wanted a Coca Cola.

01:20 HST…Suddenly stewardess Daniel hears the engine noise suddenly go to a loud stridency. The aircraft dips suddenly she staggers and has to grab hold to remain standing.

01:20 HST…First Officer Haaker who was flying the aircraft at this time requested Engineer Garcia to increase the power in order to increase the air speed. Haaker stated he noticed a vibration in the controls and an increase in the propeller noise.

01:21 HST… First Officer Haaker and Flight Engineer Garcia notice that the Tachometer for No. 1 engine is reading about 2,900 RPM. Haaker reaches overhead and activates the feather prop switch for No.1 engine. Reaching down on the engine control panel Haaker and lowered the flaps to 30 degrees.

01:21HST.. Engineer Garcia reaches overhead and immediately activates the No.1 fire switch gang bar, pulls back the No.1 throttle to the stop and cuts the mixture control lever for No.1 engine. Garcia also reduced the power on the other three engines in order to reduce the airspeed.

Note : During the procedure of feathering the prop and shutting down No.1 engine the engine actually exceeded the highest calibration on the engine No.1 tachometer.
From the onset of the engine prop going into over speed, Captain Ogg was out of his seat and working at the Navigators station with navigator Brown. He immediately regained his seat.

01:22 HST… After numerous attempts at feathering the No.1 engine were unsuccessful, Captain Ogg orders Engineer Garcia to cut off the oil supply to engine No.1 so that it will freeze the engine.

Flight Engineer B-377

01:24 HST… The flight crew notices a momentary decrease in the RPM , then a heavy thud, followed immediately by an increase in the prop RPM. The crew decided the engine had frozen and the propeller had uncoupled through a failure in the propeller drive mechanism, and was wind milling in the airstream.

01:25 HST… Captain Ogg calls Ocean Station November. And alerts the ship that they may possibly have to ditch the aircraft. The Coast Guard Cutter Pontchartrain determines with its radar that Clipper 6 is approximately 38 miles from the ship on a bearing of 256 degrees. The Pontchartrain also recommended a heading for ditching the to the crew
Captain Ogg also orders Engineer Garcia to increase power on engines 2, 3, and 4 to help check the rate of descent. At this time Engineer Garcia advised the Captain that No.4 engine was only developing partial power at full throttle. When Garcia advanced No. 4 engine to full throttle the readings were 2, 350 RPM: 80 BMEP, 23 inches manifold pressure; oil and fuel pressures were normal; fuel flow was 600 pounds per hour, oil temp, carb air temp and cylinder head temps were lower then normal; turbo supercharger operation appeared normal. There was a slight rise n manifold pressure and in cabin airflow when the No.4 turbo calibrating control was rotated to the full on position. When Garcia reduced RPM to 1,750, and closed the oil cooler and intercooler, and the cowl flaps to one half inch, The BMEP increased to 90 with 26inches of manifold pressure at the same fuel flow. Looking at his engine analyzer Garcia noted that all patterns were normal, oil temperature, and cylinder head temperature increased slightly, and the engine continued to operate.
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Pontchartrain From The Aircraft

01:25 HST… Captain Ogg, Clipper 6 notified “November” that a ditching was imminent . In return the Coast Guard Cutter Pontchartrain plotting the aircraft on its radar gave the crew a heading to the cutter.

01:26 HST… The Pontchartrain immediately alerted other ships and aircraft in the area. They reported to Captain Ogg…The sea weather was clear, the sea exceptionally calm, the winds seven miles per hour from 60 degrees.

Note: During the descent the crew found they could maintain altitude at an airspeed of 135 knots with rated power on engines No. 2 and 3 and partial power on No. 4

01:26 HST… Navigator Brown gets a heading to home on Ocean Station November and has the Captain alter their course slightly. Captain Ogg , alerts the passengers to the emergency and instructs the cabin crew to prepare for a water landing.

01:37 HST… Just prior to over heading November, Flight 6 called its dispatch office in Honolulu and advised them of the situation.

01:37 HST… Clipper 6 arrives overhead Ocean Station November. Prior to arriving overhead November Navigator Brown and Engineer Garcia determined that the remaining fuel was insufficient for the aircraft to to return to Honolulu or to continue on to San Francisco. The range was seriously empaired by the drag created by the wind milling prop and the required lower airspeed. With the remaining fuel on board Navigator Brown computed the maiximum range of the aircraft as 750 miles. The distance to Honolulu or San F4rancisco was well over 1000 miles.
By this time Clipper 6 has descended to 5,000 feet. With an airspeed of 135 knots the crew could maintain this altitude with the flaps up and rated power on engines 2 and 3. Although the aircraft was allowed to settle to 3,000 feet just prior to over heading the cutter.

Note: It was found that the wind milling propeller could be kept under control if the airspeed was kept below 140 knots. . This airspeed is about 20 knots less than that required for efficient two engine flight.

Note: The actual procedure for a Propeller over speeding required the pilot flying to Maintain Directional

Pilot Flying:
Retard the remaining throttles to reduce forward speed.
Pull the aircraft up to hasten the reduction of forward speed.
If the situation warrants have the Flight engineer Feather prop.

Flight Engineer

Close Throttle
Decrease RPM
Prop Feather
Mixture Lever for the over speeding Prop Idle Cut Off.
Ignition Switch off
Complete engine shutdown checklist.

Over the Cutter

01:40 HST… Captain Ogg set up a shuttle pattern over November using the heading of 240 degrees while making eight mile legs. 240 degrees was the heading he will use for the ditching. At this time the cutter laid out a string of electric water lights along the 240 degree heading and was standing by for the aircraft to make its approach for the ditching.

02:00 HST… Captain Ogg after evaluating the situation with his crew decided that ditching by day is in itself a dangerous situation and doing it at night is even more dangerous. At this point knowing he never had ditched an aircraft, makes the decision to delay the ditching until daylight which is 3 hours away. In the meantime Captain Ogg orbited November.

02:15 HST…While talking with the captain of the Pontchartrain Captain Ogg voice held no tone of an emergency. At one point the Captain of the cutter mentioned that the aircraft carrier Bennington was coming to the scene, “Maybe you could land on the carrier” he joked. “I don’t think I‘ll try that”, the chuckling Captain Ogg replied.

O2:45 HST… The No.4 engine backfired and the power immediately dropped off. Engineer Garcia makes an analyzer check and this time the engine shows many low resistance shorts and no combustion pattern on the “B” row of cylinders. Captain Ogg, decides to feather the prop. Garcia reaches over head and feathers the No.4 prop successfully.

02:47 HST…Engineer Garcia set the remain two operating engines, No. 2 and 3 at 2,550 RPM, 190 BMEP and 2,000 pounds per hour fuel flow. The aircraft has settled to 2,000 feet and is flying at 140 knots.

03:00 HST…As the aircraft burns off some fuel weight, Captain Ogg allows the aircraft to climb back to 5,000 feet. At this time the crew perform a few practice approaches to feel the controllability of the aircraft out at the lower airspeeds. Captain Ogg, continues to circle over the cutter to burn as much fuel as possible in order to make the aircraft as buoyant as possible during touchdown on the water.

IN THE CABIN

01:20 HST A sudden dip in the aircraft alerts the Purser Patricia Reynolds and stewardess Katherine Araki. It also awakens Mrs. Richard Gordon, who peered out of the berth she occupied with one of her daughters.

THE BERTHS

01:23 HST Pat Reynolds leaves the flight deck and returns to the cabin and tells the other cabin crewmembers that the number one engine was in trouble and the Captain was trying to “feather” it .
At this time other passengers sleeping in berths or blanket covered reclining seats began to awaken.

01:26 HST The PA announcement by Captain Ogg is heard by all the passengers. “Sorry to wake you up. “ He said regretfully, “but our no 1 engine is running wild and there might be the possibility of a ditching. Please put on your life jackets, strap on your safety belts and remove sharp objects from your pockets.”

Note : In the aircrafts cabin the passengers stated they did not feel any noticeable vibration or sense of losing altitude. There was just the high unnatural scream of the engine and the racing propeller.

01:27 HST Stewardess Pat Reynolds turned on all the cabin lights.

01:29 HST Checking her Pan Am crew manual for the procedure for ditching she read aloud to the passengers the rues for ditching: They were to bring their reclining seats to a bolt up right position. No smoking, takeoff their shoes and glasses, remove all sharp articles from pockets, pull their seat belts as tight as possible. The passengers did as they were told. According to the crew one woman ever tore the crucifix off her rosary. Stewardess Reynolds explained to the passengers when they gave the order to brace for ditching they were to bend over, resting their faces on in pillows laid in their laps and wrap their arms under their knees. She explained that they should stay in that position until they were sure the aircrafts motion had stopped, since the first shock might not be the last. Life jackets should not be inflated until they were out of the aircraft.

01:30 HST As stewardess Reynolds instructed the passengers all was quiet except for the roaring engine. She stated that no one cried out or betrayed alarm. Most of the passengers pulled out their life jackets and began putting them on without a word. A few asked for instructions.

01:33 HST It took just about three minutes to have all the passengers ready for the brace order.

01:37 HST… In the cabin the stewardesses pointed out the location of all the life rafts, and assigned several passengers to assist in the launching of the rafts. The passengers were then relocated to the safest seats, forward of the tail section, which captain Ogg had believed the tail may break off upon landing.

05:10 HST…In the cabin the stewardesses moved the passengers into seats near the wings; they repeated the ditching instructions once again. They made sure everyone had taken off their shoes and loose personal items were stowed away. The Captain reported regularly that there were plenty of ships coming t their rescue. Pat Reynolds walked down the aisle smiling and asking if anyone wanted a magazine. Mrs. Freida Dix of Jasonville, Ind. A grandmother of seven said, “Are you kidding” and everyone laughed a little. The stewardesses served coffee and orange juice, Katherine Aralki passed chick lets around.

05:15 HST… Captain Ogg announces “We will not be ditching the aircraft for at least an hour. If any passengers wish they could get up and stretch their legs and relax with a smoke if they wanted to”, he said.

THE FLIGHT DECK….DITCHING

Note: In the process of ditching the pilot will fly the aircraft with power on till the last second before flaring in order to settle into the smoothest spot he can see. The danger of ditching lies in the last few seconds of rapid deceleration as the plane touches down o n the water. The flight manual would state the Stratocruiser should attempt ditching with the nose being held about 5 degrees above the horizon.

When daylight broke over the ocean , the sun rose warm and brilliant over a level and blue green sea whose waves were only three or four feet high.

05:00 HST…A revised heading is given to the aircraft for the ditching. The heding will be to the north west at 315 degrees.

Laying Foam On Ocean

05:30 HST…On the Pontchartrain the crew removed the water lights and requested they be notified 10 minutes prior to the time the flight intended to touchdown. This would enable them to be in absolute readiness and allow sufficient time for them to lay a foam path to mark the revised ditching path of 315 degrees.

05:40 HST… As daylight arrives Captain Ogg contacts the cutter and notifies them of their intended ditching time.

05:50 HST…Captain announces to the cabin to take their seats and prepare for the ditching.

05:52HST… Captain Ogg, descends thee aircraft to 900 feet and makes a practice approach on the heading of 315 degrees.

05:55 HST…Captain Ogg, announces over the cabin PA system “Ladies and Gentlemen the water temperature is 74 degrees and the waves are only a matter of inches high. There is absolutely nothing to worry about-things couldn’t be better for us. I’ll soon give you a ten minute warning. Then one minute before touchdown I’ll tell you this is it, Do as the stewardesses tell you please.

06:05 HST… Engineer Garcia jetted carbon dioxide into the wings, a precaution in case of fire. The Pontchartrain spreads a path of fire extinguisher foam on the water, a runway like path some 2,500 yards long and 100 feet wide, this also gave Captain Ogg a point of reference and helped reduce the danger of fire after ditching.
Captain Ogg, announces “10 minutes to ditching time.”

06:13 HST…Captain Ogg, turns and makes his approach , he lines the aircraft up on the spread foam laying on the ocean surface that is perfectly visible from the cockpit. He orders full flaps and slows the aircraft to 90 knots with the gear retracted.

06:13 HST… Second Officer Dick Brown the Navigator, leaves his seat in the cockpit and enters the cabin rushing past the bent over passengers and takes his place near the main door, which he is assigned to open.
Captain Ogg announces over the PA system….”One minute” ..”This is it”.

06:15 HST…With Captain Ogg flying the aircraft, First officer Haaker and Engineer Garcia brace themselves as best they could, which was very little in the cockpit and watched the final seconds till touchdown.
First contact with the water was slight, followed almost immediately by a tremendous impact. The aircraft was partially driven under water but bobbed quickly to the surface and stopped with very little forward travel. As anticipated. the fuselage broke off aft of the main cabin door. Several unoccupied seats remained in this section. A number of seats forward of the fracture were torn loose and several passengers were hurled to the floor. Two children who were being held were thrown from their mothers arms. There were no fatalities or major injuries and no occupants were incapacitated by the crash; however. five people received minor injuries.
Stewardess Katherine Araki told herself, “ Its going to be all right.” Then there was a sudden great shook , followed by a second and worse shook. Passenger Mrs. Jacobe’s daughter Joan was twisted from her arms and so was Maureen Gordon from her mothers arms. There was a sound of thin metal being crushed and crumbling and a sound of water rushing in.

Much of the planes freight was in the lower compartments, in that instant two dogs and 3,300 canaries and a parakeet presumably died! Merchandise of varying types was all lost.

Clipper 6 Hits The Water

Spins off the left in mist

Comes to A Halt

06:18 HST… After the aircraft stopped, members of the crew and the passengers assigned to assist removed the Emergency exit doors. First Officer Haaker went to his emergency station at the port wing, where Stewardess Araki was already telling some men passengers how to take down the life rafts above the windows.

Engineer Frank Garcia took charge of the life raft on the starboard side. Second Officer Dick Brown had the main door open and stewardess Mary Ellen Daniel found herself behind him. It was where she was supposed to be but she did not recall going there.

Brown pushed the life raft out the door and inflated it. It partially blocked the doorway and Stewardess Pat Reynolds and Brown shoved until it dropped into the water. The passengers began dropping into the raft and when stewardess Daniel jumped in she looked up and saw the Pontchartrain speeding toward them like a colt. But the raft was hemmed in next to the fuselage by the left wing and the broken off tail that had drifted alongside.

First Officer Haaker, directing port side operations from the wing ordered the passengers in the raft to climb onto the wing and then get into the other raft, which had been launched between the two engine nacelles on the port side. The women went first while the men held the raft steady while they walked across the wing without slipping. There was no shouting, only low voiced instructions.

The Hero Captain Richard N. Ogg Last To Leave The Aircraft.
Captain Ogg, and Purser Reynolds were the last t leave the aircraft.

A Coast Guard boat came up alongside the raft almost immediately/ The Coast Guard men said very little. They looked like men in a hurry and they threw the raft a line. And pulled the raft away from the sinking aircraft which by now was nose down in the water with the end of the broken and shattered fuselage with a dangling and unused life raft hanging in the air. The rescue was clean and quick.

The Coast Guardsmen helped passengers out of the rafts and into the boats and brought them to the Pontchartrain ladder. As they climbed onto the deck of the Cutter sailors stood in line each one holding a blanket and wrapped the passengers and asking” Can I get you a cup of Coffee?”.

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NOTE : Two 20-man life rafts were launched through the emergency exists over the wing and one raft was launched through the main cabin door. All occupants then evacuated the aircraft successfully through these exits. The life raft that had been launched from the main cabin door was trapped against the wing and fuselage by the broken tail section, which had swung to the left. Sane of the occupants transferred over the wing to another raft, enabling the first raft to be freed. The raft launched between Nos. 1 and 2 engines did not inflate properly and filled with water while it was being pulled clear by a Coast Guard rescue launch. All of the occupants of this raft were, immediately transferred to the rescue boat without further mishap. The remaining passengers and crew, who evacuated the aircraft on the starboard side were then transferred from the raft to the cutter Pontchartrain.

06:35 HST…. The “Sovereign Of The Skies” sank .

Analysis

Since there was no opportunity to examine the aircraft engines and propellers. this analysis must be based on the most logical conclusions drawn by experience and knowledge from the evidence available.

The Board is of the opinion that two separate and unrelated mechanical malfunctions occurred during this flight and the relationship of each failure to the accident should be treated separately.

N 90943 was powered by four Pratt and Whitney R4360-B6 engines and equipped with Hamilton Standard. model 24260, propellers. The initial difficulty encountered resulted in the overspeed of No. 1 engine and inability to feather its propeller. Engine r. p. m. is normally maintained by engine oil
at boosted pressure which is directed by the propeller governor to either side of a piston in the propeller dome. Movement of this piston changes propeller blade angle to maintain the desired r. p. in. Feathering is normally accomplished by auxiliary pump oil taken from the engine oil supply tank and directed by the governor through passages used for r. p. m. control to the outboard side of the piston. Consequently. a portion of the governor and the increased pitch side of the dome piston are common to both feathering and constant speed operation. It is considered most likely that the inability to feather was caused by the sane malfunction which resulted in the original overspeed. If the auxiliary pump had failed there would have to have been a second near-simultaneous failure in the propeller system. This possibility is considered to be remote. Further more. depletion of the oil supply from the No. 1 tank. subsequent to the overspeed, with no external signs of leakage. is most logically attributed to operation of the auxiliary pump during attempts to feather following the stoppage of the engine by freezing.

The most likely causes of the overspeed and inability to feather are that oil was being misdirected at the governor pilot valve or that there was insufficient oil pressure at the do-me piston. Improper direction of the oil would involve governor malfunctions, caused either by a fault within the unit itself or by contaminated oil being supplied to the governor. Contaminated oil would indicate some failure with the engine which would most likely be of a progressive nature. No such failure was evident to the crew prior to the overspeed. Insufficient oil pressure at the dame piston is most generally due to excessive leakage. Leakage usually involves seals, passages. transfer tubes., or bearings in the propeller, propeller control, or the engine.

The Board believes that a sing] e failure occurred which affected the portion of the system common to the constant speed and feathering portion of the propeller control system. Oil was being delivered to the system by 'the feathering pump and then dumped into the engine. A more specific reason for the overspeed cannot be determined.

Subsequent to this accident PAWA Pacific-Alaska Division experienced two uncontrollable engine overspeeds and inability to feather propellers due to failure of the propeller oil transfer bearing. A redesigned propeller oil transfer bearing has been provided by the manufacturer and its use was made mandatory by CAA Airworthiness Directive issued March 25, 1957.

From the information available concerning the No. 4 engine, it would appear that the initial power loss resulted from a reduction of the air flow through the carburetor. Fuel to the engine is metered by the carburetor in pro-portion to the air-mass flow through the throttle body. Engine instrument readings reported by the crew indicate oil and fuel pressures were normal but that temperature indications and fuel flaw were low. Turbo supercharger responses indicated that that system was at least partially operating. These conditions could result from an obstruction caused by a deformation or partial breakup and displacemnent of the carburetor inlet air duct system. or a failure of the engine-driven impeller drive assembly. Although the first possibility cannot be completely discounted, the latter appears to be more probable.

It is significant to the analysis that PAWA records indicate three engine-driven impeller drive failures on like engines prior to this accident. The BMEP and manifold pressure readings. taken subsequent to one of these failures, were almost identical to those on No. 4 engine in this accident. Also, in the prior engine failure the crew reported light back-firing approximately one minute after the propeller drive failure and the propeller was feathered immediately. In the subject accident the engine continued to ran at reduced power for some time before backfiring commenced. Men, indications of many low-resistance shorts and the lack of combustion pattern on the B row of cylinders were observed on the engine analyzer. This evidence is not inconsistent with an impeller drive failure. With the failure of the impeller drive assembly, impeller rotation would stop thus reducing the airflow which in turn would reduce the fuel flow. Turbo supercharger air and normal engine breathing would provide a limited combustible air-fuel mixture to the cylinders; however, distribution of the mixture to the cylinders would be impaired. It is believed, therefore, that all of the indications reported by the crew of Flight 6 could result from the engine-driven impeller drive assembly failure.

Following these failures, the basic design of the Pratt and Whitney R-4360-B6 impeller drive was re-evaluated by the manufacturer and the CAA. No design deficiency was found to exist and it was concluded that this type of failure is not chronic with this model engine. As a result of this study the Board concluded that the design of the impeller drive is adequate and that no corrective measures are necessary.

With the propeller windmilling the range of the aircraft was unquestionably reduced to less than that required either to return to Honolulu or continue to San Francisco. Required fuel for the subject flight was computed an the basis of two-engine operation; therefore, only if the crew had been able to feather the No. 1 propeller and maintain the most efficient two-engine airspeed (165 knots) could it have reached land.

Data received from Hamilton Standard and Boeing, and derived from calculation and tests of the subject type propeller, indicate that the drag resulting from this propeller with the blades on the low pitch stops, 21.3 degrees, 145 knots. 2,000 feet m. s. l., would be:

a.
Uncoupled windmilling
520 lbs.
b.
Coupled windmilling
1,880
c.
Frozen
2,320

The additional power necessary to compensate for the additional drag in each of the above conditions is:

a.
520
lbs.
295
BHP (Brake Horsepower)
b.
1,880
1,060
c.
2,320
1,380

Since drag resulting from these conditions varies as the square of the velocity, it is evident that exceedingly higher drag forces would be encountered at speeds greater than 145 knots.

This drag information is extremely important because prior to the investigation of this accident it was not widely known. In fact. it is believed. many thought that the drag with the propeller windmilling and coupled was greater than that with the engine and propeller frozen., whereas the drag condition is greatest with the engine and propeller rotation stopped. It is noted, however that the above data apply only to the subject aircraft and propellers.

The Board believes that this report would be incomplete without a word of praise concerning the handling of this emergency by all the personnel involved. The Board highly commends the crew members for their ability in recognizing the malfunctions and taking correct emergency actions consistent with all known procedures. Their calm and efficient control of the situation averted what could have been a major air disaster.

In addition, the prompt response by the Coast Guard to the emergency and the immeasurable assistance rendered to the flight are deserving of particular Praise.

Findings

On the basis of all available evidence the Board finds that:

1.
The company, the aircraft, and the crew were properly certificated and the flight was properly dispatched.

2.
The aircraft was properly loaded with respect to gross weight and center of gravity limits.

3.
The flight was normal until the control of the No. 1 propeller was lost and the engine oversped.

4.
It was impossible to control the engine speed or to feather the propeller.

5.
The engine was frozen, however. the propeller became decoupled from the engine and continued to windmill.

6.
There was a partial power loss on engine No. 4; it subsequently failed completely and the propeller was feathered.

7.
Airspeed was restricted to 145 knots to prevent the windmilling Propeller from overspeeding.

8.
Range of the aircraft was so reduced that it was impossible to reach land.

9.
The passengers were thoroughly instructed in correct emergency procedures and the aircraft was ditched under control with no fatalities.

10.
Evacuation of the aircraft was well planned and orderly.

Probable Cause

The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was an initial mechanical failure which precluded feathering the No. 1 propeller and a subsequent mechanical failure which resulted in a complete loss of power from the No. 4 engine. the effects of which necessitated a ditching.

BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD.

/s/
JAMES R. DURFKE

/s/
CHAN GURNEY

/s/
HARMAR D. DENNY

/s/
G. JOSEPH MINETTI

The Aviation Art Of Chris Jones

2011-07-18T13:37:00.000-07:00

Shown below is some great aviation art done by my friend Chris Jones, from Manchester , United Kingdom.

P-2V-7 Neptune A Look Inside

2011-07-11T19:43:00.000-07:00

A look inside Mid Atlantic's P-2V Neptune

Flight Deck and Sonar Operators Stations

1928 Passenger, Express and Air Mail Routes in The United States.

2011-07-06T06:21:00.000-07:00

1926

1928 Map

The following is a fasinating look at the very begining of the airline systems and routes back in 1928:
The list is all the principal services carrying mail {M.), passengers
(P.), and express (£.), now in operation—or commencing
very shortly. For the year 1928.

In every case, mails are carried under contract from the U.S.
Government, while some of the operating companies carry
passengers and/or express freight in addition ; some carry
passengers or express only. Originally, it will be remembered,
mails were transported only between New York and San
Francisco by U.S. Post Office machines. Subsequently a
few " feeder " lines were added, under contract, and finally
the Transcontinental route itself was operated under contract
.
New York-Chicago (723 miles), via Cleveland and Toledo.
M.P.E. Operated by National Air Transport, Inc. (N.A.T.).
Equipment—20 Douglas (" Liberty 12 ") ; 8 Travel Air
(Wright J-5) ; 7 Curtiss "Pigeon" (" Liberty 12 " ) ;
1 Pitcairn " Mailwing " (Wright J-5) ; 1 Arial Mercury
("Liberty 12").

Toledo-Detroit (50 miles). Branch line by N.A.T.

Chicago-Dallas (995 miles), via Moline St. Joseph:
Kansas City : WTichita : Ponca City : Oklahoma City : Fort
Worth. M.P.E. National Air Transport, Inc. (N.A.T.")
.
Ponca City-Tulsa (72 miles). Branch line by N.A.T., and
also passenger service operated by Bluebird Airway.

Tulsa-Oklahoma City (100 miles) and Tulsa-Ponca City
(72 miles). P. Operated by Paul R. Bramiff, Inc. Equipment—
Stinson Detroiter Sm-IB (Wright J-5).

Chicago-San Francisco (1,949 miles), via Iowa City :
Des Moines: Omaha : North Platte: Cheyenne : Rock
Springs: Salt Lake : Elko : Reno ; Sacramento and Oakland.
M.P.E. Operated by Boeing Air Transport, Inc. Equipment—
8 Boeing 40-A (" Wasp ") • 14 Boeing 40-B (" Hornet')
1 Boeing 80 (" Wasp ").

Mailwing

New York-Boston (219 miles), via Hartford. M.P.E.
Operated by Colonial Air Transport, Inc. Equipment—
7 Fairchild monoplanes (Wright J-5) and 3 Pitcaim " Mailwings
" (Wright J-5).

New York-Atlanta (763 miles), via New Brunswick :
Philadelphia : Washington : Richmond : Greenboro : Spartanburg.
M. Operated by Pitcairn Aviation, Inc. Equipment—
15 Pitcairn " Orowings " (Ox-5) ; 8 Pitcairn " Mailwings
" (Wright J-5) ; 6 Pitcairn " Fleetwings " (Ox5 & K-6) ;
1 Fairchild Cabin (Wright J-5).

Atlanta-Miami (612 miles), via Macon, Jacksonville.
Extension of above. M.

New York-Washington (181 miles). P.E. Operated by
U.S. Air Transport Inc. Equipment—Rvan Brougham (Wright
J-5).

New York-Montreal (350 miles), via Albany. M.P.
Operated by Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc. Equiptnent—
4 Fairchild " all purpose " (" Wasp ") ; 2 Pitcairn " Mailwings
" (Wright J-5).

Albany-Cleveland (445 miles), via Schenectady : Utica :
Syracuse : Rochester : Buffalo. M.P.E. Operated bv
Colonial Western Airways, Inc. Equipment—4 Fairchild
Cabins (Wright J-5) ; 2 Pitcairn " Mailwings " (Wright J-5).

Cleveland-Pittsburgh (121 miles), via Youngstown.
M.P. Operated by Clifford Bell.

Ford Tri

Cleveland-Detroit (155 miles). M.P. Operated by
Ford Motor Co. (and Stout Air Services, Inc.). Equipment—
Ford-Stout tri-motor (Wright J-5)
.
Detroit-Chicago (252 miles). M. Ford Motor Co.

Detroit-Buffalo (218 miles). E. Ford Motor Co.

Cleveland-Louisville (350 miles), via Akron : Columbus :
Dayton : Cincinnati. M.P. Operated by Continental Air
Lines, Inc. Equipment—4 Travel Air (Wright J-5)
.
Cleveland-Chicago (318 miles). P.E. Operated by
Universal Air Lines. Equipment—3 Hamilton metal 'planes ;
1 Fairchild Cabin mono.

Chicago-Minneapolis-St. Paul (399 miles), via Milwaukee
; Madison: La Crosse. M.P.E. Operated by
Northwest Airways, Inc. Equipment—3 Stinson Detroiter
(Wright J-5) ; 3 Waco 10 (Ox-5) ; 2 Hamilton metal planes
(P. & W. "Hornet")* 1 Laird Commercial (Wright J-5).
Passenger and express service also operated by Universal
Air Lines.

Minneapolis-Fargo (230 miles), via St. Panl: Alexandria.
P.E. Operated bv Universal Air Lines.

Minneapolis-Duluth (130 miles). P.E. Operated by
Universal Air Lines.

Detroit-Chicago (265 miles), via Ann Arbor : Jackson :
Battle Creek : Kalamazoo : South Bend : La Poste. M.
Operated by Thompson Aeronautical Corp. Equipment—
4 Stinson mono (Wright J-5), 1 Laird (Wright J-5).

Kalamazoo-Bay City (130 miles), via Lansing : Saginaw :
M. Branch of above.

Kalamazoo-Muskegon (85 miles), via Grand Rapids.
M. Branch of above

Chicago-Cincinnati (267 miles), via Indianapolis. M.P.E.
Operated bv Embry Riddle Co. Equipment—8 Waco 10
(Ox-5 and "Wright J-5) ; 4 Fairchild Cabm (Wright J-5);
2 Ryan Brougham (Wright J-5) ; 1 Stinson cabin (Wright J-5).

Chicago-Atlanta (623 miles), via Terre Haute : Evansville
: Nashville : Chattanooga. M. Operated by Interstate
Air Lines, Inc.

Evansville-St. Louis (145 miles). M. Branch of above.

Atlanta-Chattanooga (107 miles). P.E. Operated by
Tennessee Air Transport Co. Equipment—2 Travel Air
(Hispano E)
.
Chicago-Memphis (480 miles). P. Operated by Mid-
South Airways, Inc. Equipment—3 Stinson Detroiter (Wright
J-5).

Travelair

Chicago-St. Louis (268 miles), via Peoria : Springfield.
M.P.E. Operated by Robertson Aircraft Corp. Equipment—
4 Ford trimotor (Wright J-5) : 3 Ryan Brougham (Wright
J-5) ; 2 Travel Air (J-5) ; also 30 D.H., Standard, Travel Air
and Waco.

St. Louis-Omaha (401 miles), via Kansas City. M.
Branch of above.

Atlanta-New Orleans (483 miles), via Birmingham :
Mobile. M.P. Operated by St. Tammany Gulf Coast Airways,
Inc. Equipment—1 Fokker Universal; 1 Pitcairn
•' Mailwing " ; 1 Travel Air (all Wright J-5).

New Orleans-Laredo (615 miles), via Houston. M.
Branch of above ; also branches to Brownsville.

New Orleans-Pilottown (75 miles). M. Operated by
New Orleans Air Line.

Galveston-Dallas (308 miles), via Houston : Waco : Fort
Worth. M.P. Operated by Texas Air Transport, Inc. Equipment—
4 Pitcairn " Mailwings " ; 3 Swallow ; 1 Ryan B-l
.
Dallas-San Antonio (281 miles), via Fort Worth : Waco :
Austin. M.P. Branch of above.

Cheyenne-Pueblo (200 miles), via Denver: Colorado
Springs. M.P.E. Operated by Western Air Express. Equipment—
Douglas, Fokker and Stearman.

Salt Lake City-Los Angeles (633 miles), via Las Vegas.
M.P.E. Branch of above.

Salt Lake City-Great Falls (489 miles), via Ogden :
Pocatello ; Butte : Helena. M.P.E. Operated by National
Parks Airways, Inc. Equipment—4 Fokker Super-Universal
(P. & W . " Wasp").

Salt Lake City-Pasco (540 miles), via Boise. M.
Operated bv Varnev Air Lines. Equipment—7 Stearman ;
4 Swallow.

Seattle-Los Angeles (1,080 miles), via Tacoma : Portland :
Mid ford ; Oakland S.F.. : Fresno : Bakcrsfield. M.P.E. Operated
by Pacific Air Transport, Inc. Equipment—Boeing 40-C
(P. & W. "Wasp"). Also Passenger and Express Service
operated between Seattle-Tacoma-Chehalis-Portland-
Medford-Corning and San Francisco by West Coast Air
Transport Co. with Bach mono. (Wasp-Siemens).

Seattle-Victoria (77 miles). M.P. Operated by North-
West Airways.

Seattle-Vancouver (125 miles), P.E. Operated by Commercial
Air Transport, Inc. Equipment—Ryan Brougham
(Wright J-5).

San Francisco (Oakland)-Agua Caliente (570 miles),
via Fresno : Bakersfield : Los Angeles ; Long Beach : Santa
Ava : San Diego. P.E. Operated by Maddux Air Lines. Inc.
Equipment—5 Ford Tri-motor (Wright J-5) ; 1 Lockheed
(Wright J-5).

Los Angeles-Oakland (410 miles), via Fresno : Merced :
San Jose. P.E. Operated by Mutual Aircraft Corp. Equipment—
6 Ryan Brougham (Wright J-5).

Los Angeles-Tucson (440 miles), via Phoenix. P.E.
Operated by Standard Air Lines, Inc. Equipment—Fokker
Universal (Wright

B-52D Drab 69 Redeployment Navigator Flight Plan and Charts

2011-06-28T09:46:00.000-07:00

Navigators Station B-52D

Sometimes I am lucky enough to find some interesting items on Ebay. I found this B-52D air crew navigators flimsy folder with charts, flight plans celestial navi form, etc. for his redeployment in 1969 from Anderson AFB, Guam to Fairchild AFB, Washington in 1969. As a rotation from flying ARC Light bombing missions in Vietnam. TAG ALL PHOTOS TO ENLARGE.

THE NAVIGATOR A FEW PHOTO'S

2011-06-22T17:09:00.001-07:00

I have always thought that the old navigators were cool. ZTo understand the old methods had to be respected.

If anybody is interested in reading a good book about a Navigator Bombadier on a B-52 read.."FLYING FROM THE BLACK HOLE", an excellent study of what a RN/BM did on the B-52 in the cold war and Vietnam. Filled with interesting info

C-124 Takeoff Procedures from the 1C-124A-1

2011-06-22T08:14:00.000-07:00

While looking through some of my old manuals I came across the C-124 dash 1. I kept this manual after we closed down the 19th Military Airlift Squadron. I worked in the 19th MAS /62nd Wing MAC, Electric Shop as an aircraft electrician 1968-69 at Kelly AFB , San Antonio Texas. Old Shaky was a cool aircraft to work on greasy , oily, a generally good old knuckle buster for the mechanic. I am proud to have worked on and served with this old bird. At Kelly we had all C models.

An old flight engineer on Shaky's told me "If you ever fly one of these birds upside down, the flight crew would be killed by all the nuts, bolts and safety wire that would get loose". After working on them I beleive it would be true!
.

Here are a few pages from the manual for the Takeoff procedures up to cruise.
TAG ALL PAGES TO ENLARGE

C-46 Tinker Belle ....Walk Around

2011-06-05T11:28:00.000-07:00

Yesterday I took a trip to Reading, Pa. and went to the World War 2 event held there. This year I had a good photo op on the C-46 Tinker Belle. The C-46 is a great old bird.

Normal Crew of Four

Two Pratt & Whitney R-2800-51 Engines
Twin-row 18 cylinder Air-cooled Radials
2,000 hp for Takeoff

10,000 lbs of Cargo or
Up to 50 Troops or 33 Stretchers

Max. Speed 270 mph @ 15,000 feet
Cruise Speed 183 mph

Climb to 10,000 ft in 17.4 minutes
Service Ceiling 27,600 ft
Length 76' 4"
Height 21' 9"
Wing Span 108' 1"

Max. Weight 56,000 lbs
Empty Weight 32,400 lbs

Normal Range 1,200 miles
Maximum Range 3,150 miles

DC-6 / C-118 Engine Analyzer

2011-06-02T08:00:00.000-07:00

I worked on many engine analyzer amplifiers on C-124's, they were miserable to work on located behind the engineers panel. Once had a flight engineer explain how they worked and what information he gained from using them. If only I could remember what he told me.

TAG ALL CHARTS TO ENLARGE

A Few Migs, On the Deck of the U.S.S. Intrepid Mig 15, Mig 17 And Mig 21

2011-05-31T18:32:00.000-07:00

I know this has nothing to do with the theme of this blog, but I hate to let a good photo op go to waste.
Some of the Migs on the deck of the Intrepid.

TAG ALL PHOTOS TO ENLARGE

Mig 15

Mig 17

Mig 21PFM

Concorde G-BOAD Alpha Delta Walk Around

2011-05-29T09:21:00.000-07:00

Took a day trip with my grandson On May 28. I took him to see Fleet Weekend held every year in New York City. Everything takes place on or near the old aircraft carrier Intrepid. Actullay I wanted to see the British Airways Concorde G-BOAD that is on display. Had a real great tour got some photos and enjoyed the day.

Me And My Grandson Nathaniel On The Flight Deck British Airways Concorde

Signatures of the last Flight Crew To Fly AD.. Captain L. Scott
I originally wrote this but :
Frank Van Haste corrected it:
On 7 Feb 96, Capt. Scott and his crew set the (still standing) speed record for flight from JFK to LHR of 2:52:59. That elapsed time is written, presumably by Capt. Scott, under his signature.

Now that is pretty cool....

Photos of Alpha Delta's Gear and Fuselage

GOLDEN AGE AIR MUSEUM..BETHEL PA.

2011-05-09T06:00:00.000-07:00

gRIMES aIRPORT
On Mothers Day, May 8, 2011 we took my wife’s Miata out for a ride on a beautiful sunny afternoon. We (I) decided to go over to the Golden Age Air Museum near Bethel, Pa. a few miles from my home. If you don’t know the location, it is located off of Route 78 in eastern Pennsylvania. Check the brochure I included,
Anyway what a great place to visit, had a wonderful tour of their collection of great old aircraft. Made me feel like I was back in the 1920’s or 30’s I will also include a schedule of their activities for this year if you are in the area don’t miss this place. It’s a trip back in time.

PAUL, OUR TOUR GUIDE, AN ENCYLOPEDIA OF AIVIATION, AIRCRAFT, KNOWLEDGE

There she was A real life Curtiss JN4D "Jenny" Made my day!

THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT A PHOTO JOURNEY

First Flight ......Nathaniel My Grandson's FIrst Flight 05-01-11 On His 11th Birthday

2011-05-01T11:50:00.000-07:00

My grandson Nathaniel at the controls gets the feel and takes off on his first flight on his 11th Birthday, what a great day for the kid.! Hopefully a future pilot. I am very proud of him.

Concorde What A Beautiful Aircraft

2011-04-17T11:15:00.000-07:00

In May I am taking my grandson on a trip to the U.S.S. Intrepid in New York. Among all the aircraft displayed on her flight deck I most want him to see the Concorde, British Airways G-Boad. Hopefully I will be able to get some great photos, inside and out.

I never got to see the Concorde up close on the ground. The only time I ever seen one was while I was out for a run one summer day. I saw a Concorde orbiting in the holding pattern over the East Texas VOR (eastern Pennsylvania), on one of its extended legs it passed over my home area. It made about two orbits then disappeared to the south. I don't know if it was Kennedy bound or Washington Dulles. There were many Thunderstorms in the area that day. But it was still pretty cool to see it orbiting the area.

Below are a few articles on the Concorde from the archives of Flight Global.

The airline pilot's view
By CAPTAIN J. ANDREW, BOAC project manager, Concorde

I AM EXPECTING Concorde to be a very nice aircraft to fly.
What the airline pilot wants to know is whether or not it
will be a good aircraft to operate, in all weathers—at all
times and all places.
When a pilot has his first look at the Concorde flight deck,
he will be dismayed to see so much crammed into such a
small space. The 8+ft fuselage diameter tapers to the pointed
nose, and into the space which is available as a cockpit must fit
the controls and displays for one of the most sophisticated
aircraft-systems ever produced. *
The layout allows a fully integrated operation to be carried
out by three men. During take-off, landing, and all critical
phases of flight, the engineer sits forward between the pilots,
monitoring, assisting, looking out. Within his reach are
throttles, fire handles, intake controls and so forth. Behind
him, the systems panel is designed to be set up and left. At
eye level, faults and warnings are displayed on a panel clearly
visible to all crew members.
The pilots have identical instrument panels which carry
large attitude indicators, and radio/inertial horizontal situation
displays. Attitude is shown over the full range with Inertial
Navigation System (INS) accuracy. Cross-pointer flight directors,
MDA indications, expanded localiser and rising runway
focus essential information where needed during low visibility
approaches. On the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) the
pilot reads distance to go, ground speed and drift. Deviation
from localiser or INS is displayed.
The mach meter presently carries moving bugs which define
the operating limits. A centre-of-gravity position indicator is
used when fuel is transferred to trim the aircraft.
The autopilot controller and VOR/ILS selectors are mounted
where they can readily be seen by the three crew members.
Push buttons were chosen for reliability and ease of use. This
fail-operative autopilot will be certificated to Cat 2 on delivery
and Cat 3A thereafter. In addition to normal autopilot
functions it will provide height acquire; vertical speed hold;
speed control; INS navigation; vertical navigation; and automatic
landing.
With the engine instruments are configuration, reverse, and
reheat indications, and nozzle area. Intake controls are at the
forward end of the engineer's system station and fuel transfer
switching is readily available.

Beneath the engine instruments are the three inertial controllers.
Space has been retained in this area for a fully
automatic chart display driven by the INS. and one controller
will probably be moved to the rear.
Departing London for Kennedy, the aircraft will be rotated
at about 180kt to achieve lift-off speed of 205kt at an angle
of 15°. Although take-off directors have been proposed for
this manoeuvre, 1 am not convinced that the director will do
anything for us, and that a satisfactory job cannot be done
without one. (We have an open mind, although we are working
to produce a runway guidance device for low visibility.)
The noise abatement procedure calls for 250kt at 500ft, and
throttle after given time to 500ft/min climb.
With the aircraft cleaned up, the climb continues at 400kt,
and if there is no ATC or boom restriction, the aircraft
becomes supersonic at 29,000ft, 80 miles from London Airport.
At 5° West the aircraft is at M1.3, travelling at over 700kt
at 38,000ft and on a standard day reaches top of climb in the
region of 10° West. From this rather indefinite point, which
varies with temperature, the cruise climb begins. (If there is
an ATC restriction, the aircraft is cruised subsonically at
M0.93.)
Reheat is used at take-off and during acceleration climb,
and seems to be a most convenient way of adding thrust when
needed. Fuel is moved to trim the aircraft during acceleration.
At the earliest possible moment the autopilot is locked on
to the INS-derived track and the aircraft is kept on the
great circle.
Studies of temperature and wind conditions during climb
and cruise on the North Atlantic have shown that the great
circle is best—when there are no ATC considerations. Higher
temperatures during acceleration do mean that more fuel is
consumed, but our own studies show that the penalties in
the worst cases are no more than 1,5001b, and well within the
route-contingency allowance.
A cruise climb at optimum Mach number will be flown.
longitudinal separation having been established by delaying
the start of acceleration of aircraft as necessary.
At top of descent, the pilot partly closes the throttles, slows
down to 325kt and descends. About 2,500ft/min should be
achievable, but we consider this to be insufficient in the
terminal areas, and have asked for the use of in-flight reverse
(the aircraft has no spoiler airbrakes).
Holding is flown at 250-300kt and the final approach at
speeds of 160kt or so. Angle of attack appears to be a
significant parameter here, and RAE are looking for a way
to display this on the Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI).
With the nose lowered, vision is very good, and auto-throttle
will simplify speed control. (I feel, however, that speed control
should present no problem to the airline pilot, with or without
auto-throttle, provided that he obeys the rules for flight in
this "different" regime.)
If Concorde meets the stringent requirements of the airworthiness
authorities and ourselves, I cannot see that a
professional airline pilot will take long to master this new
dimension.

Training the Concorde pilot

The classrooms are new and lavishly equipped, offering
all forms of visual aid, including purpose-built working
models of vital components. Without having to move
from his console the instructor can select film or slide
projectors, view graphs, wall charts or working models.
He can also monitor the progress of his class by posing
multi-choice questions which the students answer by selecting
the appropriate one of four buttons at each desk.
Student responses illuminate a master panel on the instructor's
console.
Along one wall of the main lecture room an enlarged
working model of the automatic flight-control system
(AFCS) recreates the glareshield panel of the aircraft.
Aircraft responses to AFCS inputs are shown to the whole
class on 12in-square reproductions of the attitude indicator
and the horizontal-situation indicator.
Each course comprises four crews (each of two pilots
and one flight engineer), who first meet for a three-day
introductory study of supersonic flight. The British Civil
Aviation Authority attaches a lot of importance to this
familiarisation, which breaks entirely new ground for most
of the students, and requires that an examination be passed
before students can move on to the next phase. For the engineers,
however, there is a preliminary three weeks of
intensive instruction in the aircraft's systems.
The crews then spend four weeks and two days in the
classroom covering a syllabus which prepares them to take
the technical examination for the type rating (the "ARB"
examination). During this stage the timetable provides
for four hours daily in the classroom and two in the cockpit
procedure trainer. The latter familiarises the students
with control and instrument locations and checklists but
lacks the motion and responses of a simulator.
Crews return to the British Airways training centre
at Cranebank to sit the exam, remaining there for a
performance course before beginning the four-week flight simulator
phase.
Joint simulator programme
The simulator is the result of a co-operative programme
almost as involved as that which produced the aircraft
itself. It was commissioned by BAC from Bedifon and the
Link-Miles division of Singer jointly, both companies
having tendered separately to the airlines and the manufacturer.
The £3 million programme was financed by
Brandts, a division of Grindlays Bank which has funded
the purchase of nine flight simulators during the past 18
years. The equipment is leased to BAC, initially for ten
years, on a fixed-rental basis; this arrangement is expected
to permit close analysis of training costs. BAC forecasts
an hourly cost of about £500, about one tenth the cost
of flying training on the real aircraft.
Although simulator instructors are not unanimous on
the need for six-axis motion systems, BAC was in no
doubt about specifying one to give the highly realistic feel
required of the Concorde simulator. The motion system
and hydraulics are part of the Singer contribution and
are changed little from the company's existing DC-10 and
747 systems. Singer also built the flight deck and instructor's
station, while Bedifon was responsible for the two
R2000A computers and the visual system.
Three vertically mounted models are used to give visual
realism. The largest, designed to encompass a procedural
circuit, depicts an airport not unlike Heathrow. No attempt
has been made to produce total realism, but there are two
parallel runways orientated east-west and the characteristic
shape of the Staines reservoirs has been included at
the western end. While it is not unreasonable to put subsonic
aircraft in "cloud" throughout the cruise, this
would not be satisfactory for simulation of an aircraft
designed to cruise at up to 60,000ft. Included therefore is
a realistic cloud-top model, across which the visual-system
TV camera moves at such a rate that the model's five-foot
diagonal represents one hour of supersonic cruise.
At the other extreme, the simulator also includes an
airport-apron model to give training in the precise taxiing
needed when docking the real aircraft.
During the four-week simulator period each crew completes
15 exercises, taking upwards of 60hr, by the end
of which the majority of tests for the type rating (1179)
have been completed. Provision is made for two spare
details and the aim is to reduce the time spent flying the
actual aircraft to less than lOhr before qualification.
1 spent two sessions at the simulator, one flying it and
one in the control and recording room. In this facility
recorders produce traces of the horizontal and vertical
flight paths, the latter information being particularly
valuable for analysis of glidepath performance. The instructor
at the recording panel also acts as an air traffic
controller and tapes are used to provide a background of
typical radio calls to and from "other aircraft." The recording
room is the safest place from which to
watch the movement of the simulator "in flight'; all the
movements appear to be carried to excess and many of
them look utterly unfamiliar. This is not unreasonable
when you consider the forces which need to be imposed
on the crew to approach realism. Three rotary and three
linear servos combine their responses to flying-control
and power adjustments to produce the required effect.
BAC training captain Tim Howell carried out several
consecutive demonstrations and occupied the right-hand
seat for my ride. As 1 settled into place the aircraft was
lined up on the runway with engines running, and from
the outset it felt remarkably realistic. We discussed how
best to use the limited time available and settled for two
extended circuits, intercepting the ILS at about 10 miles
and making the approach by visual references from 1,200ft.
We were simulating a light weight and using dry thrust
for take-off, which allowed me a few valuable extra
seconds of ground roll before the time came to rotate.
The key speeds for take-off were Vi 143kt, V,. 167kt and
Vu 199kt, and 1 was briefed to rotate to 15° to obtain the
Correct attitude for the Vj climb.
One gets so used to Concorde's fighter-like performance
that the "aileron" and "elevator" forces seem at first to be
disproportionately heavy, but this is largely a function of
the strong spring-centring action. The forces are in fact
relatively light for a 100-passenger transport. Full and
free control movement can be checked by reference to the
combined control-position indicator in the centre of the
panel. The rains-horn control column was angled comfortably
and was capable of full rolling movement without
striking the upper surfaces of the thighs. The Concorde
flight deck first strikes many people as
being rather small. There is certainly none of the airiness
of, say, the VC10, but once you are seated everything
seems to lie comfortably at hand and on the evidence of
the simulator the view is comparable with that afforded
by most current-generation transport aircraft. Even the
apparent "letterbox" effect, caused by the proximity of
the overhead and glare shield panels, seemed insignificant
after a Few minutes at the controls.
Wc called for take-off clearance and Tim Howell
spooled up the power while I kept my feet on the brakes
and grasped the tiller with my left hand. Brake-release
produced a satisfying surge forward and I was immediately
busy, trying not to over steer as I held the runway centre line
until the rudder became effective and freed me to
bring my left hand back to the stick. A firm force was
needed to initiate rotation and this had to be sustained
to achieve the desired 15° attitude. The undercarriage is
retracted by using an uncompromising lever on the copilot's
side of the panel. Little trim change was evident,
what there was being lost in the changes which inevitably
accompany acceleration after lift-off.
One of the few characteristics which appears to be
common to all model-type visual systems is the simulated
cloud base at around 2,000ft, and the Concorde system
was no exception. What happens is that the TV camera
runs out of terrain and needs time to reposition to the cruising-
flight landscape (or cloudscape). Within reasonable
limits cloud base can be adjusted as required, making
it possible to simulate a late transition to visual references
at the end of an instrument approach. We flew a left-hand
pattern on instruments and I noticed that the flight director
called for an exact 30° bank when a heading change was
commanded. Heading input to the AFCS is selected on
the glare shield panel, as is the required airspeed when
autothrottle is in use. Both controls are conveniently in
reach, have clear indications and require little departure
from the natural scan.
The simulator exactly reproduces the aircraft instrument
panel and 1 was surprised at how little impact the strip
instruments made on me. 1 imagine, it was a function of
workload—I was concentrating too much on the attitude
and navigation displays—but the vertical-speed indicator
did not at first attract my attention and the vertical-strip
angle-of-attack indicator never did. This instrument lay
alongside the airspeed indicator on early aircraft but was
well away at the extreme left of the natural scan on the
simulator, which presumably represents the current build
standard.
On our crosswind leg we reduced speed to 210kt and
used autothrottle thereafter down to the landing. A further
reduction to l,90kt to intercept the glidepath was
followed by progressive reductions towards a target
threshold speed of I61kt. Each speed reduction was selected
on the glare shield controller and the autothrottles were
allowed to adjust to suit the attitude and descent that T
was flying. The runway image was very realistic, featuring
clear VAS1 lights, and 1 liked the way the whole wrap round
picture was presented without a sharp cut-off at
the sides.
1 tended to allow the aircraft to get below the glidepath,
possibly through not accepting the high angle of
attack which is demanded, but the autothrottle coped
smoothly with my pitch corrections. The controls were
laterally light, leading to some rocking.
As we came into the flare Tim Howell called the radio altimeter
heights and told me to make a gentle check—
about 2° nose-up—as he called 20ft and started to take off
the power. The simulator suggested a typical delta-wing
cushioning as we sank into ground effect and then the
main wheels touched. The nose seemed to rotate downwards
for an age before the nosewheel was on the runway.
At this point we could have taken reverse thrust but
chose instead to select maximum dry thrust for another
circuit.
At my request Tim Howell cut back No 4 engine as we
lifted off at about 170kt. 1 checked the yaw satisfactorily
but when I relaxed enough to make a knee-pad note the
aircraft began to roll. A 6° pitch attitude was recommended
for the practice engine-out climb and as I rolled
level downwind I found I had applied too much rudder
and had to retrim. With the "dead" engine at flight-idle
power, the other engines showed 88 per cent r.p.m. on the
N;. gauges.
The circuit was similar to the first, though I became,
a little more conscious of a need to raise the nose in
turns, and the flight director again gave a smooth localiser
interception. We followed the same final-approach procedure
and arrived at a smooth touchdown after a rather
longer float. At this point the simulator seemed particularly
realistic, with the end of the runway approaching fast.
Reverse thrust and brakes soon brought us to a halt with
distance to spare, however, and I just had time to try
turning the aircraft round on the runway before my time
was up. Even that exercise, involving hanging the nose
well over the grass while turning, seemed faithfully
reproduced.
The Civil Aviation Authority airworthiness team has
endorsed the simulator as an accurate representation of
the real Concorde. Without having handled the aircraft.
1 have no yardstick to apply in that respect. But there
is no doubt that the BAG' school and its simulator provide
splendid training for aspiring SST crews

Flying Concorde
Capt E. C. "Mickey" Miles, flight manager (technical)
Concorde for British Airways, gives his impression of
flying the Concorde. Concorde is at present engaged in
a series of demonstration flights between Charles de
Gaulle airport, Paris and Rio de Janeiro. Arrangements
to fly the aircraft to Boston, Logan, to mark the opening
of the John A. Volpe International Terminal are now
being finalised.

6 june 1974
I START UP and taxi out, conscious that I am further from
the ground than I am used to on some aircraft—but less
so than in a 747. At the end of the runway with all the
normal take-off checks complete (there are no slots, slats,
flaps or spoilers to worry about) the aircraft is lined up.
I advance the throttles fully and switch on the reheat.
Concorde accelerates rapidly and, as the decision point is
passed, the co-pilot calls Vi and I transfer my right hand
from the throttles to the control column. The principles of
stopping from Vi in the emergency distance available, or
continuing the take-off with one engine failed, are exactly
the same on Concorde as they are on other jet aircraft.
In less time than it takes to say it, VE is reached. I
rotate the aircraft to about 15° and the aircraft continues
to accelerate along the runway to the lift-off speed. The
aircraft achieves a speed of at least V» at the end of the
take-off distance and continues to accelerate to Va + 40kt:
the initial climb-out speed. At about 500ft, depending upon
any local noise abatement procedures, reheat is cancelled
and power reduced, maintaining Vz + 40kt. When the airfield
noise restrictions have been passed, power is increased
to maximum continuous and Concorde climbs away at the
airspeed required by the local air-traffic-control regulations,
usually about 300kt. It is preferable to achieve 400kt at this
altitude as soon as possible since this gives the greatest
rate of climb. (This not only gives optimum efficiency but
also gets the aircraft up quickly to reduce any ground
disturbance from engine noise.) The nose and visor are
raised and the cockpit becomes a most comfortable place
to work in.
Climb at VMO/MMO is continued, and, as transonic drag
rise is approached, reheat is selected to transit the region
as quickly as possible. In order to compensate for the
change in centre of pressure in supersonic flight, the electric
fuel-transfer pumps are turned on. These shift fuel
rapidly from tanks in the forward centre section to tanks
in the tail. The e.g. therefore shifts with the centre of
pressure and trim is maintained beautifully with no need
to apply elevon. Any trimmed elevon necessary would be
no problem in handling the aircraft, but at supersonic
speed the drag and resultant fuel penalty would be significant.
On the other side of the drag rise the reheat is
switched off and operation is continued at VMO throughout
the flight. At about 50,000ft the rate of climb drops to a very
low value and a state of cruise climb exists—the aircraft
ascends slightly as fuel burn-off reduces weight. Slight
descents and ascents may be experienced because of temperature
changes but over the whole flight, even in the
most phenomenal temperature gradients, a definite altitude
increase is achieved.
To smooth out any of the intermediate height changes
resulting from very abrupt temperature changes, there is
an additional autopilot mode MAX OP SOFT. This mode
reduces the reaction of the aircraft below that available
in MAX OP. Both modes keep the aircraft speed at max
permitted speed, Mach number or temperature, whichever
is the most restrictive at the time. The autopilot is beautifully
designed with all the modes one could wish for. It
does not quite have one which says, HOME JAMES, but
it comes pretty close.
Of course, in normal operation the autopilot is used most
FLIGHT International, 6 June 1974
of the time just as on subsonic jets. But that isn't to say it
is needed as a "primary control system" as the autopilot
is sometimes described today. Operations throughout the
whole of the flight envelope with all the autostabilisation
devices switched off is extremely easy for the pilot. I
found it easier than on the subsonic jets I am used to.
In common with almost every pilot who has flown Concorde,
I found on my first flight that, as I hand flew the
aircraft during the transonic acceleration, one glance at
the Machmeter showed 0 • 96, the next 1 • 2—I had not even
noticed my first transition to supersonic flight. I would
rather hand fly Concorde on a long sector than any other
aircraft I am familiar with. However, normally the autopilot
does the manipulation of the controls and it is locked
on to the inertial navigation system keeping the aircraft
spot on track.
Air traffic control is told our position on the standard
HF and VHF network—far too frequently of course. The
number of reporting points is far too great. Although the
aircraft is only flying at Mach 1 • 9 there is a high ambient
temperature of ISA + 15° and TAS is up to flight plan at
1,298 m.p.h. Wherever no success has been achieved in reducing
the check points, and one is using the same ones
as the subsonic jets, they really go flashing past.
A close watch is kept on the fuel consumed compared
with flight plan—as on any other aircraft. The task on
Concorde is a little bit easier as a readout of instantaneous
fuel remaining is available on the pilot's and engineering
officer's panels. In addition, the engineering officer's panel
shows a reading of instantaneous weight and e.g. position.
The latter is computed automatically as fuel is transferred
and consumed but only from the original datum position
inserted before departure. The aircraft does not calculate
its own e.g.—it only computes change from the original
setting. There is still, therefore, a need for an accurate
load and trim sheet from the traffic branch of the airline-.
A careful check is also kept on the weather—again, as on 1
any other aircraft. Reports of actual weather, rather than
forecasts, are more interesting because the flight is over so
quickly. 4
Descent clearance is gained from 58,000ft; the throttles
are closed to decelerate and Concorde descends at 325kt.
This speed is held all the way to the circuit, or for as long
as air traffic control allows. At about 38,000ft, flight becomes
subsonic and from then on to landing the aircraft behaves
very much like any subsonic aeroplane. The visor and nose
are lowered (visibility is good, even with them raised).
Turn out to final approach is at a speed of about 200kt
and gradually the auto-throttle is dialled down to give a
target threshold speed of 155kt at the outer marker. There
is a pitch-up attitude of about 10° on the approach and,
although it may look very nose-high to the observer on the
ground, it feels perfectly normal.
At 50ft the auto-throttle is taken out and the power
eased off with a gentle flare and the aircraft settles comfortably
onto the runway. The nose is lowered with the
elevons, reverse thrust and anti-skid braking is applied ;
as necessary, and I marvel that a flight at 1,300 m.p.h. felt
so remarkably similar to all my other flights at less than
half the speed. '

.

“Boeing 707: A Navigator’s Tale”

2011-04-12T09:54:00.000-07:00

For those interested in the navigators job. There is an excellent article in the May 2011 issue of Airways Magazine entitled “Boeing 707: A Navigator’s Tale” by Dave Welch, who flew as a Navigator on a BMA 707.

Flying A BOAC 707-420 To Seattle And Back, Great Polar Navigation Segment.

2011-03-01T20:46:00.000-08:00

BOAC 707-420

From Flight Global Magazine 25, November 1960
Another great article on flying a BOAC 707-420

ONE lesson I learned from a recent double crossing of the
Atlantic and the US is that pure navigation and cruise
control are increasingly subordinated to traffic control,
in respect of both tracks and heights. The aids are relatively poor
and old-fashioned, though they work well in good conditions,
and the competition for the best height or track is so fierce that
it takes a cunning captain to operate his aircraft as the designers
intended. He needs something of the craftiness and skill of the
old tea clipper captains.
For me it all started rather suddenly when I managed to join
a BOAC Boeing 707 proving flight via New York to Hong Kong,
drop off at San Francisco, fly in a United Boeing 720 to Seattle
and come home non-stop past the Pole on BOAC's 13th 707-420.
An Atlantic crossing consists of an airways departure and arrival
bracketing a classically navigated over-water flight. ATC separations,
based on expected navigation accuracy, require 120 miles
lateral, 30min longitudinal and 2,000ft vertical separations between
airliners. You fly even flight-levels to Shannon, odds westwards
over the water (evens eastwards) and the best height available into
New York. The shortest distance is the Great Circle, but you
may plot a rhumb line to the south or a Polar curve to the north,
mainly to take you through more favorable winds circulating
round lows or highs. Jet airliners do not fly classical pressure
patterns, but the three routes allow a degree of pressure flying.
BOAC deviate from the Great Circle only if they can forecast a
rime gain of better than 15min. Because of ATC limitations, the
cruise technique for the 707 is to fly at near M0.81 at about 93 per
cent r.p.m. and at constant height, hoping for the best height but
having to accept what ATC allows. As the aircraft gets lighter,
speed increases and at M0.82 r.p.m. are reduced to drop speed
back to M0.81. This process is repeated as required.
The flight-planned track is made out for successive beacons
and then for "lat and long" positions, reporting every 10" of
longitude by HF/RT to the appropriate centre—Prestwick,
Reykjavik or Gander. The navigator makes a DR plot on a
1:6,250,000 chart overprinted with Loran lattices and Consol
count lines as well as the main beacons. He can use Loran and
Consol, astro, weather radar, NDBs on weather ships or at other
—often surprisingly remote—locations.

Weather Station Ships Bravo And Charlie location
Bravo 50*30"/ 51* Charlie 52* 45"/ 35* 30"

Weather Ship Type
We took off from London weighing 134,600kg with a 42sec
ground run, planning Green One to Shannon and thence by Polar
Curve at 33,000ft north of weather ships Charlie and Juliet, south
of Bravo and to Goose. This avoided some rather aggressive
lows. After Goose we joined the air routes and plunged into the
New York maelstrom. I tend to doff my hat respectfully when
people mention New York now. We estimated 535 m.p.h. in
ISA + 8°C, a 7hr flight leaving Ireland at 13.20Z (GMT), midwater
at 1500Z, Goose at 1705 and passing Montreal at 1840.
England and Ireland slipped away in the rock-steady rumble of
the 707. Over the water, high-level sheets and veils of cloud
scissored in perspective over mattresses of thicker stuff lower
down. There was the odd cloud street or ridge and I had the
impression of an underwater landscape floodlit.
The 707 is intended to be flown under autopilot control (Bendix
PB-20) between take-off and landing. The pilots are no less busy

In the heading picture is a BOAC Boeing 707, the type in which most
of the journey here described was made. It is a powerful and efficient
aeroplane, greatly liked by its crews.
when the autopilot is engaged than the driver of a car with an
automatic transmission.
Flight level 370 was taken by the military on this day (it often
is) and the temperatures were too high to allow us to get through
to 390, even if ATC cleared it, so we stayed at 330. You would
think that every jet airliner tried for one ideal track at the same
time, but ATC get over this by designating Lundy, South Shannon,
Bush Mills and Prestwick as starting points for the track,
with equivalent points on the other side. You could also plot a
composite track, usually made up of two legs each of one of the
three basic types. BOAC have the Edo Loran and, with the
aerial high up in the new fin k gives good results unless the
northern lights or static play it up.
The trick is to arrive at the Canadian Air Defence Identification
Zone reporting point within 10 miles laterally or 5min
longitudinally. Otherwise they file a violation, which means real
trouble. A plain Loran fix can be obtained in 2min and a fix
compensated for aircraft progress in 3min to an accuracy of two
or three miles in good conditions. In bad, it may be 20 miles.
The CADIZ entry is usually made from a series of fixes along
a run-up track to a point about 150 miles from the Canadian
coast. VOR can come in at about 200 miles and weather radar
will identify a landfall at about 100 miles. Where accuracy
is important, the aids seem to be reasonably abundant.
At 1630 we were approaching land, radar showed a faint blur
at 100 miles and VOR was beginning to come in. By 1650 we were
talking to Goose on VHF, the radar was off and we were getting
the air route clearance into New York. The home stretch was
starting. The instruments showed M0.82 with 88 per cent r.p.m.,
we had been cleared to flight level 350 with — 52°C and could
now have made the step to 390.
By 1735 we are over the lake-pitted Canadian wilds and have
the wide St Lawrence in view far on our left through breaking
sheet cloud. We are past Goose and climbing an ADF ladder
past Lake Eon and Seven Islands NDBs, along the St Lawrence
to Mont Joli and Montmorency NDBs at Quebec. We are getting
airways clearances and things are warming up, with a good deal
of radio tuning and consultation of charts and manuals. At 1830
we have been flying for 6hr 4min. We are cleared along the high
level Jet 75 Victor across Plattsburg VOR to Albany VOR. Here
we descend from 350 into Victor 91 at 250. All this has been
received and written down by the co-pilot. The let-down involves
throttling the outboard engines to 50 per cent and the inners to
68 per cent, the engineer working throttles and cabin pressure
controls together to avoid "bumps." Descent is at 290kt and
2,500ft/min. We have radar advisory service, but they lose
contact briefly about here. Capt Nisbet, 707 Fleet manager, has
now disengaged the autopilot and is flying manually.
Then it comes thick and fast with successive hold height and
descend instructions. Albany VOR to Poughkeepsie range to
Wilton VOR, to Syosset (intersection of Idlewild and Wilton
radials), to Hempstead range, out along its south-west leg to
Lido NDB and round to Ambrose (intersection of Idlewild and
Colts Neck .radials); and all the time stepping down in height,
reading checks, tuning radios, reading charts and using VHF to
receive and check instructions and be told by radar of lots of
other traffic. The clearance is somewhat changed as we progress.
We pass Wilton at 15,000ft, Hempstead and Lido at 8,000.
Ambrose at 3,000 and put down 20° and then 30° flap and gear
and slow up to 180kt. Cleared to ILS for Idlewild 04 runway
a: 1,000ft, cleared to circle round left-handed for our designated
landing on 31R and finally down with a roar of reverse thrust.
Landing weight, 88,000 kg; cross the hedge at between 130 and
;40kt. A fine piece of hand-flying and snappy team-work—and
the distance from Wilton to touchdown is probably less than 60
miles.

We made the New York to San Francisco crossing next day
in 5.45hr. Take-off 42sec at 136,600kg gross, cruising at 31,000ft
on air routes all the way. The writer shamefully asleep in a reclining
first-class seat. "Frisco" to Seattle was made next morning by
United Boeing 720. Take-off weight, 187,0001b (United use
pounds); ground-run 32sec; VR 122kt; V2 137kt is reached at
35ft. A Convairliner landed parallel 200yd away as we took off.
We cruised at M0.83 at 28,000ft; estimated flight time l^hr.
Loitered round Mount Rainier (14,000ft plus) at 28,000ft while
fog lifted from Seattle Tacoma. Emerged from cloud close to
the top of a crane jib and made perfect landing. The 720 is as
fine an airliner as the 707.

Home Past the Pole
The flight home was in the thirteenth of BOACs Boeing 707s,
non-stop over Canada, Hudson's Bay, Baffin Island, Greenland,
past Iceland and over Northern Ireland—airways to Carmi, just
inside Canada, direct to Frobisher, great circle to Bush Mills and
airways to London. The crew: Capt "Dexter" Field (who did
much of the acceptance flying on this and previous 707s), 1st Offr
Jack Butt and 1st Offr John "Skate" Lee as co-pilots, Nav Offr
"Danny" Kaye, Engr Offr D. Donaldson, Engr Offr H. Breslin,
and Ch Stwrd S. W. Hemming. The last named was required even
on this ferry flight for certain emergency drills, but also acted as
a most welcome supplier of tea, coffee, food, etc.
Our take-off weight was 130,500kg, of which 72,000kg represented
full tanks. We needed, with all allowances, 66,500kg of
fuel for the 4,210 n.m. flight. Estimated flight time 8hr 42min on
a minimum-time track, with average +24kt wind component,
calculated by BOAC's New York dispatching office and received
in Seattle by telephone. The 72,000kg of fuel would giye us
llhr 48min endurance. Track: Carmi, Churchill, Frobisher,
64°N at 50°W, 56°N at 10°W, Bush Mills, London. Flight level
330 to 90°W, 370 to 20°W, then 410. Take-off about 1700hr local,
0100Z (GMT).
Take-off clearance: "Climb on runway heading to 3,000ft:
left turn to heading 340° to intercept 030° radial of Seattle VOR:
climb NE-bound until 15,000ft via direct Carmi: maintain flight
level 330. Transition height, 24,500ft because of the mountains.
Gets dark during climb, red rotating beacons reflecting off pods;
flight deck almost Christmas-like in red and white lights on grey
panels: everyone head-down working hard, except pilots peering
into night sky. We press on to cruising height, mostly using DR
plot and scattered NDBs with occasional VOR.
Talking to all sorts of stations on VHF and HF, asking for
position reports to be passed to BOAC at Montreal. Distinctly
Canadian accents on radio.
Change heading from 025° to 060°. Meet jarring turbulence:
navigator's plot shows sharp wind-change: radar shows thunderstorms:
temperature drops rapidly; lights dimmed and captain
stares into black night, hand on autopilot heading control. This
is a jet stream—and rough! Decide to climb straight to 370 to
get clear, and notify control. Using both VHF and HF almost
constantly. Pass Tippo Lake at 0202Z estimating Churchill at
0300Z. Dull, furtive veils of northern lights snaking above us—
plays hell with the radios. See ice or snow through gap in clouds.
0230Z: Sextant aperture frozen tight, so no astro. Not in Loran
cover yet and probably blacked out when we get there. We are
told that Churchill is due to launch some rocket at our exact ETA
overhead! Search manuals, find their HF frequency, ask them to
desist, but fortunately the firing is delayed anyway.
O315Z: Past Churchill at 37,000ft, M0.82, ETA Frobisher
0435Z. Lqran switched on but not performing yet. Magnetic
variation nil at Churchill, but builds up at l°/min to 54° in the
700 miles to Frobisher. Using Polar Path gyro on DG. 0337Z:
Just getting one Loran line over Hudson's Bay. 0430Z: 480kt
TAS, heading 030°. Weather radar mapping, Loran on, both
ADFs tuned to Frobisher NDB, no astro. Outside air temperature—
52°C. Hear SAS over-the-Pole flight asking to climb from
280 to 310 at 0449Z, position 70 °W, 66 °N. KLM flight is there
too. Northern lights seem to have gone. We talk to "Leeway" on
VHF. 0445Z: Note from co-pilot Lee, "Leeway is defence radar
at Frobisher: we saw their lights on the ground: have now
returned to compass steering: will get radar fix on No 2 VHF
at about 0455Z: now reporting to Goose on No 1 HF." Our
report, read from a form, gives estimate for 64°N, 67°W as 0509Z,
the wind found, fuel state and consumption, spaed, ETA for
London and much besides. Goose asked to repeat to Gandar and
Montreal for BOAC, to Sondrestrom for ATC. Sondrestrom
cannot understand, so Goose changes HF frequency to try again.
"Leewey" fixes us by radar at 120 miles. SAS and two other BOAC
aircraft talking on HF. Navigator plotting all the time; engineer
fills in fuel tables every 5,000kg, about every 40min. Pressurizing
on one turbocompressor and two direct engine bleeds. We call
Prestwick on HF, apparently without reply.
O53OZ: Northern fights sneak up again. ADF tuned to Kook
Island NDB, mid-west of Greenland, and we see its lights below.
Whoever lives there? No 2 ADF getting Christiansund NDB,
320 miles away on southern tip of Greenland. At 37,000ft: TAS
475kt; two minutes up on ETA; winds northerly; engines at 88
per cent r.p.m.; radar tilted down 7° for mapping.
0542Z: Temperature — 55°C. Air has been smooth for hours.
Captain and navigator still hard at it, co-pilots and engineer
relieved. Passenger cabin a dark, empty tunnel—only nine seats
fitted. Dead of night, northern lights stealing about.
O625Z: At 35°W and 37,000ft. Hope to climb at 30"W. Three
min ahead of plan. No VHF contacts. Iceland cannot hear our
HF, so relaying via Sondrestrom. Expect to contact weather ship
on VHF at 0645 and get fix. Nearest to Iceland at 0700. Many
other aircraft south of us calling Gander. Receive HF weather
broadcast from Shannon giving shallow fog for most British airfields;
also Canadian maritime weather broadcast from Gander.
Frobisher has a 9,000ft runway good for a diversion. Our point of
no return relates to Gander. But now we have the feel of the other
side and are heading south-east for Britain.
0800Z: Wake with a start from sleep to see a hard yellow,
copper and pale green dawn rising over us. Still making 480kt
true on 132°. ATC has held us down to 37,000ft; passing 10°W
and estimating Bush Mills at 0830Z. Windscreen frames now
thickly coated with frost. The sun begins to shine dazzlingly
straight in at the windscreen, and shades are down, lights turned
low. Outside temperature — 48 °C. Captain still in seat.
Navigator makes complete table of airways check-point ETAs
for Red 1 and Amber 1 via Belfast, Isle of Man, Wallasey, Lichfield,
Daventry, Beacon Hill and Watford to LAP's runway 28R.
according to Boeing, be unusable for structure in contact with the
airstream at speeds above about M2.1. Another argument against
M3 is that this speed will save only 40min over an M2 flight from
New York to London.
Cruising at M2, one supersonic airliner carrying the same payload
as a 707 will have a block speed of 900kt—about twice as fast
as a 707—and will do 15 per cent more flying hours. It will be
attractive on sample PanArn routes because it will "fit the clock"
and allow really convenient scheduling.
Boeing have naturally considered the economics of the supersonic
airliner and state that these can be realistically reckoned at
about 15 per cent above those of the 707. One estimate even makes
the costs the same.
The range quoted above is .intended to make the airliner capable
of flying from the eastern seaboard of the US to centres well inside
Europe non-stop—Copenhagen, Frankfurt or Rome for example—
regardless of winds. There is a range and speed economic limit
beyond which size becomes unprofitable for a given payload.
The aircraft will cruise supersonically only over sea and would
make a small part of its journey at subsonic speed over land, for
example, across France to Rome after crossing from New York.
The problem of shock-wave trailing over a 50-mile-wide swath
of countryside is intractable, as has already been realized from
supersonic flights made by military aircraft. The progress of a
B-58 making a supersonic test penetration of Norad area to
Milwaukee could be clearly tracked by the swamping of successive
telephone switchboards by callers notifying all manner of strange
and improbable disasters. One of the main public relations problems
is to make people recognize a sonic boom so that they won't
think that something—their central heating boiler in US society
—has blown up.
A low-level supersonic pass is definitely destructive. A B-58
pass at M2 at about 40,000ft is extremely noisy but little more.
A boom is double because of the initial pressure rise and subsequent
recompression of the air, spaced about 0.5 sec apart. Pressure
rises up to llb/sq ft on the ground are disturbing and often
mistakenly identified as accidents, but do not cause damage.
Between 1 and 31b/sq ft is objectionable. Boom intensity is
partly according to the volume of the aircraft and partly according
to the lift being generated. The second factor has not hitherto
been important, but will now make a major contribution in supersonic
airliners because L/Ds of 7 and 8 or even 10 are being
sought. These could by themselves cause a 21b/sq ft pressure rise
in the boom at ground level.
On one occasion the pressure rise was actually measured as a
boom struck two plate glass windows, each measuring 5ft by 10ft.
One window cracked across with a rise of 1.751b/sq ft. The other
remained intact. The boom will not affect ships because their
structure and windows are much stronger, but the disturbance to
people will remain a problem. Pressure rises between 2 and
2^1b/sq ft will not damage the ears.
Two factors are considered definite by Boeing. The airlines
cannot afford to be liable to damage claims from supersonic flying;
and neither can they tolerate having to operate in specific corridors.
Supersonic booms may be felt 25 miles either side of the aircraft's
track and wind can alter the distribution, but the higher pressure
rises will occur only over a 10 mile-wide band.
Finally, Boeing appear to be a little sceptical about the possibility
of co-operating with European companies in designing^ a
supersonic airliner, mainly because of the obvious commercial
implications. But they feel that all the problems can be solved
and think a suitable communications system for effective technical
liaison could be developed. They insist that design leadership
would have to be firmly vested in one company.

\Descent to begin at 0852 and to last 24 min at mean TAS of
364kt, using 800kg fuel. Engineers plan pressurization management
between bleeds and turbos when throttled back on descent.
ETA London 0916Z with 19,000kg of fuel remaining at 1,000ft.
The tip of Ireland is painting well on radar at 60 miles. Sun is
blinding. A leaden sea visible between dollops of cloud thrown
almost up to our level in polar maritime cold air. IAS 250kt;
M0.82; r.p.m. 88 per cent; o.a.t. — 48 °C; cabin height 6,000ft.
Navigator hands time plot to co-pilot and relaxes slightly. HF
weather reports in French. Cillard RAF radar (in Scotland?) has
us. English voices, clipped and calm in welcoming efficiency.
082OZ: Ireland in sight. Centre and reserve tanks now dry,
remaining fuel distributed in wings. 0837Z: Cillard loses us and
we switch to Scottish Airways control. Estimate Isle of Man at
0843. Prepare-for-descent checks read out. Landing weight will
be 77,500kg—very light—VREF 126kt, target threshold speed
135kt, maximum threshold speed 149kt.
0842Z : Pass Isle of Man, in sight below, together with coasts of
Wales, Ireland, England and Scotland, and request descent clearance
for 0851. At 0846 cleared down to flight level 210 and call
Preston. Throttle outers to 68 per cent and inners to 87 per cent
r.p.m. Descending at M.O.68 at 700ft./min. Wallasey at 0853.
0900Z: The Pennines lava-like in valley fog and snowy tops.
Joddrell Bank telescope like a deployed parachute far below.
Atlantic charts and manuals being cleared away. Pass Lichfield,
estimating Daventry at 0907, tuning beacons, change to London
control. 250kt i.a.s., jolted in rough air. Daventry at 0907, estimating
Beacon Hill at 0913. Cleared to flight level 190. Watford on
No 1 ADF, Dunsfold on No 2 ADF. Find Beacon Hill by Flying
Dunsfold range leg to a bearing from Watford. Under London
radar surveillance from Daventry. Cleared to flight level 080.
Don't confuse Beacon Hill with Woburn, check with ADF.
l,000ft/min now at 150. Wheels rumble down for airbrake effect,
slow to 200kt at 2,50Oft/min; trying to make Watford at 8,000ft.
Over Watford at 11,000ft radar takes us straight on to a
southerly lead-in for ILS, asks our rate of descent. Runway visibility
1,500yd. Still on autopilot, in cloud. Flap coming down. See
Greenwich through a hole in cloud, then Crystal Palace. A helicopter
is reported leaving Battersea. Approach checks read. Autopilot-
coupled glide-path and localizer armed. Radar vectors us on
to centre-line. Speed coming back to 150kt at 3,200ft. QNH set
on co-pilot's altimeter, QFE on captain's. Height 2,100ft, glidepath
coupler engaged at 152kt, going down at 900ft/min into dull
mist. Melted frost dripping fast from window frames. Captain's
hand poised on control wheel. Windscreen wipers working hard.
Lead-in lights now dimly in view, but no trace of runway.
BEA engineering base comes into sight to our left, co-pilot
postively identifies runway and tells captain. We surge in past the
lights, the captain cuts the autopilot and holds off. When I think
we are still 100ft up, the main wheels touch smoothly, the nose
comes down, spoilers are popped out, reverse thrust pulled.
Further end of runway still out of sight. The captain takes the
nosewheel tiller and starts braking while the co-pilot holds the
column forward and calls the decreasing speeds down to 60kt. We
turn off with some runway to spare, switch to airfield control
frequency. Shutting down checks begin. We are home.
Chock-to-chock time 9hr 15min for 4,210 n.m.: we took off at
about 1700 hr Seattle time and it is now 0130 by that reckoning—
time for bed. But here in London it is 0900hr or so and a new day
is just beginning. This is the way to travel if you don't weaken. ..

Air France 1649A Starliner... F-BHBT... Over The Top To Tokyo

2011-02-10T07:24:00.000-08:00

Photo at top is of Air France L-1049G F-BHBI and NOT L-1649A F-BHBT

I have always had an interest in navigating (Pre Electronic era) and flying over the pole, or "Over The Top". I found this interesting article written in the April 25, 1958 edition of Flight Global.

Starliner
to Tokyo

AIR FRANCE INAUGURATES ITS "ROUTE
POLAIRE" TO THE LAND OF THE RISING SUN
By RONALD BARKER J (" Flight " photographs by the Author

TIME and tide used to wait for no man. But whereas shipping
lines still are the servants of tide, ambitious airlines are playing
old Harry with time. Sometimes it has to slow down and
wait for man to catch up with it, and sometimes he cracks on at such
a pace that it has to take a short cut to keep up with him. However,
neither man nor time can really afford to give the other the slip
entirely, and would-be passengers over the polar routes have nothing
to worry about on this score. After all, if you divide your life into
lumps of 24 hours and calculate on your return home how many of
those you have spent on your voyage, you cannot get home on the
wrong day. And if you decide to remain in the East after crossing
the Date Line, the sudden change of an intangible date will not
affect your metabolism!
This jolly game was introduced last year, on a commercial scale,
by S.A.S. with their flight over the polar regions from Copenhagen
to Tokyo, via Anchorage in Alaska; now Air France, following
delivery of all their new fleet of long-range Super Constellation
L.I 649As, have been able to follow suit from Paris. Until B.O.A.C.
introduces its Comet 4s on the Far East route, this new Air France
service will be advertised as the fastest commercial link between
Europe and Japan.
With Air France you set off in evening darkness (if it's early
April) at about 7.30 p.m. (1930 G.M.T.), watch the following day's
sun rise twice and set once, and lose a day in the calendar before
arriving in Japan after about 30 hours' flying time: and, as the last
dawn had cracked for you some 13 hours earlier, it's somewhat
disturbing to find that you have reached Tokyo at 11.30 a.m.
On the April 10 inaugural flight from Paris a distinguished passenger
list included Air France's administrative president, M. Max
Hymans; M. Gaston Monnerville, President du Conseil de la
Republique, and other eminent French politicians. Journalists from
France, Britain, America, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Belgium
also were on board.
Our small party from the U.K. was escorted to Paris via an Air
France Super G Constellation by David Bamford, public relations
officer of A.F.'s U.K. organization. His father has, of course, been
its general manager since the early 'thirties. At Orly there was an
informal send-off party before we were shepherded into F-BHBT
Frontenac, the latest and last of the company's fleet of ten L. 1649As.
This aircraft had, in fact, been collected from Burbank only about
a month previously by Commandant P. Wintersdorff, who captained
our crew on the second leg of the journey—that is, from
Anchorage in Alaska to Tokyo.
For this special flight the seating layout allowed everyone an
abundance of space. There were 32 "Sky-lounges" (jauteuilscouchettes,
the French call them) with retractable leg-rests arranged
in pairs either side of the gangway in the main cabin, between the
galley and the next bulkhead forward; 12 between that bulkhead
(which contains the two toilets) and the crew's quarters. Aft of the
galley were two double bunks topped by two singles, for the
V.V.I.P.S on board.
On the later commercial flights there will be 34 tourist seats, 12
first-class Sky-lounges and eight Pullman berths. As with Air
France Super Gs on other routes, the seats are trimmed in cloth of
Shocking Pink—perhaps geranium pink sounds a little kinder, for
it's a cheerful yet restful shade. Their sponge-rubber cushions and
squabs are very comfortably profiled. Carpeting and seat-backs are
in a sober grey, and the upper half of the cabin is trimmed in matt
plastic material with a grey-and-white canvas print. The curtains
are a gay, Picasso-like riot of pattern and colour.
There wasn't much fuss about getting our 70-ton liner airborne,
despite its 8,170 Imp. gallon fuel load—which gives it a full range
of over 6,000 miles. On take-off and for the first few minutes of the
subsequent climb, vivid pale-blue flame licked from the twin
exhaust-effluxes of the Wright Turbo-Compound R-3350 EA2s—
the lower outlets from the engine cylinders, the upper from the
triple exhaust turbines.
Soon the flame faded to salmon pink as the mixture was weakened
and the engine speed cut, and thenceforth only a ring in the turbine
outlet glowed red in the night. Cruising initially at 240 knots and
about 9,000ft, we headed north over Belgium, then parallel with
the East Anglian coastline and east of the Shetlands.
We had been reassured beforehand about the emergency equipment
aboard—dinghies, tents, survival suits, plenty of concentrated
foods, transmitters, stoves, rockets and smoke generators, torches,
sun-glasses, and even a hunting-knife and a triple-bore rifle for
potting at polar bears. Now a bilingual steward demonstrated lifejacket
procedure; if we were dropped into the sea, we should be
both phosphorescent and shark-proof.

Connie FE

Engine and propeller noise is quite subdued in most parts of this
largest member of the Constellation family. The inboard motors
are farther outboard than on the smaller craft, to use an Irishism;
the huge, three-bladed props are geared down more, and there is
added sound-damping in the fuselage. Only in those parts of the
cabin nearest the blade-tips—in particular, the toilets, so that one
is not inclined to stay in them longer than is necessary—is the
noise and vibration at all oppressive.
Our senses had already accustomed themselves to the hum and
very slight movement of our temporary caravan when Air France
began to serve their evening delights for the table. First, a wide
choice of aperitifs; then, lubricated liberally with champagne and
table wines, came a Caviar de Beluga with a fresh tang of the sea,
cold turbot with salad, lamb chops with haricot verts, cheeses,
petits fours, ice-cream (just about as we crossed the Arctic Circle
N.E. of Iceland), fresh fruit, coffee and brandy. This light repast
finished at about 0030 G.M.T. on the 11th.
It should have put everyone soundly to sleep for many hours, yet
at 0220 G.M.T. I woke to see a bright and decorative sky to the
N.E.—all the spectral shades over a black and empty sea. Was this
a sunrise without a sun, or a sunset, or the aurora borealis? Or even
the champagne and just a dream? No one else seemed to know,
but I think it might have been Friday's sun trying to reach us from
somewhere around Siberia. At this time we were approaching the
east coast of Greenland, which we crossed (0320 G.M.T.) at Jonsbu
—about latitude 75 deg N. My special sunrise then disappeared.
The icy mass of Greenland was crossed, in darkness, diagonally
from Jonsbu and over Kennedy Straight to Fort Conger on Ellesmere
Island. Now Friday's sun began to rise, from the S.E. relative
to our aircraft, so that we were able to pick out the forbidding peaks
and glaciers of Grant Land in the twilight.

Navigators Station on the Connie
Between there and Barter Island on the mainland of Alaska there
was a leisurely breakfast in full daylight, and Bertrand d'Astorg,
who is a poet and author as well as being Air France's second string
in public relations, entertained the guests by donning a survival
suit and being dowsed with Perrier (see photograph) to celebrate
our Arctic crossing. Our cruising speed had risen steadily as the
aircraft became lighter and the flight plan in terms of progress and
fuel consumption had proved fully satisfactory.
We were now at 24,000ft and cruising at some 295 kt. Outside
our aluminium shell the air temperature was — 56 deg F (88 deg of
frost) but a ground temperature of +37 deg F was forecast at
Anchorage—with good weather and clear skies. We were told, too,
that our nearest approach to the Pole had been 870 km, at precisely
0638 G.M.T. After that we had started, of course, to drop
down the other side of the world.
On this route there is the same independence of a fixed course
as over the Atlantic. Depending upon the atmospheric pressure at
the Pole and consequent wind directions and strengths, some flights
may pass directly over it, whereas on other occasions it may be
skirted by over 1,000 miles. On the return route from Tokyo more
favourable winds prevail, and the flying time in this direction is
quoted as 27y hours in place of just under 30 for the outward trip
—both fabulous figures for an 8,420-mile flight when considered
in relation to the time it takes to cover that distance in a private car.
Polar flight and its relationship to the earth's rotation and the
sun is most probably less obscure to most of my readers than it is
to me—and many of my fellow-passengers. To put matters in their
simplest terms (I think) the sun can be considered as rushing round
the Equator at about 1,000 m.p.h. in a clockwise direction viewed
from the North Pole. Thus from Paris to Tokyo one is being
chased by it. and from Tokyo to Paris one is rotating in the opposite
direction to meet it. On the westward journey, the higher the
latitude, the slower one has to go to keep up with the sun; so at
the Pole itself one wouldn't have to move at all—except to keep
warm.
Initially from Paris we had, as it were, spent our time climbing
up to high latitudes without making much impression westwards
or longitudinally. During this period the sun was overtaking us
rapidly; but once we had reached northern regions of the globe
where its horizontal periphery is much reduced, we were progressing
quicker than the sun.
Thus it was that our breakfast sun before Alaska disappeared
again at around 0800 G.M.T. after only about three hours, and we
re-entered the same night that we had so recently left. This was
deeply disappointing, since we were thus deprived of a sight of
Alaska's mighty mountain ranges, including the North American
continent's highest peak—Mount McKinley (20,269ft). Just before
midday G.M.T. Commandant Carmeille (who completed A.F.'s
first proving flight over this route last January) throttled back, and
we lost height gradually in increasingly bumpy conditions, for
touch-down soon after midday at 1237 G.M.T.—still just in
darkness.
This was fair enough for the Anchorites, for their local time was
only 0237. Nevertheless, the whole city seemed to be there to welcome
us, with words, music, food and drink. There were three
combo bands taking turns to play the Marseillaise, the Alaska territorial
Anthem: ". . . Alaska's flag—to Alaskans dear, The single
flag of a last frontier." We were only disappointed that there was
no Eskimo band to play us phoqne-sangs on their sealskin guitars.
All had been arranged by the Chamber of Commerce Red Carpet
Committee, and if one can make a friend in two hours, here was
ample opportunity.
Colonel Don Graham, deputy commander of the U.S.A.F. 10th
Air Division, told us something about flying activity and conditions
in the district, military, private and corporate; and about the hard
but rewarding country around there. The latest winner of the Fur
Rendezvous Queen Contest helped to entertain the guests, and a
monster stuffed timber wolf to frighten them. Whilst we were
there an S.A.S. DC-7C on its polar path flew in, refuelled and was
quickly away—routine stuff these days. A spectacular dawn, which
had begun to glow behind the range of snow-covered Chugach
mountains, provided a superb backcloth to our function. Just
before we left, a local resident, one Eugene C. Smith, smuggled me
into the control tower to enjoy a view of his home-town and surroundings.
We looked over to Hood Lake, where ten per cent of
the U.S.-registered floatplanes are kept. Hood Lake is joined to
another by a canal, which gives an adequate take-off run for heavily
laden craft. In fact, over 800 lightplanes of one sort and another
are registered in the area—it claims to be the Small Plane Capital
of the World.
Even this brief introduction to Anchorage whetted the appetite
for more—especially as there was no snow around, and there had
been only three wet days in the last sixty. Take-off was at
1527 G.M.T., and we were to remain in daylight, with the sun
chasing us until that evening in Japan—20 hours or so of daylight
in April. Our complete crew had changed at Anchorage (we had
clapped the retiring members a friendly thank-you) to await Frontenac's
return on the following Sunday (Japanese time), and we
were now in the charge of Commandant P. Wintersdorff, with
over 13,250 flying hours' experience logged.
Time now began to go really haywire. For instance, our last meal
(breakfast) had been at 0830 G.M.T. and, apart from a bite or two
during the reception at Anchorage International, we were not fed
again for 12 hours, towards the end of which the charming and
constantly attentive Air France stewardesses (one of whom was
Japanese in each crew) were embarrassed to hear our entrails
rattling in protest. The meal, when it came, was termed dejeuner/
diner—aperitif, tinned salmon and salad, braised chicken with
mushrooms, cheese and an orange—plus an endless flood of champagne
and/or wine. Meanwhile our friends at Anchorage were
probably enjoying a late breakfast.
We had passed over the tundra and ice-bound lakes of Alaska at
about 1650 G.M.T., but for a while the white, mountainous outline
of the north-west corner remained in view. Then we were alone
over the Bering Sea, roughly following the line of the Aleutian
Islands, and our next glimpse of land would be Japan, many hours
ahead.
At 1940 there was some excitement when the inboard port propeller
feathered—rumours of overheating, surmise about the pointof-
no-return. About 25 minutes later Crndt. Wintersdorff restarted
it, and it gave us no further anxiety. I went forward for a word
with him a little later, and asked why he had stopped this engine.
Apparently a warning light had flashed, and he had taken the step
as a precaution, although rightly suspecting a faulty signal switch
—it was still signalling whilst I was in the cockpit with him.
He was making frequent reference to his weather radar, the
scanner of which has a 40- to 50-mile range and enables the pilot
to foresee and avoid storm centres. Our altitude at this time was
14,000ft, and we were running a little slower into a medium headwind.
Speaking with Francois Le Noan, the navigator, I learnt
that two navigators have been carried on the first leg to Anchorage,
but that only one is required on the briefer and less hazardous
Anchorage - Tokyo stretch. Although the magnetic compass is
useless in the polar region, it is apparently usable during the last
three hours before the Anchorage refuelling stop on the outward
run, and for the whole of the Anchorage - Tokyo section.
There are, however, six or seven hours during which a Bendix
polar-path gyro compass is supplemented by several other aids.
Incidentally, although two gyro compasses are carried in case of
the failure of one, these instruments are considered sufficiently
accurate for readings to be taken only from the one. A polarized
sky light compass can plot the position of the sun during the arctic
months of twilight, when it is well below the horizon and neither
stars for astral navigation nor land are visible. In addition, there ;
are plenty of radio signalling stations adjacent to the route; unfortunately,
cosmic disturbances at these high latitudes cause much '•
interference at certain times of the year.
All in all, the non-technical passenger will be satisfied to learn
that every known navigational instrument, to cope with all the
known quantities likely to be encountered on this route, is included
in Air France's equipment. He will be more interested to hear
whether the long hours spent sitting in a very comfortable and
well-furnished aeroplane are fun, or a bore. Certainly the shorter
hops of the longer India route provide more distractions; it all ;
depends on whether time or pleasure is the more important, and
whether he is worried by a multiplicity of landings and take-offs.
In summer much more could be seen of the fascinating and little-.,
known polar regions, and the brave Alaskan scenery. I would
always choose to repeat my own experience, by taking one route on
the outward journey and returning by the other. ;
During the Anchorage - Tokyo stretch, the tedium of flying for
hours above cloud and sea was inescapable, but it would have
helped to sleep as much as possible, to compensate for the •
increasingly tricky time factor. On entering the area of the Pacific
Ocean at the south-western extremity of the Aleutians, one crosses ,
the Date Line, and it becomes tomorrow. After the unexpected
dallying in Anchorage, our arrival time in Tokyo was now expected .'
to be lunchtime (1325 on Saturday, Japanese time). At Greenwich
it was then 0425 on the same day, whereas at Anchorage it was
still Friday, and only 1825 at that. So our last meal on board was
a meaty affair—with, of course, champagne.
Our approach to Tokyo was marred by an overcast at 2,500ft, .
so that we could see little of the land until we had almost arrived i
there. The International Airport, which is becoming increasingly '.;
busy, is soon to have a new and much longer runway parallel to :
the present main S.E./N.W. strip of 9,600ft. About 1 l,000-12,000ft ;.
is suggested for the new one, but to accommodate it the island on "
which it stands will have to be enlarged into Tokyo bay at several ";•
points.
Already on terra ftrma when we landed—and stealing much of
our thunder—were two Tu-104s, which had brought in the Lenin- '
grad Symphony Orchestra a little while before us. Nevertheless,
there was a fine welcome, formalities were brief and casual again,
and Air France had certainly done us proud in every possible way.
We had enjoyed on board the Frontenac the skill as a raconteur
—albeit somewhat cynical—of the French writer and journalist,
Paul Mousset. This was his twenty-second visit to Japan, and
everyone on board the aircraft was presented with a copy of his
newest book on that country. Among his truisms about Tokyo was
his comment about the native taxi-driver: if you see his arm
waving about outside the window, it means only one sure thing
—that the window is open.
My hotel bedroom is number 280. Adjacent to it on one side is
number 278, but on the other they progress along the passage in
this order: 282, 281, 285, 283, 279. To cap it all, one local Sunday
paper, on the morning after we had landed in Tokyo, reported that
our arrival had taken place on Sunday afternoon. I must have
miscalculated somewhere.

Aircraft F-BHBT was broken up at Orly in August 1967.

What Ever Happened To The Air France Latecoere 631

2011-02-07T08:04:00.001-08:00

Latecoere 631

The headlines in the Pottsville Republican August 2, 1948 read:

GIANT FRENCH AIRLINER IS LOST AT SEA
Would be worst disaster on Atlantic Run is the 52 persons aboard are not found.
U.S. Ship Speeding Into The Search Area
August 2, 1948

Paris, August, 2, 1948 (U.P.) Sea and air units searched the mid Atlantic some 1,400 miles west of Africa coast today for a huge, six engined French Flying boat missing with 52 persons.
The plane, the largest commercial airliner in the world, was last heard from 8 P.M. EDT Saturday. It disappeared on a flight from Fort De France, Martinique, in the French West Indies, to Port Etienne, French West Africa.
The missing plane carried 40 passengers and a crew of 12. No passenger list was available in Paris.
French Naval authorities ordered a warship and naval planes from Dakar to the search area and ships at sea were notified to be on the lookout.
Air France sent two long range planes to join the search, one a Latecoere 631, a sister ship to the missing plane, and the other a long range Air France Constellation.
The U.S. coast Guard cutter Campbell, on patrol duty in the mid Atlantic, notified that U.S. embassy that it was steaming to the last known position of the giant sky queen.
The missing plane left Martinique at 10:50 a.m. (EDT) Saturday and was scheduled to arrive at Fort Etienne at 9 p.m. It was last heard from at 8.p.m. when it gave its position and said all was well.
The position given by the plane was about 1,400 miles short of its destination in an area some 850 to 900 nautical miles northwest of the Cape Verde Islands.
The U.S. Embassy notified Air France that an American radio station in the Azores had picked up a distress signal. The time of the message was not known.
The U.S. Coast Guard said the Campbell was 420 miles away from the last reported position and was expected to arrive in the general area of the search at 6 p.m. (EDT).
American planes are stand9ng by to join the search if the French request it.
Should all aboard be lost, it would be the worst disaster on the Trans Atlantic run and the third worst aviation disaster in history.
The giant flying boat is the largest commercial airliner now in use with a takeoff weight of some 83 tons. (332,000 lbs). It is 141 feet long and has a wingspan of 786 feet. It is powered by six 1,600 hp engines giving it an effective range of about 3,000 miles at cruising speeds of 200 miles per hour.

The 631....She had beautiful lines

As with all disasters , especially aircraft that are missing, the rumor mill runs wild. Just like the story printed on August 5, 1948.

REPORT LOST FRENCH PLANE FOUND AND ALL SAFE. BUT STORY “MIXED”
August 5, 1958
Pottsville Republican

Paris, Aug. 5 (U.P.) The French press agency said today that Air France had received a dispatch saying the Latecoere 631 flying boat missing in the South Atlantic since Sunday had been found with all 52 aboard alive.
After its dispatch reporting the discovery of the plane, the news agency circulated another from Dakar saying the search had been futile. The possibility was seen, but not confirmed, that it was delayed and had been superseded by the discovery report.
The agency dispatch reporting without immediate confirmation the discovery of the big flying boat was from Marseille. It said Air France the national air line which operated the plane, had been notified.
Air France headquarters in Paris said it had no information tending to confirm the Marseille dispatch.
The press agency itself cautioned that the report should be “Treated with reserve”.
According to the unofficial report, the craft was found 120 miles south of the point from which it last reported all well about midnight Sunday.
It was flying from Martinique to West Africa with 40 passengers and a crew of 12.
The last radio report was sent from a point some 1,400 miles west of the African coast and 800 to 900 miles northwest of the Cape Verde Islands.

Five days after the ill fated aircraft left Martinque, aircraft debris was spotted floating on the surface of the ocean by the U.S.C.G. Campbell.

The massive flight deck of the 631

FIND WRECKAGE OF LOST
FRENCH AIRLINER AT SEA
AUGUST 6, 1948

New York, Aug 8…Charred seat cushions and other debris found in the South Atlantic near the last reported position of a missing six engined Air France flying boat indicated that the craft exploded killing all 52 persons aboard, the Coast Guard reported today.
However, the captain of the Coast Guard cutter Campbell radioed from the scene, 1,200 miles west of Dakar, that search for survivors would be continued in the hope that some might yet be found alive. The plane disappeared Sunday.
There is no doubt that the plane was stricken by fire either before or after an explosion” The Campbell reported
The report from the cuter said, that the sea in the area, only 65 miles from the normal course of the French airliner, was covered with debris. Among the items picked from the water were leather trimmed, rose upholstered seats, bits of plywood tabletop and a locker door.
“There is little doubt that the wreckage and debris seen today by the crew members of the Campbell came from the plane.” Captain Beckwith Jordan reported. “The Campbell has changed course to the leeward pursuing the theory that any survivors who managed to escape the airliner by raft would have been driven in that direction by the steady wind.”
The plane seats, built on painted aluminum frames, were still joined together and were hauled aboard the cutter with grappling hooks.
The floating wreckage was first sighted by a B-29 which guided the Coast Guard cutter to the scene.
The 73 ton airliner, the Latecoere 631 disappeared Sunday on a routine flight from Fort –De- France, Martinique, French West Africa. The passengers were mainly Britons, Frenchmen and Colombians.

According to the article the 631 was lost 1200-1400 miles west of Port Etienne or 850 to 900 miles NW of Cape Verde Islands.
The aircraft left Fort De France, Martinique at 10:50 a.m. (EDT) and was due to arrive at 9:00 p.m. (EDT).

The total distance of the trip is 2370 nautical miles. According to the newspapers the total flight time was 10:50 minutes, which if calculated correctly gives a rough ground speed of 219 knots.
The charts show a rough course of 075 and the area where the Campbell would have spotted wreckage or as close as possible with the info available.

THE LATECOERE 631:
From Flight Global: 1947

Air France announce that the Latecoere 631 will go into
service on the route to the West Indies for which three have
been ordered. On July 25th an initial flight started from
Bordeaux, calling at Port Etienne and flying on to Fort de
France, Antilles. On the schedule the journey from Paris to
Bordeaux is to be made by train and takes six hours. The
rest of the journey is to be completed in just over twenty-four
hours

The French have for many years appreciated
the inherent qualities and future possibilities
of the large, long-range commercial flying-boat.
Unlike ourselves, they already possess a few machines ot
this class which, though falling short of the standards
which will be set in two years' time by the SR45 (span
220ft, flying weight 120 tons, cruising speed over
300 m.p.h., range 5,000 miles), do at least approach the
massive Saro in dimensions. One of these boats, the six-engined
Latecoere 631-04, fourth machine of its class, was
flown over last week from Biscarrosse to the B.O.A.C.
base at Hythe, and was made available for flying experience
and examination The visit was arranged by Commercial
Transocean (London), Ltd., the British representatives
for the Office Francais d'Exportation de Materiel
Aeronantique.

The basic design of the 631 dates from 1938, when the
first prototype was ordered by the French Air Ministry to
a specification calling for a flying-boat to operate on
North and South Atlantic routes, carrying forty passengers
for 3,700 miles against a 37 m.p.h. headwind.
Between 1939 and 1940 construction was interrupted, but
was put in hand again after the German occupation, and
the first machine flew in November, 1942. Thereafter
it was confiscated by the Germans and taken to Friedrichshafen,
on Lake Constance, where it was eventually sunk
by bombing. Flights have already been made over the
South Atlantic to Latin American countries, and it is
understood that Air France will shortly make a proving
flight over the same route.
A considerable number of these flying-boats have been
ordered. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 will go to Air France, Nos. 5, 6
and 7 to the Mexican Government, and 8, 9 and 10 to Air
France. It is possible that Air France will ultimately order
three more. The price, incidentally, is in the region of
£350,000.
Everything considered, the Latecoere is a most creditable
achievement. She is remarkable not only for her overall
size and the spaciousness and arrangement of her interior,
but for her graceful line's and very clean aerodynamic
design. Points worthy of special notice are the lateral
stabilizing floats, which retract into the tail fairings of the
outboard nacelles, and the tail unit, with a dihedral tail plane
carrying unbraced fin and rudder assemblies totally
above it at its extremities.
As demonstrated last week, the 631-04 is laid out to
carry forty-six sleeping passengers on the North or South
Atlantic route and for short-range operation, e.g., 1,000
miles, will seat a hundred. The wing span is 188ft, the
aspect ratio 9.4, and the gross wing area 3,760ft. At an
all-up weight of 157,300 lb this gives the moderate wing
loading of 41.5 lb/sq ft, which is particularly desirable
in view of high power loading of over 16 lb/h.p. The
six Wright Cyclone GR 2600 A5B units at present installed
give a take-off output of i,6oo h.p. each and allow cruising
speeds of up to 185 m.p.h. at 1,500ft. From boat No. 5
onwards Wright engines giving 1,890 h.p. will be installed.
We are assured by M. Castex, of O.F.E.M.A., that the substitution
of Bristol Hercules would increase the cruising
speed by as much as 40 m.p.h. With the present engines
the maximum speed is 246 m.p.h. at 6,000ft, and it is
claimed that, at a weight of 45 tons, flight is possible with
three engines stopped on one side. Ratier 14-ft 3-blade,
fully feathering, electrically controlled airscrews are fitted.
The claimed take-off time of 66 seconds, at a speed of 97 m.p.h.,
can well be believed, for with a heavy fuel load
and carrying sixty-odd passengers for a demonstration flight
over London (take-off weight 65 tons) the machine seemed
to unstick in about 54 seconds. In the evening, with fewer
passengers, the time was reduced to no more than 40
seconds.
The most critical passengers on flights last week seemed
to be even more impressed by the interior appointments
of the boat than by her external dimensions. The sensitive
eye of Mr. Lonsdale-Hands found little fault. Aft of the
entry door is a large kitchen with a Butane gas cooker,
and in line with it are toilets. Moving forward along the
central corridor one passes eight cabins, each containing
two convertible armchairs, a bedding locker, and a wardrobe.
These are screened from the corridor by curtains.
Further forward are four more cabins, each seating four in
convertible armchairs, and next comes a really spacious
restaurant bar. This, being in line with the engines, is
somewhat noisier than the other compartments, and the
tables are inclined to vibrate. As in the other compartments,
the ports are insufficiently wide, though this is a
fault shared by many other large commercial aircraft of
much later design. Here criticism of the bar must end Moving forward again
(by this tune the bow window is
becoming distinctly visible in the distance)
one discovers
a baggage hold and another toilet, and further on still are
two more blocks of cabins, one for eight and one for four
passengers. Finally, immediately aft of the bow mooring
compartment, is a cosy nook for two passengers. Through
a large window in the extreme bow a view of the land or
seascape immediately ahead is obtainable.
During most the flight from Hythe up to Mortlake, over
London, and back by way of Shoreham, we were on the
upper deck with the pilot, M. Prevost, who handled his
huge charge with true French finesse. The crew compartment
is austere, but everything seems to work well. One
feature to which it is difficult to become accustomed, having
been used to flying in Short boats, is the immense length
of the bow, sloping away forward of the windscreen. This
suggests the deck of a large cabin cruiser, an impression
which is heightened by the mast amidships. On the London
trip the ground speed was about 165 m.p.h. The altimeter
reading is, perhaps, best left unrecorded.
In the evening M. Prevost paid his respects to Calshot,
the Saunders-Roe works at Cowes, and the bases at Hum
and Poole. Passengers included General Phillipe, Chief
Engineer, French Air Ministry; Dr. Ricardo; Capt. Dudley
Travers; Capt. Alger; and—taking an evening off before
making the initial flight in the Saro jet fighter—Mr. Geoffrey
Tyson. We engaged in conversation a gentleman who was,
perhaps, more impressed by the 631 than anyone else.
By name Mr. R. F. Little, he was the flight engineer in
the Dornier Wai, in which Frank Courtney made his westeast
Atlantic bid in 1927.

Editors Note: Other Latecoere 631’s crashes

Latecoere Boat Lost
April 6, 1950
TEN lives were lost when, on March
28th, a Latecoere 631 six-engined
flying-boat crashed in the sea off Cap
Ferrat while on a test-flight.

September 10, 1955

The Latecoere flying boat had been based in Africa to fly cotton from Lac Lérè in Chad to Douala. On a flight to Biscarosse, France for routine overhaul the aircraft entered a tropical storm. The wing broke, probably as a result of winds hear, and the aircraft crashed. This was the last active Latecoere 631 flying boat. Plans to convert some stored 631s for cargo transportation were not carried out; all remaining planes were scrapped.
F-BDRE

Some Thoughts on the Convair Liners... CV-240 and CV-340

2011-01-31T16:15:00.000-08:00

A Flight Global Aricle From 13 February 1953

THOUGHTS ON THE CONVAIR-LINER
ONE reason for the belief that few, if any, orders have been
lost to the British civil aircraft industry by reason of long
delivery-dates may well be that a great part of the market has
already been captured by American competitors. Many of our
potential customers have quite recently placed orders for American
transport aircraft which must be fully utilized for anything between
five and ten years before their owners can think of replacing them
with turbine-powered types. In the long- and medium-range
categories most of the successful American machines are of wartime
or immediate post-war design, and the latest orders are for
those versions developed to give better performance and payload
capacity.
A good example of these successful American designs is the
Convair-Liner series for short and medium stage-lengths. The
prototype Model 240 first flew in March 1947 and was certificated
for civil aviation only eight months later. Altogether 175 Convair
240s were built—170 for the airlines. A larger, more powerful
version, the Model 340, made its initial flight in October 1951 and
received its C.A.A. certification in March 1952. Latest available
figures show that the 340 has proved as attractive to operators as
its predecessor, for over 20 orders have subsequently been placed
for a total of at least 175 aircraft. Several have already been
delivered and are in service with domestic operators.
Assuming a unit value of £200,000 per aircraft (and this is considerably
less than the figure at present quoted for the 340), these
combined orders for 350 Convair-Liners are worth £70 million—
or some £35 million more than the total value of Britain's aircraft
exports in 1952. About three-quarters of Convair's civil output is
for domestic operators, the total export value of Model 240s
delivered or 340s on order being in the region of £18 million.
Details of Convair orders and the 32 operators responsible (including
26 airlines) are as follows:
American Airlines 79 CV-240
Braniff 20 CV-340
Chicago ajd Southern 10 CV-340
Continental 5 CV-240 ..7 CV-340
Delta 10 CV-340
Hawaiian 10 CV-340
National 6CV-340
P.A.W.A. 15 CV-340
Northeast 5 CV-240 ..4 CV340
United 55 CV-340
Western 10 CV-240

(excluding military contracts):—
previous purchase of 240s. The largest number of 340s will be
operated by United Air Lines, with 55 aircraft; five of these were
originally ordered by Pioneer Air Lines. Large numbers of the
T-29 crew-trainer version of the 340 have been delivered to, or
are on order for, the U.S.A.F., and an additional order for turboprop
variant (employing Allison T-38 turboprops and designated
T-29E) was placed in October 1951. Yet another military version
ordered in large numbers is the C-131 casualty-evacuation transport.
The Convair 240 is normally equipped to carry 40 passengers
plus baggage. By comparison, the Model 340 has a longer fuselage
providing standard accommodation for 44 passengers or additional
freight; it also has higher aspect-ratio wings of increased span to
permit the carriage of 500 gallons extra fuel (the 34o's two integral
fuel tanks give a total capacity of 1,750 U.S. gallons). Numerous
other refinements have been embodied. Basic comparative data
for the two aircraft are as follows: Convair 240: length, 74ft 8in;
span, 91ft 9m; wing area, 817 sq ft; weight empty, 30,3451b;
take-off weight, 41,7901b. Convair 340 : length, 79ft 2in; span,
105ft 8in; wing area, 920 sq ft; weight empty, 32,3991b; take-off
weight, 47,000 lb. Both types are pressurized and are powered by
the same basic engine—the Pratt and Whitney R-2800; but the
Model 340 has two CB16 engines which give a higher normal
cruising power than the CAi8s powering the earlier machine. For
short ranges the manufacturers quote maximum payloads of
10,155 lb (Model 240) and 14,100 lb (Model 340).
One disadvantage common to both aircraft is that the relatively
narrow internal cabin-width of 8ft ioin makes five-abreast seating
an impossibility. In the 340, higher-density seating can only be
achieved by installing extra pairs of seats in the fore or aft portions
of the cabin and by decreasing the seat-pitching, in stages, from
the normal 38m down to 34m. In this way, seating capacity can
be varied between 44 and 56.
According to the maker's figures, the Convair 340 can carry
13,500 lb payload over a 200-mile stage-length at a block speed of
210 m.p.h., assuming that 1,100 b.h.p. are being drawn from each
engine at a cruising height of 10,000ft in still air; under the same
conditions a payload of 10,000 lb can be carried by the 340 on a
1,000-mile stage at a block speed of 240 m.p.h.
Convair's estimate of operating costs under U.S. domestic
conditions shows a direct hourly cost of $138 and a corresponding
figure of 67 cents per statute mile. These values assume a fairly
high average utilization of eight hours daily, average journey length
of 200 miles and speed of 207 m.p.h., with seven-year depreciation
of capital investment. Corresponding figures for operating the
CV-340 outside the United States show increases of some $60 per
hour and 25 cents per mile, primary reasons for the increase being
high fuel costs and lower utilization. In any case, such figures are
probably optimistic and would vary greatly under different
operating circumstances.
The price of a Convair 340 with spares, according to the latest
available estimate, is $700,000 (£250,000), making it more expensive
than the Viscount—which, as recent events have shown, is
now capable of competing with the Convair on better than equal
terms. In performance, structure weight and dimensions, the
specifications of the two aircraft are remarkably close, but the
British machine, being four-engined, is basically more costly to
build in terms of man-hours and materials.
Only high U.S. labour costs can be responsible for the undoubtedly
steep price of the Convair, bearing in mind the fact that
the American company's design, jigging and tooling costs are
spread over an output of over 600 basically similar aircraft, compared
with (so far) 75 in the case of the British machine. Vickers-
Armstrongs claim superiority for the Viscount on the scores of
speed, operating cost and load-carrying ability over almost the
entire medium-range band. In addition, the four-turbine-engined
airliner is claimed to have more passenger-appeal from the aspects
of comfort, performance and security. Events support a belief
that the Convair sales-curve is well past its peak, and confidence
that present and future versions of the Viscount will achieve at
least comparable success on the world's short- and medium range
air routes.

New York Metroplex Procedure Plan 1970 SID's @ STAR"s

2011-01-27T12:28:00.000-08:00

I found this cool old chart from 1970 in my air traffic controller course books. While in the PANG.

NEW YORK METROPLEX 1970 PROCEDURAL PLAN

On 2 April 1970 a new air traffic procedural plan will be implemented in the New York area. The plan represents a major improvement in the Air Traffic system. It includes significant revisions to the existing procedures. Primary arrival fixes have been moved out to provide additional departure routes and greater flexibility in handling the air traffic. Improved distribution of traffic to reduce bottlenecks is expected. Improved arrival procedures have been developed to insure against gaps in arrival sequences.

Sorry my scanner is to small had to piece the chart
TAG all photos to enlarge

Cockpit Photo ...Unknown

2011-01-19T07:09:00.000-08:00

Found this old photo at a flea market, but can't seem to identify the twin engined aircraft.

Does it look familiar to anyone?

Tag to enlarge

FLYING THE EARLY BOEING 707-80 "THE DASH EIGHTY

2011-01-12T14:19:00.000-08:00

Boeing 707-80 prototype

"The view from the pilots seat is excellent"

Flying the Boeing 707-80

A fantastic article about flying the original Boeing 707 written in Flight Magazine, 15, June 1956

Captain Spooner is the Senior captain on B.O.A.C. Stratocruiser fleet. He was the first Englishman to fly the 707.. On this flight he flew with famous Boeing test pilot Tex Johnston.

FLYING THE 707
By CAPT. ANTHONY SPOONER

15 June 1956

ON April 11, at the invitation of Boeing, I was privileged
To visit Seattle for three days and to fly the 707 prototype.
It is no small tribute to the far-sightedness of
manufacturers that the importance of the pilot's opinion, as
Expressed through his national associations and through the
International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association, is now
sufficiently recognized for such visits to be arranged.
So smoothly did the journey go that after departure by
B.O.A.C. Monarch at 8 p.m. on Monday, April 10, I was able
to touch down some 6,000 miles away at 8.30 p.m. the following
evening. I was naturally tired, partially because I had worked
my passage across the Atlantic as a navigator, but none the less
not unduly so, for both airlines had run to schedule and both
trips had been carried out in near perfect weather. Also, my
Transatlantic Stratocruiser and United Airlines' DC-6B were
exceptionally quiet aircraft. More modern piston-driven equipment
may be faster but certainly is not quieter.
During my three-and-a-half-hour transit in New York I telegraphed
ahead to Mr. Ralph Bell, Boeing director of sales, and
he kindly arranged for a car to meet me at the Seattle-Tacoma
Airport. This was but one of the thoughtful gestures which he
and his staff made. During this visit I received as much courtesy
and attention from all of Boeing as I would had I been a
potential customer with a $100 million order burning a hole in
my pocket. This is one more example of the fact that responsible
manufacturers are fully alive to the worth of pilot opinion, and
it is in keeping with the policy recently adopted by Vickers and
Bristols at home.
Out at the huge Boeing plant early next morning, I was put
in charge of Mr. Ray Chamberlain of the sales department. He
readily understood my position and for the next three days acted
as guide, counsellor and friend. He rarely left my side and
spared no pains to ensure that I saw what I wanted and got an
answer to the many questions I asked. At no time was it necessary
for me to emphasize the point that, although the operator
is the customer of the aircraft manufacturer, the pilot is the true
consumer of his products.
From Ray Chamberlain I learned that a special flight had
been arranged for me that afternoon. It should give satisfaction
to pilots to realize that such a flight, costing more than $5,000,
had been specifically arranged and that no attempt was made to
fit it in with some existing test programme. Later in the morning
I had the pleasure of a frank talk with

Mr. W. E. Beall, the senior vice-president. Points arising from
this talk were that Boeing did not necessarily confine their structural
programme to the strict C.A.A. requirements. When in
any doubt, they did not hesitate to exceed these standards. For
example, he referred me to the additional stress-factors they
had given to the window cut-outs and to the fact that, though
American design philosophy favoured a multi-path constructional
method in preference to the British guaranteed-life test-tank
procedure, Boeing, while keeping faith with all of the requirements
of the former, were in addition planning to subject a
complete 707 fuselage to a thorough water-tank test. However,
they were not contemplating wing-flexing tests.
Another point Mr. Beall rightly made was that Boeing aircraft
had carried out virtually millions of flying hours in the
40,000-ft zones and they had done this in highly pressurized,
large fuselages, yet they had never experienced a single decompression
failure in flight. Thus, in building fuselages capable
of withstanding high differential pressures, they were, in the
707, doing a little more than they had been doing in the military
field for the past seven or eight years.
The rest of the morning was taken up in conversation with
Mr. Taylor, manager of customer relations, and with Mr. Jack
Steiner, project engineer for the 707. I was to see a lot of Jack
Steiner for the next three days and I soon learned that he was
a walking encyclopedia of technical information. His office is at
the Renton Plant some miles away. In this plant, which is soon
to be considerably enlarged, the KC-135 (Boeing jet tanker) and
the 707 production lines are being laid down. Up to now, most
of the 700-odd KC-97s (Stratocruiser tankers) had been built
here and the change-over from the one type to the new types
is in full swing. To give some indication of the size of the future
production, I quote the figure I was given that some $45 million
had been expended on the jigging alone. Clearly Boeing mean
to build this new aircraft in hundreds, if not thousands.
At present the KC-135 programme is ahead of the 707
schedule. I was able to see for myself how near to flight the
first of the production aircraft were and I saw signs that others
would soon be following. There are no visible signs of any
707 assuming definite shape, but I understand that they are
already cutting metal for the first production model due to fly
early in 1958.

Here I think it worth explaining the similarity and differences
between the two aircraft. In basic appearance, both the KC-135
and the 707 are remarkably similar and both stem from the
prototype 707 which first flew 21 months ago. Certain vital
sections are common to all three aircraft. These are the wing,
the gear, the control surfaces, and sweepback. Generally it is
true to say that the underside of the fuselage is basically the
same. Initially, both aircraft will use the same type of engines,
mounted on identical pod beams. However, the similarity is
only basic. Customer requirement and conflicting standards for
military and civil usage have, in effect, made the 707 and the
KC-135 only about 25 per cent exact in detail. For example,
the upper fuselage shape of the 707 is both taller and wider than
that of the KC-135, since this latter is an upright oval and the
707 has a double bubble joined at a crease cord. Also, the customer
and civil requirements have resulted in the 707 design of
emergency flap and gear being considerably altered so as to have
no controls other than in the cockpit.
It should be emphasized that both the KC-135 and the 707
are considerably larger aircraft than the prototype now flying.
It was quite obvious from all I saw that Boeing means to
make a serious challenge in the civil aircraft field. They certainly
cannot be accused of running off a few civil aircraft on a military
production line. Possibly this change in their thinking stems
from a practical realization that it is economically unsound to
put all one's eggs into one basket. Possibly, too, they have (by
using hindsight) been kicking themselves for failing twice in the
past to cash in upon innovations in the civil market which they
pioneered only for others to profit by. I am thinking of their
model 247, which preceded the universally used DC-2 and -3
and yet was at that time the only all-metal, monocoque, monoplane
transport. I also have in mind the Stratoliner, which preceded
other four-engined pressurized aircraft by several years.
This time they seem quite determined to profit by the lead in
experience in this size of jet aircraft, a lead which they now unquestionably
hold. At the same time, they stand to profit in
experience by having a military type of certain similarity in full
production and service prior to the first civil deliveries. The
importance of this fact is immense, since it means that before even
the first civil production model gets itself into the air a vast flying
programme will have been carried out by die military cousin. How
many of these KC-135s will have been airborne prior to the first
civil deliveries is anyone's guess, but it will be many more than
150. The plant extension and colossal jigging programme
indicates some such figure. The point should also be borne in
mind that already the prototype 707 has logged over 400 hours
on over 320 individual flights.
Before leaving this subject, it should be remembered that this
prototype is neither a 707 production model nor a KC-135. Its
relationship to the production 707s is comparable with that of the
Vickers-Armstrongs 630 to the subsequent Viscount 700 series.
An interesting period was spent with Jack Steiner and the everpresent
Ray Chamberlain examining one of the mock-ups of the
707. Several mock-ups are being produced, according to varying
customer requirements. Generally, the mock-up I saw (and I think
it was the Pan American one) revealed few surprises, since most of
the details have been published some time ago. The view from
the pilot's seat is excellent, comparable indeed with that of the
Stratocruiser except for the absence of the lower windows. On
the other hand, the pilot has been placed much closer to the large
forward-facing windows, which must be about 36in across. He
is also placed closer to the side windows. I understand that the
fields of vision are now capable of exceeding the existing American
S.A.E. requirements.
The pilot's instruments (standard size) will obviously vary somewhat
from customer to customer. The engine instruments are
of the 2in size and seem to be too small. However, later in the
day when actually aloft, it did seem possible to read them without
much difficulty. In spite of this, I consider that a better-balanced
situation would result if most of the existing five rows of small engine
instruments on the pilot's central panel were shifted to the flight
engineer's panel; the central instruments could then be of normal
size. I was informed that some such arrangement was within
the bounds of customer requirement but, doubtless, at some
additional cost. It would not, I think, clutter up the flight
engineer's panel unduly and would have as an additional advantage
the merit of leaving some space in the central panel for the introduction
at a later date of additional instruments. Experience has
shown that the state of the art is always progressive and that every
year or so a vital additional instrument is developed as a positive
requirement. For instance, engine-mounting-vibration instruments
might well become a desirable addition to jet aircraft, as they have
to conventional aircraft. Another point is that at present the
flight engineer's panel does not contain all engine instruments. It
principally concentrates upon electrics (D.C. and A.C.), fuel
system and gauges, cabin pressure control and an impressive overhead
circuit-breaker panel; the hydraulic gauges are up front by the
co-pilot with the emergency change-over controls situated between
engineer and co-pilot.
The earlier proposal to hinge the flight-engineer panel so that
it could be swivelled towards the pilot has been abandoned. The
panel is reasonably close to the pilots and I would judge that
nearly all his controls can be reached by one or the other of the
pilots making a "long arm."
In contrast to the mock-up, the prototype 707 (which is generally
known as the Dash Eighty) has only three rows of 2in engine
instruments up front; it also has the radio panel mounted in the
overhead position. Such pictures as have been released did not,
therefore, give a true representation of the production aircraft.
It has been considerably redesigned so as to allow for several types
of radar. In the production machine, since part of the radar
is in the overhead panel, the radio panel has been re-located to lie
at elbow level on either side of the throttle quadrant.
The proposed method of applying reverse thrust was foreign to
me and, consequently, seemed awkward. It is, however, basically
similar to that now in use by Constellation pilots and I was
informed that it carried their blessing. The rear of the throttle
quadrant is given over to the fuel and engine cut-off controls,
thus precluding the utilization of this section for reverse thrust.
It also means that engine starting is a pilot-control operation.
Because I have been nursed for so long by efficient flight engineers
in a Stratocruiser, I am opposed to this philosophy and I would
have preferred starting to be taken over by the flight engineer.
The afternoon was given over to a flying programme. The
flight test division of Boeing is in the charge of "Tex" Johnston,
chief of flight test, and after only a brief chat with Tex and his
chief henchman, "Dix" Loesch, I was installed in the left-hand
scat of the 707-80 with Tex alongside. Dix acted as flight engineer.

ENGINE starting is pneumatic, in keeping with the modern
American practice of dispensing with the battery and using
direct A.C. generation. There is, of course, a small D.C.
battery for certain secondary purposes. Various devices are offered
by Boeing to enable one engine to be started without the use of
specialized pneumatic ground starting equipment. The customer
can take his pick according to the weight penalty he is prepared
to stand. The internal starting systems are a combination of
electrical, pneumatic and combustion and the air supply required
is drawn from compressed-air bottles.
Engine starting appears to be a simple operation but, as I have
explained before, it must be performed largely by the pilots, since
the flight engineer has no physical control over the one set of
throttles aboard. Once one engine is running3 the others can be
started internally by using the air supply and electrical power
generated by the engine so running. It was worth noting here that
all four engines will be fitted with 30 kVA A.C. generators driven
by Sundstrand drives. Starting certainly takes no longer than
in piston-engined aircraft and from the cockpit the operation is
practically inaudible. Indeed, the sound level in the cockpit is
remarkably low at all stages of flight,
Taxying presented no problems apart from some difficulty
experienced in unlocking the parking brake. I did criticize, however,
the size of the nose steering wheel; I would have preferred
a wheel of much bigger segment. From an airport congestion
angle the inability to lock the tandem bogie mainwheels on the
inside of a turn may make the parking of the aircraft in a confined
space a difficult problem. I understand that there is on the market a
polished steel plate which ground crews can insert under the
inboard wheel. This acts as a turntable and enables the aircraft
to execute the equivalent of a wheel-locked turn. I also understand
that some airports are building in similar turntables as a
permanent feature of the apron areas.

The weight at which the Dash Eighty [as the prototype is
usually called] was being flown was at almost irreducible minimum
since it had been flying nearly all morning and refuelling would
have caused a delay on a ramp which was packed solid with
production B-52s. At take-off, we were about 122,000 lb. ("Child's
IN these pages, Capt. Spooner, D.S.O., D.F.C., continues his account of
a visit to Seattle, where he was invited by the Boeing Airplane Company
to sample the prototype 707. A senior B.O.A.C. Stratocruiser captain,
and chairman of the British Air Line Pilots' Association, Capt. Spooner
made the flight as a representative of pilots, and not as a prospective
customer. In Part 1, last week, he described preparations for 707 production
and commented on various features of die aircraft Here he
tells the story of the flight, which was made in company with "Tex"
Johnston, chief of flight test, and his henchman "Dix" Loesch, who
acted as flight engineer. A few company officials went along for the ride.
play to four derated J57s producing about 9,500 lb thrust per
engine.") Fuel on board for this flight was about 20,000 lb.
I had expected Tex to do the take-off, but no sooner had he
asked me to unlock the parking brake and steer the aircraft down
the commencement of the centre line (both parking brakes and
nose steering are controlled from the captain's seat alone) than
he called, "You've got it. It's all yours." Nosewheel steering
was gradually abandoned to rudder pedal control at about 80 kt
and at about 100 kt the nose was raised well clear of the ground.
At about 120 kt, without any real recognition of the fact, I became
aware that we were airborne. It is interesting to note that, due
to careful design and recognition of the dangers involved, this
aircraft is not unduly affected by an apparent tail-up or tail-down
configuration. It will fly off at almost any reasonable attitude
and the fore-and-aft-trimming device is compensated by the individual
M.A.C. percentage as listed in the load sheet. Gear and
flaps were raised without any noticeable change of attitude and
the aircraft commenced climbing at alarmingly steep angle at
about 4,000 ft/min with a rapidly increasing indicated air speed.
The problem with this particular prototype is that there is a
limitation speed of 180 kt with the flaps in the take-off position.
This is being improved in the production models, which are
designed to permit a take-off-flap speed of up to 220 kt. Since I
had not located the flap indicator and was not anxious to exceed
the 180 kt limit until absolutely certain that the flaps were full in,
I practically had to stand the aircraft on its tail to keep the speed
down whilst checking with Tex that the flaps had come full in.
In all, it took seven to eight minutes to reach an altitude of
31,000ft with an airspeed indicating between 250 and 300 kt. At
this height the aircraft was clearly hungry for more altitude, since,
although we were now climbing at Mach number 0.8, the rate
of climb still indicated about 4,000 ft/min. (We were, of course,
almost incredibly lightly loaded.) The control of the aircraft did
not present a fraction of the difficulty the instruments did. The
latter problem was purely a question of unfamiliarity. For example,
the airspeed pointer rotated through 360 dcg to indicate each
100 kt and it took me a little time to locate the sub-pointer that
showed whether I was going at 210 or 310 kt I.A.S. Likewise,
with an altimeter winding-off the tens of thousands of feet so
rapidly, I had to hunt about with my eyes for the little hand
showing me whether I. was at 6,000, 16,000, 26,000 or 36,000!
The Sperry Flight Integration System was also strange to me,
but once I discovered a standard-type artificial horizon I concentrated
upon this rather than upon the complicated unfamiliar
instruments. The rate-of-climb indicator was off the clock most
of the time, due to our phenomenal rate of ascent, and the tiny
r.p.m. dials in the centre panel presented a percentage of maximum
r.p.m. rather than the r.p.m. themselves. Never having flown a
jet aircraft before, the significance of the other engine instruments
was largely lost to me.
Controlwise, the aircraft was almost perfect, except that I found
myself fiddling about with the fore-and-aft-trim device rather
unnecessarily.

The flying control system is worth a chapter itself, and so much
has already been written that I hesitate to add more. However,
to pass lightly over such perfection is to do it less than justice.
Basically, the aircraft has a spring servo-tab system. The forces
acting upon these tabs move control surfaces which are aerodynamically
balanced. Both controls and tabs are also statically
balanced, so that when the aircraft is at rest there is nothing
dangling down. The aerodynamic balancing is achieved internally
by methods which Boeing have evolved from much wind-tunnel
experiment, backed up by many thousands of hours' flying
experience.
Allied to this are two extra control forces. These are an adjustable
horizontal stabilizer and two supplementary lateral control
systems. The adjustable horizontal stabilizer can be controlled
either manually or electrically; and in practice the latter is used,
since some 90 turns of the trimming wheel are required between
full tail-up and tail-down positions. Manually, this would require
considerable physical effort. The electrical system operates through
a clutch to the same trimming wheel as is used manually, and
when electrical actuation is called for this trim wheel literally
whirrs around. However, if the electric motor did happen to run
away (a most unlikely event, since elaborate precautions have been
taken to prevent this), the trim wheel can be stopped physically.
It could, however, cause a pilot to lose some skin, and it might
perhaps be preferable to use the sole of the shoe rather than the
palm of the hand. Regardless of this fact, the most satisfactory
feature of this device is that, provided a good e.g. position is
established, it does not matter very much where the horizontal
stabilizer is. Except when being flown at the extreme limits of the
e.g. range, the aircraft can be handled (and, I believe, even landed)
with the trim wheel right forward or right aft. It simply requires
greater stick forces. My error in fiddling with the trim wheel was
that I was trying to achieve a perfect hands-off trim by a cautious
turn or two of the wheel. These little movements had practically
no effect whatsoever until I grasped the idea that I really had to
spin the wheel like a rotary polishing mop for anything noticeable
to take place.
Lateral control is threefold. There are two separate sets of
ailerons and the lift spoilers (two a side, on top of each wing).
The asymmetrical use of these spoilers provides, in effect, a third
set of ailerons. They are normally used as ailerons throughout
the entire flight and except when disengaged (when they lie flat)
or when no hydraulic pressure is available (when they also lie flat),
they are automatically connected to the aileron movement of the
control column. Even when being partially used symmetrically
as speed brakes, they still act as additional ailerons. When the
spoilers are in the fully "up" maximum speed-brake position, then
and then only is partial aileron effect lost, because it is impossible
to raise the spoilers more than 100 per cent. But even in this case
there is a little aileron effect, since the hydraulic follow-up
mechanism does have the effect of slightly depressing the spoiler
which is on the outside of the turn. However, since spoilers are
only used as full dive brakes or speed brakes for an emergency
descent or some such unusual proceeding and are normally partially
used in the symmetrical configuration, the condition of being
deprived of aileron (spoiler) effect seldom applies. Of the two
normal sets of ailerons, the outboard set is only effective when the
flap is down. With the raising of the flaps after take-off the
gearing of this set of ailerons is progressively reduced to zero. On
take-off, I tried to detect a reduction in lateral control ratio as the
flaps came in, but I was unable to do so; nor did I notice any
increase in aileron effect when, ultimately, I lowered flap prior to
landing.
In normal flight, the rate of roll is considerably more effective
than on any large aircraft I had previously flown, and a good
feature is that maximum bank can be achieved without the control
wheel exceeding 90 deg of movement. Thus a pilot does not get
himself into the hands-crossed-over position so difficult to maintain
without change of grip. Since the spoiler-aileron device is
hydraulically operated, the question at once arises of what happens
if the hydraulics fail. As previously mentioned, the mechanical
effect is for the spoilers to lie flat. The aircraft is now entirely
controlled laterally by the small-area inboard ailerons and, to my
surprise, the effect on control at speed is almost negligible. I
did not have occasion to try out this situation at low speed; but
the aircraft has often been landed with the hydraulic power to the
spoilers switched off, so the effect is certainly not one liable to
cause a disaster. I did try 60 deg bank turns at Mach number 0.83
using inboard ailerons alone and I was able to swing from one
turn into the opposite turn with far less effort than required when
flying a Stratocruiser. With the spoilers operating this manoeuvre,
more can be achieved easily with one hand.
Those who saw Tex Johnston perform an upward barrel roll
in the 707, starting from only a few hundred feet up, can bear
witness to the aircraft's impressive manoeuvrability.
The rest of the flying programme was taken up with demonstrations
of stalls clean and stalls with everything dangling. In both
cases, lateral control was available down to the stall, with ample
warning provided by buffeting which commenced mildly at about
20 kt above the stall and progressed to a horrible fierceness. This
is an aircraft that needs no artificial stall warning device.
Recovery from stalls presents no difficulty. Some time was
spent in the air slamming throttles back and then, with the engines
idling, pushing the power hard against the forward stops with
the kind of rough movement normally only reserved for opening
swing-doors. The absence of engine surge or pulping was remarkable.
Equally remarkable was the almost instantaneous power
response. As one threw the throttles forward one was almost hit
in the back by the acceleration forces.
At my request, Tex demonstrated an emergency descent. At
the time we were cruising along at some 310 kt I.A.S. at a height
of about 33,000ft. First action is to close the throttles and apply
full air brake. This is always possible, since there is no speed
limitation on the spoilers. The gear can be dropped at 270 kt
I.A.S. and, in a matter of seconds after pushing the control column
hard forward, Mother Earth appears straight in front of the
windscreen. Once the gear is fully down, the speed can be
increased to 320 kt I.A.S.; and, though now only inboard ailerons
are effective, ample lateral control is available. On the descent
we lost about 183000ft in one-and-a-half minutes in spite of having
to make turns away from the mountain ridge I happened to be
diving at.
Another demonstration I was able to try was the sudden pulling
back of an outboard engine. Almost no yaw effect was felt and
one twist of the rudder trim-control wheel restored flight to
normal. The engine was then completely stopped and relit without
fuss or ado, although it was felt necessary to limit our threeengine
speed to 240 kt prior to relighting. In this case, relighting
was performed at about 25,000ft; but, I understand, relighting
can be performed at up to 40,000ft.
As we had now been up about one hour, our limited fuel supply
was running low; so, after Tex had exchanged the right-hand seat
with Dix, we proceeded back to Seattle, noting on the way how
effectively the D.M.E. was performing. This appears to give accurate
indications beyond 100 miles.
As far as I can recollect, the highest Mach number reached
during this flight was about 0.86. At no time was a noticeable
change in pitch or roll apparent and, except when actuating the
air brakes at speed, there was no buffeting. The aircraft is
guaranteed to Mach 0.88 and has been flown up to at least 0.95.
The buffeting experienced by applying the spoilers as air brakes
was of moderate character and did not prevent normal control
movements from being made.
When at about 4,000ft downwind of the airport and at about 240
kt I.A.S., Dix suggested that I might like to figure out an approach
on the landing circuit for myself. In the absence of any guidance
other than that the speed over the fence should be about 120 kt,
this was an interesting exercise. The speed was rapidly lowered
by the immediate dropping of the gear and, on a wide base leg,
I was able to get the approach flaps down at 180 kt. Power was
controlled by pushing or pulling throttles, by feel rather than by
reference to unfamiliar (and largely incomprehensible) engine
instruments. Responses were so rapid that this method proved
quite effective. On finals, full flap was called for at 140 kt at
about 300ft up, and this was accomplished with little noticeable
change of attitude. The 707 is not one of those aircraft which
dives steeply with the application of landing flap. The lowering
of initial flap, 30 deg, did cause a slight nose-down attitude, but
I did not feel any urgent need to trim this out, preferring to hold
back the nose-down tendency by slightly increasing the backward
stick force. There was a slight balloon effect on the flare-out,
but it was not of such magnitude that a sudden forward movement
of the control column was called for.

A smooth touch-down was made with the nosewheel held off the
runway and there was no tendency either to sink rapidly immediately
prior to landing on or to bounce after touch-down. We
did float half-way down the long runway but this, I think, was
due to the fact that the 120 kt speed over the fence incorporated
a generous margin for beginners and also to the fact that I had
forgotten I was supposed to be doing my own throttle movements
and had, out of force of habit, called for "power off" instead of
doing so myself. On the spur of the moment, Dix suggested that
I make the landing a touch-and-go. All that was required was a
positive grounding of the nosewheel by a push forward on the
control column and the opening-up of the throttles while Dix
retracted the flaps to the 30 deg position.
Acceleration response was almost immediate and before I had
time to get my hand away from the wide-open throttles I was
again pointing almost straight upwards in an endeavour to stop
the speed building up beyond the 180 kt limitation. I was still
having trouble in locating the flap-position indicators, possibly
due to the fact that each of the four large double-slotted flaps has
a separate indicator needle. These are mounted on two gauges
on the pilot's instrument panel and from habit I was looking for
one large gauge on the co-pilot's side of the aircraft.
The next circuit was a much tighter and neater affair and
unremarkable except that Dix showed me by how much I ought
to trim out the slight nose-down effect which appears upon initially
lowering the flap. For literally second upon second, he made
the trim wheel fly around (I personally thought that the electric
motor had run wild); but, at the end of it all, though the trim
indicator was far removed from where I had had it for my first
landing, I did not notice any appreciable difference in the handling
of the elevator control and my final landing was done with some
real measure of confidence, in spite of the fact that I had only been
in the aircraft some 90 minutes and had had no proper dual and
still had no accurate notion about the correct speed and approach
pattern drills. Incidentally, it is worth notice that, with no magnetos
to check, no propeller-pitch settings to bother about, no cowlflaps,
no intercoolers, no oil-cooler flaps, no radiator settings,
the field-approach check-list is reduced to almost nothing.
On this our final landing, Dix showed me how to unload the
wing by raising all the spoilers to their maximum immediately on
touch-down. After this manoeuvre, positive nosewheel steering
and brake application are available. Whether one can land with the
spoilers full up I did not check, but I believe that the effect upon
stalling speeds is less than 5 kt. In the landing attitude these
spoilers, when used fully, do exert some pitch-down attitude
necessary for immediate effective braking.
At this weight, now only about 107,0001b, the aircraft used very
little runway in spite of the fact that there is no reverse-thrust
mechanism fitted to the Dash Eighty. Against this fact, however,
it must be remembered that production 707-120 aircraft using
this same wing area will be cleared for landings up to 165,000 lb.
A general assessment is difficult to arrive at. I suppose that my
dominant impression is that the aircraft, as I flew it, was almost
incredibly simple to manipulate and easy to fly. Yet it is as
powerful as it is docile. I believe that Boeing estimate that the
cost of the Dash Eighty prototype has been about $16 million
(nearly £5fm) of their own money, and I think that the manner
in which they allowed a non-jet pilot to throw it about and to
handle it close to the ground is perhaps a better indication of its
qualities than words can express. Some 50 "unfamiliar" pilots
have done as much, or more. These facts speak for themselves.
The next morning was taken up discussing with Ray Chamberlain
and Mr. Downey the final engineering details of the control
system. Jack Steiner later joined in the conversation and a discussion
developed about the need for greater rudder throw and/or
aileron drag effect in the low-speed (0 to 60 kt) case as applicable
to icy runways. I was favouring the addition of a booster rudder
in order to obtain some positive ground control. In this respect,
the aircraft is somewhat similar to the Bristol Britannia. The
situation may resolve itself when engines of greater power, such
as the J75 or Conway are fitted; in these cases, the rudder boost
may become a requirement in order to meet the one-engine-out
case on take-off. I also made the point that the present method
of locking and unlocking the parking brake required an unnecessary
shifting of the feet to the very top of the foot-brake pedals
in order to supply the strong physical forces required.
After lunch (during which the table-cloth got covered with
graphs of CLmax lines and Mach numbers) I continued with Ray
Chamberlain and others the discussion of details such as fuel-dump
procedures, fuel contents gauges, ground clearance, relighting
altitudes, holding-pattern heights, gust locks, fuel heating, vertical
loads, gust criteria speeds, and so forth. I was then handed over to
Mr. Dudley Nichols, and others whose names now escape me, in
order to examine the structural details of the KC-135 now being
built on the production lines. I was able to satisfy myself about
various details of the multi-path constructional system and the
machining of the integral wing fuel tank units. It was interesting
to observe that, apart from the fore-and-aft shear web, fitted with
spar caps, there is no main wing spar. A number of spanwise
stringers take their place in carrying the primary bending loads.
These and the very thick external skin carry about 75 per cent of
the stresses.
I had queried the position which would arise relative to the bag
tanks in the central wing area in the event of a wheels-up landing.
After examining the immensely strong keel beam and after noting
how much solid protection was given by the gear itself in the up
position, I was almost convinced that, short of a catastrophic
arrival, the centre-wing tanks would never be ruptured by any
wheels-up landing. I also examined the main gear trunnion. This
is placed aft of the rear shear web and is not connected with it.
An auxiliary box unit with a form of fusible link is the only solid
connection between the rear shear web, which is part of the outer
casing of the wing tank, and the main gear attachments. Thus
there seems to be little risk of the gear ever pushing its way
through into the fuel tanks; instead, if treated badly, it will break
off and disappear aft. Incidentally, this gear folds up into a very
compact space sandwiched between the massive keel beam and
the strong box section of the lower floor level.
Boeing engineering has always been on the massive scale and
these aircraft indicate a continuation of this policy. There are
many indications of great structural strength.
Another query of mine was to express concern that, in the event
of a wheels-up landing, the pods carrying the engines would get
mixed up with the fuel tanks. This subject has received a considerable
study and Boeing have been able to profit from the experience
of their military aircraft. A workable solution has emerged
which has, I understand, proved itself in operation. Again fusible
links are employed.
One ingenious feature of the aircraft is the arrangement whereby,
when the cabin pressure falls below certain safety limits, the
oxygen system available to both passengers and crew is automatically
put into operation.
On Friday the 13th Ray Chamberlain picked me up as usual
outside my hotel at 8.30 a.m. and, after clearing a few matters,
he handed me over to Mr. W. Cook, engineer-aerodynamicist,
who showed me around Boeing's vast 54,000 h.p. wind tunnel.
This, it is claimed, is the largest privately owned wind tunnel in
existence and it operates up to transonic speeds with models of
10ft wing span. Boeing stress the importance of the facility,
which has enabled them to evaluate about 150 different wing
shapes for their big jet aircraft. I observed, from one of the wall
charts, that approximately 21,000 hours of test tunnel work had
gone into their four major jets, the B-47 and B-52 having each
required nearly 8,000 hours and the K-135 and the 707 absorbed
the remainder.
Later we visited the plant where research was in progress
designed to solve the noise-level problem. Here Boeing are pooling
their experience with Rolls-Royce, though both concerns are
carrying out independent programmes. In order to speed their
work Boeing have simulated a jet orifice which realistically produces
the required airflow, temperature, and noise-level, and I
saw the various silencing attachments which had already been
tested. With one such attachment, noise level had been reduced
by as much as 40 decibels, but only at a considerable sacrifice to
speed and manufacturing simplicity. Boeing have specified that
the silencer they will ultimately fit will result in less than 2 per
cent loss of thrust, and a compromise solution between engine
thrust and maximum silencing is inevitable. To date, a loss of
15db can be achieved without overstepping the desired criteria.
Those at work on this programme paid tribute to Mr. Greatrex
of Rolls-Royce, whose nozzle is the basis of several successful
experiments.
It is interesting to note that the Rolls-Royce Conway operates
normally at about 6db less than the J75. Since, for the same
thrust, it weighs about 1,500 pounds less per engine, the case for
the Conway is a strong one. I also understand that the Bristol
Olympus still further reduces this weight and is capable of
similar amounts of thrust without noticeable increases in fuel
consumption. Boeing are fully aware that, apart from the serious
social problem of high noise-levels, there is an equally serious
structural problem. At a considerable weight sacrifice they have
thickened-up various flap and aileron sections in places where
the metals are subjected to possibly dangerous noise-level effects.
The rest of the morning was taken up with various aerodynamic
discussions regarding the control problems of high-speed aircraft.
The placing of the spoilers so that they produce neither
severe buffeting, nor changes in pitch, nor noticeable increases
in stall speeds, is a classic example of what can be achieved by a
comprehensive wind-tunnel test programme. The reversal of
aileron effect at high speed is another such example.
Out for lunch, I took the opportunity to say goodbye to Mr.
W. E. Beall and to Jack Steiner and spent an interesting half hour
with the servicing department, who were examining the wreckage
of the Northwest Stratocruiser which had just been raised from
the sea-bed nearby. I also had an interesting discussion with
Mr. Ralph Bell, director of sales, who had, via I.F.A.L.P.A.,
sponsored my visit.
It was with real regret that I said goodbye to Ray Chamberlain,
who for three whole days had spared no pains to ensure that I
saw what I wanted and got the answers to the questions in my
mind. Apart from anything else, I would have got hopelessly
lost in this huge plant, which is almost a city in itself. I believe
that they employ about 9,000 engineers; and the goods they
produce, as we all know, are contributing much to the security
of the free world. I have no reason to doubt that the company's
new embarkation into the civil field will be attended by success.
They are making a most determined effort to stay in the civil
market and to get on top. With this determination behind them
and with their great military experience to back it up, it was
gratifying to me to note with what favour they regarded the
British jet engines. As has been announced, they are offering
their customers a free choice of British or American engines, and
they have now designated type numbers for the Rolls-Roycepowered
aircraft. Who will be the first to order these aircraft,
known as the 707-420 and 707-520, is anyone's guess, but that
orders will be obtained I have little doubt.
I had meant to take it easy on Saturday and get my notes
up-to-date in preparation for the session I had arranged with
Mr. Clarence N. Sayen, in Chicago, who, apart from being president
of A.L.P.A., is also president of I.F.A.L.P.A. However,
Bill Cook, who had previously shown me the wind tunnel and
the noise-abatement laboratory, offered to show me the rest of
Boeing's experimental test section. I gladly accepted this offer
as, apart from anything else, I wanted to have another look at the
prototype Dash Eighty. I had been so busy flying the aircraft
that I had no opportunity to examine its other features.
One point I was able to satisfy myself upon is that, although
the aircraft has a servo-tab control system, the controls can be
checked for full movement on the ground. This apparent contradiction
is due to the spring control. With no air loads to
centralize the control of the servo-tab surfaces, initial movement
of the control column moves the tab and further movement
acts upon the control surface itself. A subsequent movement
will then actuate the tab.
I also had a chance to make the proper examination of the
flight engineer's panel. Details of this are not important, since
in the production aircraft there has been considerable rearrangement
of instrumentation. However, I did note that the fuel diagram
layout is essentially simple and that the auxiliary internal
tip tanks and the centre wing area tanks operate in a manner
which will not result in the aircraft being starved of fuel due to
lack of watchfulness on the part of the flight engineer. I was
also able to note that the use of direct A.C. power, generated via
Sundstrand drives, has eliminated much of the complicated conversion
of power which normally has to be accomplished. It
is worth noting that these A.C. drives are protected against
failure by malfunction indicators, overhead indicators and throw out
clutches, and by being given their own separate oil systems. I
was also delighted to see that only the day before the Dash
Eighty had been fitted up with Atkins collision-warning lights
on both upper and lower lobes.
After leaving the aircraft, we toured acres of experimental and
test departments. In these test laboratories, almost every conceivable
aerodynamic condition can be simulated. A list of the
laboratories would be over a page long. The importance of this
is the understanding of the Boeing philosophy that a $5 million
aircraft is only as strong as its weakest link. Thus, almost every
component part which comes into the plant is subsequently
re-tested in the company's own laboratories. These tests involve
the use of cold chambers, heat chambers, salt-spray chambers
sunshine and rain chambers, and even chambers in which a
highly combustible mixture of butane and air is held under
pressure while parts are operated under working conditions at
varying temperatures.
I also learned of the static tests which are a military requirement.
One military model at some time early in the production
line is virtually pounded to total destruction by the application of
abnormal stresses. Another interesting section was one in which
the sound level of 180db could be produced. With an eye to the
future so-called heat barrier, many of the latest test sections
were capable of producing very rapid rises in temperature. In
the course of this tour of inspection, I also saw the vast water-test
tank.
For those unfamiliar with the specifications of the 707, I feel
that in justice to its advanced design I must mention, in conclusion,
some of the features which appealed to me. These are:—
Airborne radar; SEL CAL; Skydrol 500 hydraulic system (with all
electrical wiring made out of Skydrol-resistant materials); anti-skid
brakes; isolated power shields; isolated radio compartment; thermal
(second spool) engine and wing anti-icing; electrical tail unit anti-icing;
emergency air brakes; free-fall emergency gear; indication of engine
reverse to each engine; high gust-criteria speeds (Vb 230 kt, Ve 350 kt);
circuit-breaker within reach of pilots; separate hydraulic motors for
inboard and outboard flaps; total absence of gust locks; lateral control
available with one flap section asymmetrical; automatic wheel-braking
during retraction; dual gyrosyn compass systems; dual V.H.F., V.O.R.,
A.D.F., HZ-1, etc.; inspection panels to all wheels when down; static
thrust indicators; inspection panels to cargo compartments; dual cables
to all controls; hydraulic system limited to 3,000 lb/sq in; Nesa
windows; underwing refuelling; rubeless tyres; two fuel booster pumps
per engine on separate circuits; Freon fire extinguishing agent; emergency
electric flap actuation; separate indicators to each of the four main
flaps; flight engineer's panel within reach of pilots.
The only omissions of importance which occurred to me
were:—
Boosted rudder; central landing light; vibration indicators attached
to the engine mountings; firmer parking-brake lock; fuel heaters; larger
engine instruments; space for let-down chart; crews' toilet (with up to
147 passengers on board, this could be quite a problem); limited turning
circle; individual fresh air vents to crews' positions; hydraulic pumps
to all engines instead of inboard engines.
Considering the balance between these two lists, and considering
how essentially simple this aircraft is to operate and
fly, the conclusion remaining is that in the 707 Boeing have
launched a product which will, I feel, make an impact upon the
industry such as no aircraft has made since the DC-3 twenty
years ago.

ALLEGHENY AIRLINES FLIGHT 305 CONVAIR 340/440... N3414

2010-12-19T15:52:00.000-08:00

Allegheny Airlines Flight 305 Crash at Capital City Airport, New Cumberland, Pa. November 29, 1969.

A friend of mine gave me copies of the photo’s of A Convair 340/440 from Allegheny Airlines. It over ran runway 26 at the Capitol City Airport, New Cumberland, Pa. On November 29, 1966.

The Convair was operating as flight 305 to Pittsburg, Pa. with a crew of 4 and 12 passengers. The aircraft was tail number N3414. Looking at the photographs you would never know that the aircraft was totally written off after the accident. There were no fatalities with this accident

According to the accident report, Flight 305 had a complete electrical failure due to an improperly installed heater. The pilot decided to abort the takeoff, but the prop reverseve did not work. The Convair overran the runway and collided with an approach light tower.

THE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING AN ALLEGHENY AIRLINES CONVAIR 340 TYPE AIRCRAFT, N3414

DISCLOSED SEVERAL CONDITIONS THAT WE CONSIDER HAZARDOUS TO FLIGHT. A NEARLY TOTAL FAILURE OF THE AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL SYSTEM OCCURRED DURING THE TAKEOFF RUN OF ALLEGHENY FLIGHT 305 AT HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA, ON NOVEMBER 29,1966.

THE TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED AND WHEEL BREAKlNG APPLIED. THE ENGINE THROTTLES WERE PLACED IN THE REVERSE THRUST POSITION, BUT BECAUSE OF THE ELECTRICAL FAILURE THE PROPELLERS DID NOT MOVE TO A NEGATIVE PITCH WHICH RESULTED IN THE REAPPLICATION OF FORWARD THRUST. THE AIRCRAFT RAN OFF THE END OF THE RUNWAY AND STRUCK AN APPROACH LIGHT STANCHION WHICH TORE AWAY A SECTION OF THE LEFT WING. THE AIRCRAFT CAME TO REST
NEAR THE BOTTOM OF A HILL BEYOND THE END OF RUNWAY 26,

THE NOSE WHEEL COLLAPSED AND THE OUTBOARD FUEL TANK IN THE LEFT WINGWAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BUT RETAINED ITS FUEL.

Recommendation:
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL USERS OF CONVAIR 340,440 AND 580 MODELS BE ALERTED TO THIS VARIATION IN ELECTRICAL COCKPIT HEATERS, THAT THE TERMINALS BE PROMINENTLY IDENTIFIED AND MANUAL INSTRUCTIONS CITE THE DIFFERENT TERMINAL CONFIGURATIONS WITH APPROPRIATE INSTALIATION INSTRUCTIONS.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE CONVAIR 340,440 AND 580 AIRCRAFT HEATER CIRCUITS BE MODIFIED TO PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION THAT WILL OPEN UNDER THE MOST ADVERSE FAULT CONDITION BEFORE THE FEEDER LIMITER OPENS. DURING THE INVESTIGATION, TWO MAINTENANCE ITEMS WERE NOTED WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE WORTHY OF YOUR ATTENTION. WHILE EXAMINING THE AIRCRAFT, LOOSE NUTS, SCREWS, DRILL SHAVINGS AND TRASH WERE FOUND INSIDE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL COMPARTMENT. ALSO, IT WA3-REVEALED THAT NO FUNCTIONAL TESTS WERE PERFORMED ON THE HEATER AFTER ITS INSTALLATION BEFORE RELEASING THE AIRCRAFT FOR PASSENGER SERVICE.

ALLEGHENY AIRLINES HAS ISSUED FLIGHT CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE NO. 88-103 WHICH REQUIRES THE FOLLOWING: 1. INSPECT ALL AIRCRAFT FOR PROPER HEATER INSTALLATION. REPLACE AND DESTROY ALL NONSTANDARD HEATERS.

2.. CHECK HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR PROPER RATING.

3.. CHECK HEATER WIRING FOR CONFORMANCE TO HEATER WIRING DIAGRAMS.

4. WHENEVER A HEATER IS REPLACED, THE STRUT SWITCH IS TO BE
BYPASSED AND THE WIRING STUDS CHECKED FOR PROPER POLARIN. (A
FULL FUNCTIONAL CHECK CANNOT BE CONDUCTED DUE TO LACK OF RAM AIR). THE FEDERAL AVlATlON AGENCY IS IN THE PROCESS OF ISSUING AN ALERT BULLETIN WHICH INSTRUCTS FIELD INSPECTORS TO ALERT ALL OPERATORS OF CV-340,44OAND580 MODEL ARCRAFT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROPER HEATER INSTALLATION AND TO ASCERTAIN THAT MAINTENANCE MANUALS CONTAIN ADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING HEATER REPLACEMENTS. MANUFACTURING DATA CALL FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF POWER TERMINALS. AN FAA ENGINEERING REVIEW IS BEING MADE OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ON THESE AIRCRAFT TO DETERMINE THE NEED FOR MODIFICATION OF THE CIRCUIT PROTECTIVE DEVICES. TO PRECLUDE ACCUMULATION OF TRASH AND UNWANTED ITEMS IN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL COMPARTMENT, ALLEGHENY AIRLINES IS IN THE PROCESS OF ISSUING
AN INSPECTION CARD CALLING FOR VACUUMING THIS COMPARTMENT EACH 300 HOURS.

Flying the Northern Route In The DC-6B "Empress Of Toronto

2010-10-16T19:35:00.000-07:00

Flying the Northern Route

This is a great story from the August 24, 1956 issue of Flight Magazine, dealing with a flight over the Northern Route. Beter known as "OVER THE TOP".

'TWENTY-FOUR hours in Vancouver is too short a time
This was my main reflection as Canadian Pacific's DC-6B
Empress of Toronto taxied out from Gate 6 and across the
apron. Ahead of us was the novel prospect of a polar-route
flight to Europe, while behind me was a honeymoon couple and
the memory of a day-short glimpse of Canada's sparkling west
coast.
I had arrived in Vancouver the previous morning by T.C.A.
Viscount from Edmonton, which may not have been the most
picturesque way to cross the Rockies, but was certainly the fastest
and most comfortable. Much of that day I had spent at the
airport, soon absorbing its unique atmosphere of expanding and
varied activity. I had watched DC-3s, Cansos and Convairs
leaving for places with names such as Kitimat, Uranium City,
Yellowknife and Flin Flon; and I had sensed the airport's international
significance as a real cross-roads of Commonwealth
aviation.
Of the various operators and associated companies which
jostle each other for space on Vancouver's airport, Canadian
Pacific Air Lines are the largest. The airline's headquarters and
main base are here, occupying some 300,000 sq ft. Prior to the
introduction of the Vancouver-Amsterdam service, GP.A.L.'s
trans-Pacific route from Sydney via Auckland, Fiji and Hawaii
was well established, and part of the popularity of the northern
route has been due to the fact that it completes a fast and convenient
network linking Australia, New Zealand and Canada with
Europe and the United Kingdom. A much publicized if dubious
distinction for passengers on this route is their ability to cross
the Equator, the International Date Line and the Arctic Circle
on one and the same service, and within four days. The company's
other main inter-continental service, intersecting this
route at Vancouver, is from Hong Kong and Tokyo to Mexico
City, Lima and Buenos Aires.
My first contact with the direct planning of our flight from
Vancouver to Amsterdam was at 11.30 on the morning of the
flight, two hours before take-off, when I joined the crew for their
detailed met. briefing. The assembling of weather information
for the flight had begun much earlier, however—at about 2 a.m.
—when special upper-air charts had been prepared in the airport's
met. section. The C.P.A.L. flight dispatcher had checked
with met. a few hours .'ater, and had prepared provisional routings
in the form of a pre-plan; using the forecast wind-components
at various altitudes he had calculated times and fuel
consumptions at various engine powers. From the pre-plan, the
captain had obtained a general picture of the probable effect of
weather conditions on the flight, before discussing the later
weather information at the 11.30 briefing.
A first look at the charts indicated some doubt that we would
be able to reach Sondrestrom Fiord, Greenland (the only
normally scheduled stop between Vancouver and Amsterdam) in
one hop. Although there would be tailwinds in the early part of
the flight, followed by southerly crosswinds, critical easterly headwinds
in the later section were forecast.
After a half-hour session with the met. man, during which the
various alternative routes were discussed, the crew returned to
the dispatch office at C.P.A.L. headquarters for detailed flight
planning. The range and fuel consumption for given headwind
components were noted and related to the forecast winds, the
effect of cruising altitude was considered, and meanwhile an
accurate check of freight, baggage and passenger weights was
being made to determine the find permissible fuel toad.

The captain of the aircraft on this trip was to be Capt. Ralph
B. Leslie who, just one year earlier, had flown the inaugural service
of this same route. Previously chief pilot of the Sydney-
Armsterdam sector, Capt. Leslie had also been responsible tor
much of the preliminary flying and planning in connection with
the opening of the new route. First officer was Ted Randall, one
of a C.P.A.L. family (his father and brother are also pilots) who—
despite the earnest efforts of the airline's publicity departmenthad
never yet flown all three together in the same crew.

Listed as second officer on the crew list was Capt. Bill Roxborough,
a check pilot who was making a familiarization flight on the
northern route for the first time. Completing the flight
crew—and doing most of the work in the flight-planning phase—
were the two navigators, Bill Douthwahe and Bill McLean.

The final permissible fuel figure was 31,800 lb, 400 lb more
than had initially been estimated, and Capt. Leslie decided to
flight-plan to Sondrestrom direct, with Frobisher as alternate.
One of two power techniques could be used: long-range
economical cruise (normally used on flights of more than 12
hours' duration); or combination power, which meant beginning
the flight at 1,240 h.p. and cutting down to 1,100 h.p. after four
hours' flying. The distance to Sondrestrom was some 2,700 miles.

It was decided to employ combination power. An easterly
leg was to be flown across the Rockies to East Princeton, after
which we would set course—the Great Circle course^—direct for
Sondrestrom, which would take us north of Edmonton. The leg
to Sondrestrom, it was finally calculated, would take 10 hr 37 min.
From Capt. Leslie I heard brief details of the special techniques
used on the northern route. The basic navigational problems,
he explained, were caused by the unreliable magnetic area in
the region of the North Magnetic Pole (a region extending to a
radius of over 1,000 miles); and in the convergence of the meridians
towards the Pole in the high latitudes. Ordinary magnetic
compasses and conventional map projections are of little use in
flying accurate long-range routes in these areas.

The answer to these problems had been found in the use of a
directional gyro with a very small rate of random drift, together
with the adoption of the Greenwich Grid chart system (in which
headings given in grid degrees remain constant throughout a
Great Circle route). Canadian Pacific, in common with S.A.S.,
the other northern-route operator, use the Bendix polar-path
gyro, which is fitted with a high-latitude t»mpensator.
Having filed the flight plan with the flight dispatcher, we
moved back across to the terminal block, where I left the crew
to complete their pre-flight formalities, and went to join the other
passengers. For many of these Vancouver was simply a nightstop
where they had landed the previous midnight, having
boarded the Empress of Toronto at Auckland just three days
earlier.
A fair number were starting their journey at Vancouver, however,
and these were liberally equipped with eager friends and
relatives. There was obviously still some novelty in flying the
so-called polar route to Europe—at least for passengers and
friends, if not for the crew.
We jostled through the crowd at Gate 6 and boarded the aircraft.
The popularity of this service was clearly no myth; 55
out of the 56 seats were filled. Scheduled take-off time was
1.30 p.m., but it was 1.45 before we began to taxi out, and two
o'clock when the Pratt and Whitneys were opened up for the
take-off run.
We gained height for the easterly leg across the Rockies in a
climbing circle out over the bay. This gave us a fresh view of
the wide and handsome picture that is Vancouver in its own
special setting of- mountains, coastline and the Pacific. Soon we
had crossed the coastal range and the North Okanagan belt and
were approaching the Rockies themselves.

Much of the grandeur of the Rockies scenery was obscured by
a mixture of cloud as we crossed the range at 17,000ft, but there
remained the striking sight of some of the highest peaks jutting
up above the main strato-cumulus layer. Steep islands with snowcovered
tops, and smaller lumps on which, it seemed, one might
quite easily stub one's toes.

Capt. Leslie spoke over the cabin-address system, apologizing
for the take-off delay, which had been caused by a malfunctioning
tachometer. He was sorry we could not see more of the Rockies;
they were very beautiful at this time of year. We would decrease
height to 11,000ft after passing Edmonton, he said, in order to take
advantage of more-favourable winds.

A cabin crew of three was carried by the Empress of Toronto.
There were two stewardesses, Patricia Stobart and Dolores
Jordan, and one steward, Leendert van Eijk, whose home is in
Amsterdam and who was previously with K.L.M. Soon it was
time for them to take orders for drinks before lunch, and to
indicate one of the differences between first-class and tourist
facilities by dispensing packages of books of matches, embossed
with the passenger's name in gold, to the fortunate firsts. One
mentally deducted their probable cost from the $204,70 difference
in fares on the Vancouver-Amsterdam trip . . .

The confusion of my stomach and mind on this trip began
between three and four o'clock Pacific Daylight Time (local time
in Vancouver), when a truly magnificent lunch was served. The
trick was to lose eight hours between Vancouver and Amsterdam,
keeping up a pretence of normal habits the while. To assist
matters, footrests and blankets were brought round at five o'clock,
just after lunch had ended, and most of the passengers obediently
took the hint and went to sleep.

There were, however, a number of exceptions. Across the
aisle, oblivious to the atmosphere of rest which pervaded the
first-class cabin, an English couple were earnestly discussing
serious topics. In the seats behind me was a young Canadian
• newly married couple, quietly listing their reasons why their
wedding reception was much better than others they had attended.
The girl, I remembered, had approached Jack Crump of C.P.A.L.,
with whom I had been talking before the flight, to thank him
for providing some information several months previously. The
young lady had at that time been preparing a College thesis on
airline economics—a most unlikely sort of thing to accompany
red hair and freckles—and since then she had graduated with a
First (hence the gratitude to Mr. Crump) and, the previous day,
had got married. The two were now on their way to a twomonths
honeymoon in Europe.

Across from these two, two separate young women were variously
occupied. The window-side one, having surely exhausted
her supply of films in recording every aspect of the pre-lunch
scenery, was churning out letter-cards at an amazing rate; while
her companion, blanketed and footrested, slept eloquently with
her mouth open.

Representative of another type of traveller was the middleaged
married couple who sat in front of the two tall and untidy
Britishers. For them, it seemed, the flight was complicated.
Well-equipped with personal impedimenta—much of it contained
in a Braniff Air Lines bag with a Japan Air Lines label—one or
the other was invariably moving, adjusting, re-arranging, or displacing
either themselves or their belongings in the intervals
between restless sleep. They were no beginners in the travel
game, though: the wife had declined the six-course Empress
lunch in favour of two dishes of what looked like asparagus stalks;
the husband had swiftly blocked up the ventilation slits with two
postcards from the flight pack which said "Welcome"; and at one
stage they had the seat-arm off and stacked in their ceaseless quest
for peace of mind.

We were now passing over the incredible, interminable lakespattered
expanse of the "Barren lands" of Canada's Northwest
Territories, having earlier crossed the flat sweep of the northern
prairies. The thousands of small, intricately jigsawed lakes which
stretched all around seemed to be patterned on a huge melonskin
surface. More lakes, and more barren marshland. Our
first sight of ice came at 6.20 Vancouver time, when some of the
lakes to the north were seen to be frozen. Then a hesitant
whitening appeared to starboard, too, with a blue-black edging
which traced the shores of the larger lakes. A little later, some
way above the sixtieth parallel, the scene below was completely
white.

This part of the route, approaching within 500 miles of the
magnetic pole, is especially susceptible to magnetic errors and
discrepancies. Compass errors of over 60 deg have been caused
by magnetic bodies on the ground, and the change in magnetic
variation over this sector can be from 20 deg west to 60 deg east.
Our aircraft was carrying two independent stand-by gyros in
addition to the Bendix polar-path unit. The Bendix and at least
one of the others were operating continuously throughout the
flight. McLean and Douthwaite were checking the aircraft heading
every half-hour by means of astro sights; and astro fixes of
OUT position were being taken every hour. Other navigational
facilities—such as Loran, D.R. and radio ranges—were, of course,
being used during the flight.

After the astro checks the gyros were not re-set, but their
individual rates of precession were noted and used in subsequent
adjustments to course. I was told that the precession rate of the
Bendix instrument was between one and two degrees per hour.
Following the direct Great Circle track to Sondrestrom, we
would by this time have been crossing the great Hudson Bay.
We had taken a more northerly course, however, in order to take
advantage of better winds, and so were continuing over land
towards the north of the bay. "How many times could you fit
the British Isles into Hudson Bay?" asked the blonde, tiredlooking
Englishwoman of her husband. It seemed an excellent
question.

Throughout the flight, regular information on the aircraft
position, course, alterations of flight plan, and other details were
being transmitted back to Vancouver, where our progress was
charted in the dispatch office. The flight dispatcher, who had
initiated the planning for our flight with his pre-plan early this
morning, would now be noting our change of course to the north.
At nine o'clock Vancouver time (midnight local time) Captain
Leslie announced that we were passing the northern tip of
Southampton Island, which straddles the top of Hudson Bay.
We were only 450 miles from the North Magnetic Pole, he
reported, and we should cross the Arctic Circle in about 25
minutes. We had then just passed over Roes Welcome Sound,
a large stretch of water between the mainland and Southampton
Island—and the first stretch of open water since leaving the
Pacific. To our left was Repulse Bay.

Empress of Toronto purred on, and below passed wide rolling
sandbanks of stratus, tinted a tepid pink by the northern sun,
now low on the port horizon. The English couple had begun
a new and strange occupation: the wife was filling in a diary, in
great day-to-day detail, beginning three weeks previously. I
could not avoid hearing her intense questioning of her husband.
"What time did you leave? . . . How did you come back? . . .";
and, for the fourth of June, a bizarre reply which sounded like
"Drove train back, drinking. . . ." That, one thought, must have
been quite a day.

At 9.22 Vancouver time (I had decided not to confuse my
watch until the last possible moment) came an electrifying
announcement. "For your information," Capt. Leslie crisply
reported, "we are now crossing the Arctic Circle, at 22 minutes
past midnight, local time." Almost with a click everyone's eyes
turned to look down at this important boundary but, alas, the
dotted line shown on all the maps just wasn't there. The passengers
on the starboard side gazed down on a sheet of stratus (which
looked just the same as the lower-latitude stuff), and those to port
had slightly better value with a glimpse of Foxe Basin (with ice),
the channel which separates Baffin Island from the Canadian
mainland. The occasion raised a ripple of excited chatter and
some smiling nods across the aisle. "What did you do in the
evening?" the Englishwoman asked. . . .

Normally, Capt. Leslie explained, the Circle would not be
crossed until about an hour and a half later. However, the more northerly
track made good on this occasion would also mean that
we would not see the sun set (and rise ten minutes later); instead,
it would be with us the whole way—which it was. Just to confuse
things further, the moon at that moment began to come up on
the starboard side. "Monday afternoon, cocktails. What did you
do on Tuesday? . . . "

The sight of the crags, mountains and cliffs of Baffin Island
was perhaps the most dramatic of the entire first leg. Topped
by a thick and creamy layer of real snow, in contrast to the icing
blobs seen floating in the grey washing-up water of Foxe Basin
the cliffs and valleys were given sharp contrast in the bright sunlight.
But beneath the illusion of whipped cream caused by the
light-and-shade combination on certain slopes lay the reality of
an extremely inhospitable type of country.

At about ten o'clock (this, being Vancouver time, was
equivalent to 2 a.m. at Sondrestrom) dinner was served, with the
magnificent Baffin Island scenery as an accompaniment. The
keen young short-time husband behind me had commented "Just
imagine living on one of those ice packs . . ." as we had
approached the coast; and an equally imaginative attitude was
shown by the tall Englishman as he firmly declined his champagne
in favour of a can of beer. Steward van Eijk took this very well,
and I managed not to choke over my filet mignon at the time.
To the north, the sun's bright light had softened to glow with a
subtle presence on a proud, silent range of peaks.

Discussing the flight with Capt. Leslie, I heard that we were
meeting headwinds of 35-40 kt from the top of a low-pressure
area. These regions were more normally encountered further
south. Our revised E.T.A. at the Greenland base was now
5.15 a.m. local time.

The sun's reflection could now be seen, metallic and cold, on
the pack and drift ice which fringed the coast of Baffin Island.
Consulted by the young Canadian couple as a relatively experienced
Arctic Circle flier (one previous trip to the Lofoten Islands
in a Coastal Command Neptune from Kinloss), I was able to
confirm that the iceberg-like objects jutting up from the coastal
ice were indeed icebergs. The wide background expanse of
coastal ice was traced with a fantastic pattern of random lines and
areas, presumably as a result of changing pressures and movements.
The general effect was something like a gigantic photomicrograph
of an etched metallic specimen—or like the patchwork pattern of English fields, entirely white fields withspidery outlines. As we headed out over the Davis Strait towardsGreenland, the view below became obscured by cotton-wool
ripples of cloud.

Accepting Captain Leslie's invitation to come up front, I found
him busily signing 55 Arctic Circle Club cards (denoting a successful
crossing of the Circle by each passenger) as I entered the
cockpit. Ted Randall was getting some rest, and Capt. Roxborough
was in the co-pilot's seat.

From the jump seat in the cockpit I watched the approach to
Greenland and Sondrestrom. Our indicated speed and altitude
were 200 kt and 11,000ft, the latter decreasing as directed by
Sondrestrom Control in stages. Our landfall was made at
Holsteinborg, where we turned on to a course on which we would
join the fiord of Sondrestrom.

Having intercepted one leg of the base's beacon, we turned
again, this time to fly in along the fiord itself—and into the
sun. This part of Greenland, at this time of year, was not snowcovered,
and presented a rocky brown face to the world. Ahead
of us, as we let down along the fiord, could be seen the airstrip
—some thirty miles distant. Although conditions were ideal, we
had requested a practice G.C.A. approach.

Soon we were literally in the slot, with our wing-tips below
the level of the cliff-face on either side, and the straight-in
approach was completed with a smooth touchdown at three
minutes past five in the morning, local time. The strangely
garbed natives who, exchanging weird and unfamiliar cries,
shuffled out to greet us, proved to be the U.S.A.F.
While the aircraft was being refuelled, passengers adjourned
to the waiting room to quench thirsts, to buy souvenirs, and to
post cards (featuring polar bears and Eskimos) to most ends of
the world. Quite a number of infants and small children were
travelling; they seemed to be among the more assured of the
passengers. Also bearing up very well under the circumstances
was a nervous young Englishman who was saying to Stewardess
Jordan, "Yes, I'm the one who's going home to get married—
can't you tell by the worried expression?"
Not waiting to ascertain Miss Jordan's reply, I left the lounge
and sampled the fresh air of Sondrestrom. This felt good. The
air temperature was a comfortable 64 deg F, and the time was
five-thirty in the morning—a unique and distinguished hour for
any journalist to be out and conscious. True, back in Vancouver
people were just turning in after a big time, or perhaps just
going on to Ted's place; while in London the morning rushhour
traffic jam at Vauxhall would be almost over: but these
were philosophical thought-toys for others to play with. Such
confusions were not for me. *

The various U.S.A.F. aircraft on the base, also, were not for
me—or so I was informed by the security-minded gentleman
with a gun in his belt. I concurred, noting only that the machines
comprised a gaggle of flat-footed wheel/ski Dakotas and a B-29.
Soon the other passengers were coaxed and coached back to our
Empress, where I rejoined them; we bade the natives farewell;
and taxied out to the runway. One hour at Sondrestrom, Canadian
Pacific Air Lines had said, and one hour they meant: we
took off at tb ree minutes past six. Out over the deep-green water
of the fiord, and then eastward
across the snow-covered inland region and the white-streaked
brown-and-grey coastal border. One of my last impressions of
Greenland was of the piercing blue of a number of lakes which
interrupted the vast white expanse—looking exactly like royalblue
ink blots soaking into a sheet of white blotting-paper. We
climbed to 17,000ft on course for Amsterdam, which we expected
to reach in 7 hr 15 min. This leg was of 2,200 miles.

From the gap in my notebook between leaving Greenland
and eating breakfast I deduce that, while Iceland and the North
Atlantic passed below, I slept. I woke to be greeted with the
news that, while my watch indicated 11.15 (Sondrestrom time),
local time was 3.15 in the afternoon. This was clearly as good
a time as any to have breakfast, for in two hours it would be
tea-time and we would be landing at Amsterdam. Any confusion
this may cause the reader is, I vouch, extremely small beer compared
with my own blank bewilderment at the time.

Fifteen minutes later the coast of Scotland came up, and we
passed over Prestwick and a range of grey, brown and purple
highlands. This countryside soon gave way to a pleasant green
patchwork of fields; looking down on it, we shared the blue
sky only with some tufts of fair-weather cumulus. We finished
breakfast, and it was ten to four. A brace of Hunters swam up to
taste the bright afternoon above the scattered clouds, and
thoroughly enjoyed themselves in a lively tail-chase to our right.
Our northern-route flight was drawing to a close. Confidently
we could now look in the eye the silent paper bags which had
faced us all the way from Canada's west coast. "After use, fold
toward you" they said. We were now reasonably sure the use
would not arise.

At 4.55 the stewardess came round with coats and hats and,
after a let-down through a dull and grey overcast over the flat
Dutch countryside, we landed at Schiphol at 5.15. Flying time
from Vancouver had totalled 18£ ht while the total elapsed time
was only one hour more. For those of us who were going on
to London, there remained a two-hour wait for the connecting
K.L.M. Convair service, and an hour-and-ten-minute flight.
Walking from the airport lounge at Schiphol, I almost collided
with a huge mass of Dutch roses, which turned out to be the
wedding-bound Englishman with a modest posy for his
betrothed. He still had on his worried look, and anxiously
sought my reassurance—readily given—concerning the probable
reaction of the loved one to his flowers.

We came in across die Great West Road and touched down
at London Airport at 8.20 p.m. From Vancouver the whole trip
had taken us 22 hr 15 min. From Auckland, passengers had
taken four days.

Airport formalities soon completed, the passengers boarded
the airline coach, or were met by friends with cars. The young
man about to marry, the tall and languid couple, the aviation
writer needing a shave. New Zealanders, Canadians, and Englishmen.
Already some had clearly slammed their minds shut
behind them on their Arctic Circle flight, and were hurrying
back into dieir familiar routine environment. Odiers, I knew,
had not closed the door on their thoughts, and were lagging
behind a little. Perhaps as far as Sondrestrom, where we had
seen a polar bear—if only the one painted on the control tower.
Perhaps even to Vancouver, where it was now five a.m. the
following day—but let us not start that son of time-wasting
nonsense again.

For us, as well as for die Canadian Pacific crews, die phrase
would now be "nordiern routine," and not northern route. We
had completed a flight which was at once uneventful and yet of
absorbing interest; relatively short in time and yet somehow
spanning a long sector of new and varied experience. In our
wallets were the crisp, shiny cards which proclaimed our membership
of die Arctic Circle Club (whatever that might imply);
while in my mind was the thought diat, even if 24 hours in
Vancouver was too short a time, one could easity return there
from London in an even briefer period.

DOUGLAS DC-8 /30/50/61/62/62F CHECKLISTS

2010-09-12T10:36:00.001-07:00

A FEW CHECKLISTS FOR THE DC-8 I HAD LAYING AROUND
TAG ALL CHECKLISTS TO ENLARGE

Eastern Airlines 1952 Ground Signal Guide

2010-08-27T20:19:00.000-07:00

THE GROUND SIGNALMAN AND HIS SIGNALS 1950'S STYLE
CHECKOUT THAT HAT ..LOOKS LIKE A GAS STATION ATTENDANT!
TAG ALL PHOTOS TO ENLARGE

CRASH OF EAL FLIGHT 512 ... DC-7B , N851D

2010-08-24T06:34:00.000-07:00

HEADLINES POTTSVILLE REPUBLICAN
TAG ALL PHOTOS TO ENLARGE

NOVEMBER 30, 1962
THE CRASH OF EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 512, DC-7B , N851D

Eastern Airlines Flight 512, bound from Charlotte, N.C. to Idelwild Airport, a DC-7B four-engine aircraft, arrived over the New York City area at approximately 9:00 P. M. on November 30, 1962.
The DC-7B was one of seven Eastern Air Lines flights daily from Charlotte to New York. It arrived here at 6:25 p. m. from New York and started on its non-stop 2-hour return flight at 7:05 p. m. when Douglas Municipal Airport was bustling with activity
The crew previously had been informed that due to adverse weather conditions the flight might have to be diverted to Philadelphia. While in its holding pattern, the aircraft was advised that "there was pretty bad fog on the airport," and that as a result "some [planes] are making it and some are not."
At approximately 9:37,Idelwild Approach Control cleared EAL 512 for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 4 Right. Such an approach required the controller to guide the aircraft by radar until the plane intercepted a localizer beam, at which point the crew assumed full navigation of the plane.
Then at 9:45 P.M. something went horribly wrong.

On December 1, 1962 the Associated Press released the following story.
THE POTTSVILLE REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPER….
25 KILLED IN FOG-SHROUDED PLANE CRASH AT IDLEWILD
26 SCRAMBLE TO SAFETY THROUGH EMERGENCY EXITS

New York…An airliner groping through a fog crashed with a loss of 25 lives -- 26 escaped -- at Idlewild Airport Friday night in the sixth major aviation disaster in a week.
It boosted the total death toll to 206.
The latest in the series of accidents at 9:45 p. m., kept the airport closed until 7:10 a. m. today, delaying more than 50 flights.
Federal investigators converged at the airport to determine the cause. Another airliner had landed safely only 90 seconds before.
The plane, an Eastern Air Lines four-engined DC7B bound here from Charlotte, N. C., slewed into a marsh and burned.
Airport tower controllers sighted the plane about a mile from its runway and everything appeared normal, said Oscar Bake, Eastern regional assistant administrator for the Federal Aviation Agency.

FOG CUT VISIBILITY

"From this point on, because of intervening ground fog, tower personnel were not able to see the aircraft," he related. "At approximate touchdown time, the tower saw an orange glow from the direction of Runway 4-R."
Investigators said the plane was coming in for an instrument landing, along with visual checks by the pilot.
They disclosed that one of two instrument approach landing systems was not working, but expressed doubt that this had anything to do with the crash.
William L. Lamb, air safety investigator for the Civil Aeronautics Board, said the precision approach radar system was out of operation because instruments were being moved from one room to another in the control tower.
A second system -- the instrument landing system -- was working.

PILOT’S CHOICE

Lamb said the pilot presumably knew that one system was out. He said that, when both were working, it was usually the pilot's choice which to use.
The city mortuary reported that 23 of the 25 victims were men and that the other two apparently were women.
Aboard were 46 passengers and five crew members. Three crew members perished and two, stewardesses, survived.
The crewmen who perished were Capt. EDWARD J. BECHTOLD, 43, the pilot, of Laurel Hollow, N. Y.; JULES WAGNER, co-pilot of Cambria Heights, N. Y.; and ROBERT L. VORKEES, 31, pilot-flight engineer, of Comoack, N. Y.
Officials declined comment on the cause of the crash pending investigation. Survivors scrambled through emergency exits, crawling and running from the flames that engulfed the forward portion of the propeller-driven Eastern Air Lines DC7B, arriving from Charlotte, N. C. Idlewild had been completely covered by fog earlier in the evening and Capt. EDWARD BECHTOLD, a veteran frequently used as an export cross-examiner in government inquiries into crashes told the passengers he might try to land at Philadelphia.
"We don't know what made him change his mind," said LEONARD CLEMENTI of Huntington, Long Island, one of the injured survivors.
Another passenger, LOU LOUFT, a movie producer from Dover, N. J., recalled the pilot announcing: "We can make it. There is a little hole. We should be down in about six minutes."
On instrument control, the big airliner started descending from the eastern side of the busy airport on Long Island, the side toward Queens, Brooklyn and Manhattan.

LIGHTS VISIBLE

"We could see the lights as we came down," said HELEN FOURNIER, 21, of Forest Hills, Queens, one of the two stewardesses on Eastern's Flight 512. Both survived.
"Then we came down with a bang," she continued. "It was kind of quick. It seemed that the pilot was increasing the power, but we didn't get anywhere. Then there was a sort of flash. There was no explosion, though."
Several passengers recalled what seemed to be a desperate effort by BECHTOLD to get the lumbering aircraft back into the air.

TAIL END HITS GROUND

"The tail end of the plane hit the ground and the plane slewed around," said M. V. LITTLE, 54, of Garden City, Long Island.
Hurtling across a reedfilled marsh, 200 yards west of the runway, the aircraft smashed to a half and burst into flames.
It split open down the back. Seats were tossed into the foggy darkness, some with bodies still strapped into place for landing.
WALTER MUELLER of Floral Park, N. Y., told of the thoughts burned into his memory: "The first thing that enters your mind is: 'I've had it.' You're not sure in your mind that you're living. You just do things."
"The flames came into the plane from the front end before we ever stopped," said LOUFT, producer of Louft Productions, Inc., a motion pictures firm.
He was returning from a commercial film assignment in Charlotte with his two partners, script-writer FRANK SMITH, 72, of Manhattan, and production manager FRANK KOLAREK, who lives near Idlewild. All survived.

REHEARSAL SAVES LIVES

Before leaving North Carolina, KOLAREK rehearsed how to open the emergency exit beside his seat.
"KOLAREK saved several of our lives because he got that window open immediately," SMITH said.
Passengers leaped and tumbled through the openings, driven by the flames and fear.
"We kept pushing passengers out," stewardess FOURNIER recalled. "First one out and then another one. We pushed them all out. When everyone was out that I could see. I jumped to the ground. I ran and ran and I stopped and I said, 'No, I can't do this. I must help them.'"
She returned to the flaming wreckage and helped drag and guide survivors away from the intense heat.
ONE MAN ON FIRE
"One man was on fire," she said. "His whole body was burning. I put him out” Passengers, too, returned from safety to try to aid their less fortunate travelers.
Ambulances, guided by men on foot, crept toward the scene. Elsewhere in the fog blanket on Idlewild, five airliners were "lost," holding their positions on the ground, awaiting police cars to guide them to some haven.
Staffs at three hospitals mobilized to handle the injured, and two doctors from Peninsula General Hospital went to the airfield.
COUNT 25 BODIES
"There were 25 bodies, including one child," said DR. OSWARD MORAN. "I counted them. It was terrible. All of them were burned."
The crash was Eastern's first since an Electra turbojet plunged into Boston harbor shortly after taking off Oct. 6, 1960, killing 62 persons.
Idlewild's last crash occurred just nine months ago, on March 1. An American Airlines transcontinental jet climbing from the runway faltered and dived into Jamaica Bay, carrying all 95 persons aboard to their deaths.

SURVIVORS STORY
“Plane Came Down All Of A Sudden”

New York AP… There are more than a score of voices left to tell the last moments-split seconds filled with flashes of fire, explosions and final disintegration.
These are graphic expressions used by some of the 26 survivors of Friday night’s crash of an Eastern Air Lines four engine plane.
Twenty-five voices are stilled forever. They were among the 51 aboard the piston propelled DC-7B who lost their lives in the fog shrouded crash.
Stewardess Helen Fournier of Forest Hills, Queens was one of the survivors.

ORANGE FLAMES THEN SMOKE

She said this of her experience. “The plane came down all of a sudden. It didn’t stop. There was an orange flame. Immediately the plane filled with smoke.”
Walter Mueller, of Floral Park , N.Y. said the craft “disintegrated into a huge ball of fire. In a split second flames were all over.”
Donald Barbour, 36 of Coxsackie, N.Y. where he is manager of Special Heating Products, had praise for the pilot’s unsuccessful attempts to raise the plane off the ground after it first touched down.
He praised the stewardesses saying, “They were really terrific in helping the passengers. I think they more than you could humanly expect them to.”
M.V. Little of Huntington Station, N.Y. was asked if their was any panic in the plane following the crash.
“Hell yes,” he replied. “Everyone was trying to get the hell out of there.”

SHOWN BELOW.... PARTS OF THE CAB INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF FLIGHT 512

Eastern 512 Crash Investigation

Eastern Air Lines Flight 512, a Douglas DC-7B, N 815D, crashed during an attempted go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at New York International Airport, at 2145 e.s.t., on November 30, 1962 Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive.

Flight 512, regularly scheduled from Charlotte, North Carolina, non-stop to New York International Airport, entered a fog condition near the threshold of runway 4R. A go-around was initiated; however, the aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose-high attitude and was virtually destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

In command of flight 512 was Captain Edward J. Bechtold, age 43, was employed by Eastern Air Lines on April 26, 1945, and had accumulated a total of 15,644 hours flight time, of which 2,700 hours were in DC-7 type aircraft. A veteran Eastern pilot and a man who was recognized as an expert on air safety. He was a member of the Air Traffic Control Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association, Chairman of the New York Air safety Committee. Captain Bechtold often criticized Idlewild's facilities, especially dealing with landing aids.

The First officer on flight 512 is Julius A. Wagner, age 45, he was employed by Eastern Air Lines on March 15, 1951, and had accumulated a total of 9,042 hours flight time. He had accumulated a total of 1,610 hours flight time in DC-7 type aircraft, of which 71 hours were as pilot-in-command.

The Pilot/Flight Engineer is Robert L. Voorhees age 31, he was employed by Eastern Air Lines on August 26, 1957, and had accumulated a total of 4,080 hours flight time. He had accumulated a total of 149 hours as pilot-engineer and 718 hours as a pilot in DC-7 aircraft.

In the cabin were Flight Attendant Helen L. Fournier was employed by Fasten Air Lines on April 16, 1962 and Flight Attendant Patricia J. Richards was employed by Eastern Air Lines on June 24, 1961.
The DC-7B was manufacturer's serial No 45084, owned and operated by Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York, was manufactured in September, 1956, and had a total flying time of 18,411:06 hours of which 281:91 hours had been accumulated since the last major inspection. The aircraft was powered by four Wright model 972TC18DA-3/4 engines with Hamilton Standard, model 34E60-363 propellers. Engine times were as follows:

________________________________________________________________________________
The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the technique employed by the crew during abandonment of the approach under fog conditions not adequately reported.

Flight 512 was attempting a go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at Idelwild. Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive.

The EAL forecast attached to the Dispatch Release of Plight 512 indicated clear skies or scattered clouds for Idlewild.

Flight 512 departed Charlotte at 1941 and proceeded in accordance with an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance

While en route to Idlewild, EAL 512 was in radio communication with the Atlanta, Washington, and New York Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). The flight was also maintaining radio contact with EAL on company radio

Note:
Being that EAL 512 had no voice recorder on board all radio transcripts are taken from the CAB report.
The following transcripts are taken from the CAB accident investigation and are the authors interpretation of what transpired up and till the crash of EAL 512.

The aviation terminal forecast, valid for the period from 1800 on November 30, to 0600 on December 1, predicted partial obscuration, 3 miles visibility in haze and smoke with occasional 2 mile visibility. FAA publications indicated that the landing aids for runway 4R at Idlewild included an Instrument landing System (ILS); sequenced flashing lights; runway centerline, edge and threshold lights; taxiway lights; approach lights and rotating beacon. The Precision Approach Radar (PAR) was declared by a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) to be out of service.

The EAL forecast attached to the Dispatch Release of Plight 512 indicated clear skies or scattered clouds for Idlewild.

19:27… The Idlewild forecast is amended by the Weather Bureau. This amended forecast was to be valid for the period from 1940 to 0600; it called for "ceiling zero obscuration, visibility zero, fog, variable to clear, visibility 1-1/2 miles ground fog."
There is no evidence that Flight 512 was advised of this forecast.

19:41… Flight 512 departs Charlotte on an IFR clearance.

20:15… TEL-autograph transceivers in the FAA control tower cab and IFR room became inoperative. This equipment is utilized to communicate written weather information between the Weather Bureau office and the control tower cab and IFR room. Also, it was discovered that the direct voice communication line (hot line) between the control tower and the Weather Bureau was inoperative.

20:23…. 512..Dispatch, If Idlewild below on arrival, you are cleared to Philadelphia.
512 roger.
512..dispatch , several other flights are diverting to Newark.

At this time the RVR digital readout in the tower for runway 4R was malfunctioning

20:45 …EAL 512 , New York you are cleared to the Sandy Hook holding pattern at fl 11.0.
20:45.. Eastern 512.

20:52… Eastern 512, New York your EAC (Expect approach Clearance) is 22:07
Eastern 512 Roger, EAC at 22:07

20:57… Eastern 512, hold at Sandy hook, right turns, and expect indefinite delay due to weather, Aircraft are landing on runway 22L.

Shortly after this transmission all traffic was changed to 4R.

21:02 … Hello Company, 512 requests Idlewild weather.
21:02 . ..512 Idlewild visibility was….now one mile. EAL Flight 330 missed approach runway 22.

21:07…NYARTCC…All aircraft this frequency inbound Idlewild, the latest weather time 0205 (2105 EST), partial obscuration; a mile and, a half with fog; landing runway four right, RVR inoperative."

21:09… Eastern 512..New York..your revised EAC now 21:40..
Eastern 512, EAC 21:40.

21:10… Company 512,, we are coming up on Sandy Hook, have an expected approach clearance time of 40 minutes after the hour, altitude 9,000 feet, and understand the visibility is now one and a half miles..

21:12…Company 512, request Idlewild landing information.

21:13…512, The Idlewild pressure altitude is 9640, Idlewild altimeter is 30.30
512, roger our field pressure is 30.31

APPROACH CHART FOR RNWY 4 AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT.

It should be noted here that five weather observations were recorded by the observer on duty at the Idlewild Weather Bureau office between 2108 and 2153. During that period, the official visibility 4/ for Idlewild was that "prevailing visibility" observed by the FAA controllers 5/ located in the tower cab. 6/ Control tower operators are required to maintain a log of their observations of visibility. There is no documentary evidence that such log was maintained on the evening of November 30 in the Idlewild tower. There was, however, a Weather Bureau record 7/ of both prevailing visibility and surface visibility 8/ at Idlewild during the evening of November 30.

21:24.. Eastern 512, NYARTCC…contact Idlewild Approach Control on 119.7
119.7 Eastern 512

21:25 ...Idlewild Approach, EAL 512 in Sandy Hook holding pattern.
Eastern 512, Idlewild Approach..four right IlS in use, landing runway 4R..Wind calm, The Idlewild weather, sky partially obscured, visibility 1-1/2 miles with fog. Altimeter setting: three zero three one. Precision Approach Radar not available. Middle marker, middle locator, Runway Four Right inoperative; Runway visual range Four Right inoperative."

At this same time, EAL Flight 620, a turbojet aircraft, landed on runway 4R at Idlewild, Shortly

21:27…Idlewild Approach, United 500, (A DC-6) making a missed approach on 4R, That stuff is no more than fifty feet thick and is really thick.
21:28… United 500 , Idlewild Approach,,Were almost on top of it here in the seventh floor, we can hardly see the ground…Good old fashioned ground fog..

At the time of this conversation another United 712 a Turbo jet landed on 4R.

21:30…This is Idlewild Approach… All aircraft copy. Runway Four Fight ILS in use. Landing Four Right Wind northeast six, altimeter three zero three one. Idlewild weather, sky partially obscured, visibility is one and one half miles with ground fog, and, just got out new visibility, its one mile now. One mile with ground fog Runway visual range four right inoperative. Middle locator Four Right inoperative, and Precision Approach Radar not available.

21:32.. Following this transmission, American Airlines Flight 996, a turbojet aircraft, landed on runway 4R

21:33. Eastern 512, Idlewild Approach, descend and maintain 6,000 feet. Radar vectors to ILS final approach. (vectors not given)

21:34.. Idlewild Approach … sky partially obscured; visibility one mile with ground fog; and wind is northeast at six, altimeter setting 30.31.
2134,…American Airlines Flight 910, a turbojet aircraft, landed on runway 4R.

21:37…TWA 46, a turbojet lands on runway 4R

21:39:11..Eastern 512, Idlewild, you are nine miles southwest of the ILS outer marker, contact tower on 119.1

21:39:59.. Idlewild Approach Approach Control gave a new weather broadcast of 3/4 mile visibility in ground fog on frequency 119.7
.
2139,…UAL Flight 950,at DC-7 aircraft, landed on runway 4R. This landing was described by Captain L. W. Witlow as: "Just after my First Officer . . . reported to IDL approach control the IDL 4R LOM (outer marker) inbound he remarked 'I can see the glow of the approach lights', shortly thereafter he remarked 'I can see the approach lights but not the runway'. I then looked out and observed the full line of approach lights and the runway lights on the approach end. From that point on, I made a visual approach referring to my ILS instrument so as to stay on the glide slope, which I did until I was definitely over the runway.'

21:41… Eastern 512 is approaching the OM, while United Flight 164 was landing on 4R. The captain of UAL 164 described his landing as follows: "Either at or shortly after passing the outer marker the glow of the approach lights was visible through the fog . . . The flight was, until this point, made in clear air with clear skies above Lights were clearly visible either on or very near the airport. Prior to reaching the middle marker, the threshold lights were observed . . . Landing was effected at 2141 EST in visibility that I would judge to be somewhat less than 3/4 mile. An accurate appraisal of visibility during the last 20 feet before touchdown was virtually impossible due to the brilliance of the runway lighting." At approximately this time, a Sabena turbojet aircraft, located on the ground at Idlewild one mile northwest of the threshold of runway 4R, was cleared for takeoff on runway 7R. The Sabena crew informed the control tower on VHF radio frequency 119.1 that visibility was ". . . a bit too poor . . ." and, requested a delay.

21:42.. Idlewild Tower Eastern 512 just passed the Outer Marker.
Eastern 512 Idlewild Tower ...the condenser discharge sequenced flashing lights in the approach light system are being turned on let us know if you want them off.

21:43… Eastern 512.. Idlewild Tower, you are cleared to land.
EAL 512.. Ok, please dim the flasher.
Tower.. Roger, I have to shut them off.

This was the last communication with Eastern 512.

21:44 EAL Flight 406, a Electra turboprop aircraft, was immediately preceding Flight 512 in the landing traffic for runway 4R. EAL 406 landed on 4R. The captain of EAL 406 indicated that approaching the airport the sky was clear and the approach lights could be seen prior to the outer marker. After passing the outer marker he lost the lights temporarily, but they became visible again before the middle marker. From this point, the run-way and threshold lights were also visible; however, fog described as variable, was encountered. He stated that ". . . after landing, we ran into very thick fog at the northeast end of the runway causing a little delay in clearing at the end."

The crew of EAL 512 did not report the runway in sight passing the middle marker, a required report. Two tower controllers observed the red rotating beacon light on the aircraft disappear in a fog condition 1/2 mile from the end, of runway 4R

21:44… EAL 512 Idlewild Tower advise when it was clear of runway 4R. There was no response.

21:45… Idlewild Tower…American 8, passing the outer marker, Tower. . we got a bright light ahead of us, appears near the airport - you got any information?"
21:46…American 8 ..Idlewild Tower overfly the runway and report while over the runway, 21:46…Tower….American 8. . . Runway four right appears to be clear, we got a fire in sight down there . . . to the left of the runway.

The Crash

EAL 512 crashed approximately 2,500 feet beyond the ILS touchdown point 9/ on the left side of runway 4R at 2145. After the accident, at 2150, a weather observation was recorded with " . . . visibility 3/4. mile in fog . . . surface visibility 1/8 mile." The landing minimums for EAL 512 were 200 feet ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility. The "surface visibility" observations of the Weather Bureau were not communicated by the FAA tower personnel to EAL 512 on any recorded communications frequency. Tower personnel stated that the Weather Bureau observations for the period 2108 to 2150 were not received by them. The Weather Bureau observer at Idlewild did not recall specifically advising any person in the control tower of the "surface visibility." He said: "I do not remember sending out any observation. The only thing I can say is I do not remember not sending out any observations."

The first impact marks made by the aircraft were slashes from the Nos. 1 and 2 propellers. These marks were located 3,460 feet from the threshold center of runway 4R, on a bearing of 37 degrees. Computations based on reed cuts and propeller slashes indicate a flight path impact angle of 2 degrees-with a 6-degree bark to the left and an airspeed of 135 knots. A splash mark from the tail-skid, commencing 50 feet before the main impact, indicated an aircraft attitude of 3 to 5 degrees nose high.

Breakup of the wings and fuselage occurred on a mound of earth approximately 3 feet high, located 3,600 feet from the threshold center of runway 4R, on a bearing of 37 degrees. The left wing failed near the wing root, between the Nos. 1 and 2 engine nacelles, and at the tip. The left wing fuel tanks ruptured, resulting in ground fire which burned a large area just beyond the mound. The right wing separated at the wing root with portions of the upper and lower fuselage skin fairing and structure still attached.

The aircraft fuselage separated at impact in the vicinity of the aft wing spar with the forward portion coming to rest 90 degrees to the wreckage path. This break occurred approximately at the cabin partition between the forward tourist and aft first-class sections. All survivors, 6 tourist, 18 first-class passengers and 2 stewardesses, exited through the main passenger door, aft emergency exit door or windows, or through breaks in the fuselage. They reported seeing fire from the wings immediately on impact, followed by fire inside the cabin a few seconds later. As a result of this fire both stewardesses, who had been seated in the aft lounge, were unable to see forward of the galley area by the main loading door.

The nose landing gear was separated from the aircraft; the actuating cylinder indicated it was fully up at impact. The main landing gear was found in the retracted position. There were no landing gear gouge marks along the wreckage swath. All three landing gears on the DC-7 retract in the forward direction, and retraction time is about 7 seconds.

The flap-actuating cylinders indicated the left flap was set at approximately 20 degrees or "takeoff" position at impact. The right flap actuating cylinders corresponded to an approximate setting of 10 degrees. Examination of the flap actuator on the flight deck indicated a 20-degree flap position had been selected at impact. The right flap bus cable turn-buckle was found broken; however, a laboratory examination revealed that this break could only occur to this type of brass when under a tension load, at a very high temperature. Wing flap control valve cable continuity could not be traced to the cockpit controls because of fire damage.

All four engines received considerable impact damage, with various components being torn loose or broken away. Examination of the engines revealed no evidence to indicate pre-impact failure, operational distress or malfunction. Tests of the propeller governors revealed that engine speeds for Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 had been 2,474, 2,445, 2,463, and 2,422 r.p.m., respectively. Propeller shim plate markings indicate blade angles at impact were 37, 37, 36, and 38 degrees, respectively, for the Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 propellers. At impact, the approximate horsepowers being produced by engines Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 2035, 1950, 1993, and 1890, respectively. Normal engine horsepower for a landing approach is approximately 1,000 horsepower per engine.

A few hours after the accident, at 0245 on December 1, 1962, the FAA made a flight check of the complete ILS serving runway 4R. This check disclosed that the front course of the localizer, glide slope, and markers were operable and within required tolerances at that time. A further check was conducted on December 4, 1962. The purpose of this flight was to determine whether or not Lockheed Electra L-188 on the instrument runway, or taxing near the localizer antenna, would affect the presentation of instruments in an aircraft making an approach. Three approaches were made under these conditions and no abnormalities were noted in the localizer course from over the outer marker to the runway threshold. The latter test was prompted by concern that an Electra, which had, landed approximately one minute before Flight 512, might have interfered with localizer signals.

Eastern Air Lines FAA-approved DC-7B Flight Manual describes the go-around procedure with four engines operating as follows:

"1.
Captain applies or calls for power as required usually METO. NOTE: At airspeeds expected at the start of a go-around, the use of T.O. r.p.m. and power not normally needed. If go-around from balked landing is made with full flaps and gear down and speed reduced to approximately minimum landing, T.O. power and. r.p.m. may be necessary.

2.
Wing flaps - TAKEOFF position.

3.
Landing Gear - UP.

4.
Normal CLIMB POWER after landing gear is UP.

5.
Wing flaps may be left at TAKEOFF position or retracted at captains discretion."

The chief pilot of the Douglas Aircraft Company was questioned about the DC-7 performance and acceleration characteristics in various configurations. He stated that power application as low as 2,100 to 2,200 horsepower per engine, instead of METO, at the start of a go-around in the landing configuration, would, produce a low rate of climb initially, and a slower transition to a climb. There would be no tendency for the aircraft to roll or yaw if all engines are accelerated evenly. He further stated that with a gross weight of approximately 96,000 pounds and "Using the landing configuration of gear down, flaps full and using all four engines at takeoff power, the angle of climb for a speed of 115 knots would be approximately 3 degrees. That's the noseup, and that would be using the airplane fuselage as the reference line on the horizon . . . at the same configuration, speed at 135 knots the angle would be 2 degrees. For configuration of flaps 20 degrees, and the gear up, using all four engines at takeoff power, the angle with 115 knots would be 9 degrees noseup, and 135 knots would be 8 degrees noseup." If less than takeoff power were used, in the 2100 or 2200 horsepower per engine range, ". . the angle would be slightly less."

He also stated that with a gross weight of 96,000 pounds, brake horse-power of 2,250 and 2,600 r.p.m. at sea level on a standard day the aircraft would accelerate at a rate of approximately 2 knots per second. Placing the flaps at 20 degrees, 40 degrees, and finally at 50 degrees flaps and gear down the acceleration would drop to approximately 1.52, 1, and. slightly less than 1 knot per second, respectively. He further stated that using an airspeed of approximately 115 knots, at maximum landing weight, "There would be no problem at all to pull it up and rotate it . . . into . . a balk-landing climb."

Analysis

The investigation revealed no evidence of control system, powerplant, or structural failure. The forces to which the aircraft was subjected when it struck the mound of earth near the point of initial impact, undoubtedly contributed to the extensive breakup of the structure.

The system of weather observation and reporting as it concerned the flight deserve special attention. The U. S. Weather Bureau, the Federal Aviation Agency tower controllers, and the Eastern Air Lines dispatch organization each had, duties relating to weather observation and reporting. The system placed the initial responsibility on the Weather Bureau to observe and record the weather information. Since the official Idlewild, visibility was less than four miles, the responsibility for taking visibility observations was assumed by the FAA tower controllers. There was an exception in the rules which provided that the responsibility for taking official visibility observations would revert from the tower to the Weather Bureau, when the tower was above the top of the phenomena. However, during the period with which this report is concerned, the tower was observing restricted visibilities which indicated that the top of the phenomena was, in fact, above the tower. The FAA tower controllers furnish meteorological information to aircraft in flight, particularly in the terminal area. The prime responsibility for furnishing significant weather information to EAL 512 while en route was a duty of the Eastern Air Lines dispatcher.

The information furnished to EAL 512 did indicate that the weather situation at Idlewild was deteriorating. These reports included notification of indefinite delays due to weather; alternate airport information; that company traffic missed an approach and that the visibility was one mile when the flight departed Sandy Hook holding pattern. The information contained in the remarks section of the Weather Bureau observations which indicated that the "surface visibilities" were less than the reported official visibility were not furnished to the crew of EAL 512. Further, the Approach control broadcast of the 2136 special observation, which included "visibility 3/4 mile in ground fog" was made at 2139:59, or after EAL 512 had been instructed to change to tower frequency.

Owing to the vertical and horizontal separation of the tower cab from the approach end of runway 4R, the tower visibility observation was not representative of the condition along the runway. However, since the tower RVR was considered inoperative, the governing visibility factor applicable to landing minimums of 1/2 mile visibility was that observed by the tower controller. It was on this basis that the airport remained "above minimums" while EAL 512 attempted an approach.

There were two indications of poor visibility which the crew of EAL 512 should have heard during their approach. The crew of an aircraft clearing the runway reported experiencing visibility of 50-60 feet. In addition, the jet flight awaiting departure from runway 7R requested a takeoff delay for weather improvement. These transmissions all took place on tower frequency, which EAL 512 had been instructed to monitor shortly prior thereto. However, if the crew of EAL 512 was aware of these reports, the knowledge that company traffic bad landed immediately ahead of them, at 2144, could have offset any apprehension they may have had regarding the successful completion of their approach.

Since the captain of EAL 406, which landed immediately ahead of EAL 512, stated that he saw the approach, runway, and threshold lights from the middle marker, and since the pilot of EAL 512 requested that the "flashers" be dimmed, it is presumed that he was encountering similar weather conditions. During the approach, EAL 512 should have been at 197 feet above the field elevation over the middle marker. A decision must have been made at this point either to complete the approach or go around. Although the transcript of recorded communications did not reflect passage of the middle marker or the captain's intention at that tine, it is concluded from the testimony of surviving passengers that the captain elected to continue his approach and effect a landing. From the middle marker-to the runway threshold, altitude and airspeed were reduced in preparation for the landing. As the aircraft continued to descend, a rapid deterioration of visual reference was encountered in thick fog. This fog was similar to that observed by crews awaiting takeoff on runway 7R, and by crews that landed on runway 4R. When visual reference was lost, the pilot elected to go around.

Attached to this report is a drawing depicting the probable flight profile of EAL 512 which indicates that:
1.

The aircraft was on the glide path at the middle marker with its gear down, flaps at 30 degrees, airspeed at 130 knots, descending at 574. feet per minute and a constant power of 100 BMEP at 2,450 r.p.m., or 1,040 brake horsepower per engine.

2. As the runway threshold was approached, flap extension from 30 degrees to 40 degrees was initiated at an altitude of approximately 75 to 80 feet. The extension of flaps from 30 decrees to 40 degrees required 2 seconds, during which time the aircraft decelerated approximately 1 knot to 129 knots. A slight deviation above the glide slope occurred when the crew, seeing the threshold and some of the runway lights, began to execute a visual approach.

3. After crossing the threshold, the aircraft continued along a flightpath of 1-1/2 degrees slope downward and about 6 degrees to the left of the runway heading for 8-3/4 seconds. During this period, there was a rapid deterioration of visual reference when thick ground, fog was encountered. At the end of this period, the aircraft had decelerated to a speed of 124-1/2 knots and had descended to an altitude of approximately 25 feet above the ground. After perceiving the fog and evaluating the situation, the crew of EAL 512 elected to abandon the approach. Without increasing the r.p.m., slightly more than climb power was applied, and the landing gear was retracted coincident with retraction of the flaps to 20 degrees. The nose of the aircraft was rotated upwards to between 3 to 5 degrees above the level position. The missed approach procedure was initiated about 1,000 feet beyond the ILS touchdown point, to the left of the runway, altitude about 25 feet.

Execution of the missed approach procedure by the crew of EAL 512 necessitated a transition to instrument reference due to the loss o visual reference. This had to be accomplished at an extremely low altitude. There was little time or margin for error if the maneuver was to be successfully accomplished.

The DC-7B aircraft in the landing configuration can be transitioned from the landing attitude to a climb without loss of altitude. In order to accomplish this, takeoff power, or even climb power, with aircraft rotation to approximately a 3-degree noseup attitude is required. The retraction of flaps to 20 degrees during such a transition requires an aircraft rotation to approximately to a 9 degree noseup attitude, in order to compensate for the loss of lift as the flaps are retracted. Surviving passengers did not experience the pronounced charge in altitude which would have resulted from aircraft rotation to 9 degrees noseup during the crew's execution of the missed approach. The ground impact splash from the tail skid confirmed a 3-to 5-degree noseup attitude.

The amount of power application and, the degree of aircraft rotation used by the crew of EAL 512 should have been adequate to accomplish the pull-out, had, the flaps and gear remained extended. However, inasmuch as flap and gear retraction was effected prior to establishing a positive rate of climb, either one of two actions by the crew would have precluded the aircraft settling into the ground:

1. Additional aircraft rotation, commensurate with the power utilized.

2. Use of the remaining power available.

The Board concludes that additional aircraft rotation was not effected due to a lack of immediate instrument orientation, and that additional power was either not requested, or delayed because of other duties.

Probable Cause

The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the technique employed by the crew during abandonment of the approach under fog conditions not adequately reported.

Recommendations

Following this accident the Board sent recommendations to the Federal Aviation Agency and the United States Weather Bureau. These recommendations and the responses thereto were as follows:

1. It was recommended that the Air Traffic Control procedures require the transmission of all operationally significant weather information in terminal areas to approaching aircraft. The FAA, by letter dated January 8, 1963, stated that the necessary procedural changes were being prepared.

2. It was recommended that the RVR instrumentation in the recently commissioned IFR room of the Idlewild tower was inadequate. Also, the Board requested a study of the physical arrangements in all towers where PAR is installed. On January 11, 1963, the FAA stated that corrective action was being taken and that a new program would permit installation of five RVR indicators in a tower facility.

3. It was recommended that an alternate method be developed to determine runway visibility when the RVR is inoperative. This was to be accomplished by utilizing runway observers, certificated by the Weather Bureau. On January 14, 1963, the FAA stated that this procedure would be implemented on a trial basis in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The Weather Bureau indicated concurrence with the recommendation on January 8, 1963.

4. The Weather Bureau, was informed that the staffing plan of the Weather Bureau Airport Station at Idlewild was inadequate to maintain proper surveillance of all the weather recording devices available. On January 8, 1963, the Weather Bureau indicated, that corrective action would be taken.

5. It was recommended that the Weather Bureau amend their methods of observing and, reporting prevailing weather when "partial obscurations" are present. The Weather Bureau indicated concurrence with this recommendation on January 8, 1963.

6. The FAA was informed that there was a period of time on the evening of this accident when no record of tower visibility observations was retained. It was recommended that the responsible activities should be recording and reporting the same values of visibilities at all times and that there should be a written record of all tower visibility observations, on February 4, 1963, the FAA stated that operations procedures were being developed to accomplish this end.

7. It was recommended that the "Remarks" portion of weather reports be broadcast to aircraft. The FAA informed the Board that a priority project had been initiated to standardize the transmission of weather information from ATC facilities to airmen in flight.

BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD:

/s/ ALAN S. BOYD
Chairman

LANCASTER BOMBER VR-A

2010-06-26T19:31:00.000-07:00

CAPTURED THESE PHOTOS OF THE CANADIAN LANCASTER AT THE WORLD WAR 2 WEEKEND AT THE READING AIRPORT, PENNSYLVANIA.
WHAT A GREAT OLD BIRD WAS THRILLED TO GET TO CRAWL AROUND HER.

Specifications (Lancaster Mk I):
Engines: Four 1,460 hp Rolls-Royce Merlin XX inline piston engines.
Weight: Empty 36,900 lbs, Maximum Takeoff 68,000 lbs.
Wingspan: 102 ft 0 in.
Length 69 ft 6 in.
Height: 20 ft 0 in.
Performance:
Maximum Speed at 12,000 ft: 287 mph
Service Ceiling: 24,500 ft
Range with 14,000 pound load: 1,660 miles
Armament:
Two 0.303-inch (7.7mm) guns in nose, ventral and dorsal turrets.
Four 0.303-inch (7.7mm) guns in tail turret.
Fourteen 1,000 pound bombs.
Crew: 7

BOMB AIMER POSITION

PILOT POSITION..NOTICE TWO YOKES

ENGINEERS PANEL RIGHT SIDE

TAIL GUNNER